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Editor’s Introduction
This is the third issue of Volume 1 of Genocide Studies and Prevention. It is the
first non-topical or general issue and, therefore, contains articles covering a wide
variety of topics. The lead article by Professor David Scheffer, formerly US ambassador
at large for war crimes issues (1997–2001) and currently the Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and director of the Center for International
Human Rights at Northwestern University, is an exciting and interesting call for
a new genre of human-rights law. Arguing that the term ‘‘genocide’’ has imposed
limitations on action to protect human rights, Scheffer calls for a new category of
international law, ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ The purpose here, as he argues, is to ‘‘simplify
and yet render more accurate both public dialogue and legal terminology describing
genocide and other atrocity crimes.’’
Scheffer’s proposal is so interesting and innovative that we, the co-editors of
GSP, have invited ten of the foremost scholars and international lawyers in the field
to comment on his proposal. We will publish their reactions as a symposium in the first
issue of volume 2 (February 2007), along with Scheffer’s response to the commentaries.
The second article in this issue, ‘‘Labeling ‘‘Genocide’’ in Sudan: A Constructionist
Analysis of Darfur,’’ by William F.S. Miles, professor of political science at
Northeastern University, adopts a theoretical framework of constructionist analysis
to demonstrate that the ‘‘severity of political problems,’’ including genocide, ‘‘is a
function of the socio-linguistic processing and naming of them.’’ Miles marshals
empirical data to trace the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ ‘‘in the print media with respect
to Darfur’’ and finds that ‘‘avoidance of the signifying label ‘genocide’ in the media
leads to a downgrading of attention to, and salience for, Darfur among the public at
large, their elected representatives, and policy makers.’’
The third article, by Edward Paulino, assistant professor in the Department
of History at CUNY/John Jay College of Criminal Justice, examines a potentially
genocidal situation that has not attracted the attention of genocide scholars. In
‘‘Anti-Haitianism, Historical Memory, and the Potential for Genocidal Violence in the
Dominican Republic,’’ Paulino points out that in 2005, after the murder of a Dominican
woman near the Dominican–Haitian border, Haitian communities were deported
and their homes were attacked by revenge-seeking Dominicans. He notes that
this was part of a historical pattern of anti-Haitianism that goes back to the nineteenth
century. In conclusion, Paulino warns that there exists a potential for an
‘‘escalation of mass violence against the largest ethnic and racial minority in the
Dominican Republic.’’
The fourth article is a departure from the social-science and historical forms
of analysis usually manifested in the study of genocide. In ‘‘The Restless World of
Leonardo Alishan (March 1951–January 2005): A Burnt Offering on the Altar of the
Armenian Genocide,’’ Rubina Peroomian, a research associate at UCLA, demonstrates
the importance of literary analysis as a tool to help understand genocide through
a study and description of the work of the poet Leonardo Alishan. Peroomian’s moving
portrayal is an important departure from the typical genre of genocide literature, since
she expands the discussion from the usual fields of history, political science, sociology,
and so on to the area of literature and, in this case, poetry. Poets often convey what
social scientists are at a loss to express. Listen as Peroomian describes Alishan:
His longing for beauty, his quest for perpetual harmony and order, remained in stark
contrast with the chaotic world that engulfed him, the world of genocide, where order
and harmony had no meaning. As an artist in pursuit of beauty in art, Alishan faced
that impossibility and declared his failure to overcome the challenge. He was not able to
resolve, and no one has resolved, the dichotomy between fragmentation forced upon his art
as the characteristic of genocide literature and coherence as a condition of beauty in art.
Peroomian’s moving account of Alishan’s life and poetry offers us a view into the heart
of the artist as he attempts to deal with the atrocity of genocide. Alishan becomes, in the
end, according to Peroomian, ‘‘a burnt offering on the altar of the memory of genocide.’’
In the fifth article, ‘‘Deportation and Massacres in the Cipher Telegrams of the
Interior Ministry in the Prime Ministerial Archive (Bas bakanl|k Ars ivi),’’ Taner
Akc¸am, visiting associate professor of history at the University of Minnesota, once
again uses new source material to refute denial of the Armenian Genocide. Using
official Ottoman sources, Akc¸am confirms that the CUP intended to kill, not relocate,
the Armenians, reconfirming the duplicity of the CUP and using these official sources
to construct his thesis.
The final contribution, ‘‘ ‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of
the Assyrians and Chaldeans during World War I,’’ by Hannibal Travis, assistant
professor of law at the Florida International University College of Law, examines a
largely unknown genocide that took place at the same time as the Armenian Genocide.
The Ottoman Empire’s persecution of Assyrian and Chaldean civilians during World
War I was, according to Travis, ‘‘a form of genocide.’’ He argues that ‘‘Ottoman soldiers
and their Kurdish and Persian militia partners subjected hundreds of thousands of
Assyrians and Chaldeans to a deliberate and systematic campaign of massacre,
torture, abduction, deportation, impoverishment, and cultural and ethnic destruction.’’
By bringing this forgotten episode to public consciousness, Travis contributes another
important case study to the growing literature on the sad cruelty of the last century.
We hope that you, the reader, will find this third, general issue interesting and
exciting.
Herb Hirsch
Co-Editor
Notice of Errata
Taner Akc¸am, ‘‘The Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union
and Progress (_Ittihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915,’’ Genocide Studies and
Prevention 1:2 (Fall 2006): 127–48, contained the following errors: (a) p. 137, para. 2, l. 7,
‘‘pre-ordained’’ should read ‘‘premeditated’’; (b) p. 137, para. 2, l. 3, ‘‘Tekdid-i Seyyiat Komisyonu’’
should read ‘‘Tetkik-i Seyyiat Komisyonu,’’ and should be translated ‘‘Committee for the
Investigation of Misdeeds’’ (as also on p. 141, para. 4, l. 2, and p. 142, para. 1, l. 2); (c) p. 138,
para. 3, l. 6, ‘‘Dr. Holleg Mordtmann’’ should read ‘‘Dr. Johannes Heinrich Mordtmann’’; (d) p. 140,
para. 3, l. 6, ‘‘newly formed Assembly’’ should read ‘‘newly formed Senate’’; (e) p. 141, para. 2, l. 12,
‘‘secondary criminals on the side’’ should read ‘‘accessories to the crime’’; (f) p. 142, para. 4, l. 3,
‘‘Tes -| Mahsusa’’ should read ‘‘Tes kilat-| Mahsusa; (g) p. 143, para. 2, l. 3, ‘‘Second Precinct’’
should read ‘‘Second Department’’; (h) p. 147, n. 69, l. 2, ‘‘Foreign Minister Javo’’ should read
‘‘Foreign Minister von Jagow.’’ GSP and the author regret these errors.
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Genocide and Atrocity Crimes
David Scheffer
Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University
School of Law
The term ‘‘genocide’’ has been commonly used, particularly in political dialogue,
to describe atrocities of great diversity, magnitude, and character. Yet the prospect
of the term’s arising in policy making too often imposes an intimidating brake
on effective responses. The political use of the term should be separated from its
legal definition as a crime of individual responsibility. Governments and
international organizations should be liberated to apply the term ‘‘genocide’’
more readily within a political context so as to publicly describe precursors
of genocide and react rapidly either to prevent or to stop mass killings or other
seeming acts of genocide. They should not be constrained from acting by
the necessity of a prior legal finding that the crime of genocide in fact has occurred
or is occurring and, once that legal finding has been made, that governments
are somehow obligated to use military force in response. There also is a critical need
for a new term—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—and a new field of international law—atrocity
law—to achieve a similar objective, namely, to enable public and academic
discourse to describe genocide, crimes against humanity (including ethnic
cleansing), and war crimes with a single term that is easily understood
by the public and accurately reflects the magnitude and character of the crimes
adjudicated before international and hybrid criminal tribunals and of
the law being applied by such tribunals, governments, and international
organizations. The purpose would be to simplify and yet render more
accurate both public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and
other atrocity crimes.
In this article I advance two proposals. First, there is a critical need to liberate
governments and international organizations from the genocide factor, by which
I mean to enable them to readily identify precursors of genocide without being
constrained by the legal requirements that must be met to properly identify the crime
of genocide. Second, I believe it is essential that we transform the terminology used in
scholarship, public documents, and public dialogue regarding the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity (including ethnic cleansing), and war crimes into a more
adaptable and accurate vehicle for the collective description of these crimes, and that
the relevant term should be ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ while the associated discipline should be
described as ‘‘atrocity law.’’
Liberating Governments and International Organizations
from the Genocide Factor
This topic presents a very difficult challenge. On the one hand, I will argue that
governments and international organizations, particularly the United Nations, need
to be liberated to apply the term ‘‘genocide’’ more readily in describing and reacting to
mass killings that appear to have genocidal intent—whether occurring over a short or
a long period—rather than being constrained by the necessity of a legal finding that,
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in fact, the crime of genocide has occurred or is occurring. In other words, I want to
draw a distinction between the political application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ and the
legal application of that term. Beyond that, the historical application of the term has
far-reaching but different ramifications from its political and legal applications.
On the other hand, I will argue in my second proposal that we need to go even
further and describe as ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ a grouping of crimes that includes genocide
but is not confined to that particular crime. In short, we need to simplify and, indeed,
render more accurate both public dialogue and legal terminology about such crimes. At
present, there is far too much confusion and garbled terminology about what is in fact
occurring in an atrocity zone.
These two arguments might appear, at first glance, to be at cross purposes. How
can we liberate the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ while at the same time sharpening its
precise application within the realm of international politics and law? To answer that
question, one might begin by focusing on the political application of the term that
merits a liberating influence.
Raphael Lemkin recognized the need for a new term to describe the type of human
destruction that no other legal term had adequately covered up through World War II,
and his introduction of the term ‘‘genocide’’ filled a gap in terminology that has had a
profound impact on law, culture, history, and politics since the late 1940s.1 But the
term ‘‘genocide’’ has proved insufficient and even, at times, counterproductive. The
range of criminal conduct that involves assaults on civilian populations and the misuse
of military power in armed conflict extends far beyond the relatively narrow confines
of the crime of genocide. Yet the term has been commonly used, particularly in political
dialogue, to describe atrocities of great diversity, magnitude, and character. Political
officials and observers have reached a stage where every mass killing, whether
immediate or drawn out over long periods, soon evokes the language of genocide
and its all too often intimidating brake on effective responses. As an almost perverse
methodology, governments and institutions seem incapable of responding effectively
to atrocities because these have not yet been determined to be genocide. If and when
such events are painstakingly defined as genocide, the same governments and
organizations are paralyzed, prevented from acting by the presumption that any action
will trigger that nation’s or organization’s legal responsibility to commit enough
personnel and resources, and stay the course long enough, to defeat the forces of
genocide. Effective action in the face of genocide, in contrast to cautious inaction,
can also challenge precepts of international law prohibiting the use of military
force or other punitive measures without, for example, explicit Security Council
enforcement authorization under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
I witnessed this phenomenon in the US government and at the United Nations
many times during my public service in the Clinton administration. During the early
years of the administration, officials seemed incapable of definitive action unless and
until genocide was determined to have occurred, and even then action was problematic
because either too much time had elapsed, and the killing had subsided, or the
larger responsibility any timely and effective response might trigger was too much
to shoulder politically. Probable genocide in Burundi in the fall of 1993 evoked no
response at all. Genocide in Rwanda in 1994 generated a pathetic and disastrously
delayed response. Genocide in southern Sudan throughout the 1990s led only to
diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. Genocide in the Balkans during the early 1990s
generated many diplomatic, humanitarian, judicial, and peacekeeping responses, but
very little that proved effective until a single genocidal event, the Srebrenica massacre
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in July 1995, finally triggered decisive military actions leading to the Dayton Accords
later that year. Probable genocide in the southern marshes of Iraq during the 1990s
colored a tough US policy toward Iraq during those years but resulted only in
sustaining the no-fly zone over the south and the UN sanctions regime, rather than
spurring intervention to reverse the genocidal policies of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Possible genocide in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s prompted
only diplomatic and ultimately UN peacekeeping initiatives, but the killing there
continues to this day, and no one is volunteering to trump the peacekeeping effort with
a humanitarian intervention. Even in Kosovo in 1999, when genocide appeared to be a
strong possibility, NATO’s response was confined to air power rather than invoking
the combined might of air and ground power, which might have averted further killing
by Serb military and paramilitary forces.
Since February 2003 the United States and the international community have
faced a similar challenge with respect to the situation in Darfur, Sudan. Once again,
action initially hinged on a finding of genocide, which the US government arrived at by
September 2004, albeit some eighteen months after the killing and ethnic cleansing
began in Darfur.2 (This was about how long it took for the Clinton administration, once
in office, to arrive at a similar conclusion regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina.) Yet
the term ‘‘genocide’’ has proved quite daunting, perhaps even more so once it was so
determined. One wonders whether the Bush administration remains fearful that, if it
were to act effectively on the evidence of genocide, it would trigger an unacceptable
responsibility to go the full distance to stop genocide in Darfur. Why confront genocide
head-on in Darfur if the result would create intolerable pressure on the United States
to shoulder the full, or nearly full, responsibility of genocide prevention in that
region—perhaps more so during the next crisis—as well as the risk of contravening the
UN Charter and customary international law on the use of force?
Governments, as opposed to prosecutors and courts, need to understand and apply
the term ‘‘genocide’’ largely in a preventive rather than a criminal context. It has
become folly of the most profound character to insist that a government, or the UN
Security Council, must first take the time and effort to determine, under international
criminal law, that the crime of genocide has been committed before taking military
action or, if it can work quickly enough, diplomatic or economic measures to stop what
might be, but may turn out not to be, genocide.
The article I obligation under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) that contracting parties ‘‘undertake to prevent and to
punish’’ the crime of genocide3 cannot possibly be met unless governments, and the
international or regional organizations through which they sometimes prefer to act,
respond on the basis of political, not legal, judgments about what is actually occurring
in the field. Those political judgments may be flawed, based on initial intelligence and
open-source reporting from the field that may prove erroneous over time; they may be
driven more by the urgency of a violent situation than by rigorous legal scrutiny of the
intentions and actions of individuals throughout the chain of command. A government
may be disproved in its initial assessment that another government, a separatist
movement, or a militia group has committed genocide. Perhaps the violence turns
out to be crimes against humanity. But unless there is some fairly flexible policy
that governments can employ, without attracting charges of character assassination,
to allege what appears to be an emerging genocide and then respond vigorously to
stop it, the academic discourse and political rhetoric about preventing and stopping
genocide will continue to be detached from reality.
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Governments should be liberated to describe quickly and publicly the precursors
of genocide that may ultimately establish the crime of genocide but, at a minimum,
should alert the world to the need to react in a timely manner to prevent further
destruction of innocent human life, whether in times of armed conflict or in times
of internal repression. This, of course, is only one facet of genocide prevention, namely,
the terminology employed, and what is proposed in this article supplements the
many existing proposals on genocide prevention and how to achieve it operationally.
Governments, international and regional organizations, and the media should regard
the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ as significant on a political, not legal, level. The term
is useful, pragmatic, and sufficiently diplomatic to be employed without necessarily
triggering some of the intimidating consequences of charges of genocide. It reflects
a judgment that precursors of events that may constitute the crime of genocide are
apparent. The recognition of precursors of genocide may put just enough pressure
about possible genocide in the public domain to encourage governments and relevant
international and regional organizations to respond faster and more effectively,
without the almost paralyzing pressure that builds with the bald use of the term
‘‘genocide.’’
In April 1999, I had the opportunity to articulate a similar term, ‘‘indicators
of genocide,’’ during the opening days of the Kosovo conflict of that period, when
Serb military and paramilitary forces were crossing into Kosovo and unleashing
violent ethnic cleansing and murderous assaults on the Kosovar Albanian population.
There is some value in examining precisely what the Clinton administration did at
that time that led to the use of the term ‘‘indicators of genocide.’’ I have reached
the conclusion since then that an alternative term, ‘‘precursors of genocide,’’ would be a
more appropriate one to use in the future. The term ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ has
evolved to denote the many political, sociological, economic, military, and diplomatic
events that occur long before actual genocide takes place and which point to trends
that may erupt into genocide at some point in the future. This is a vital exercise, and
one that I engaged in intensively as chair of the US government’s Atrocities Prevention
Inter-Agency Working Group in 1999 and 2000, working closely with academic experts
and the intelligence community on various schematic diagrams of such indicators
of genocide. But the exercise has been refined since then to give the term ‘‘indicators’’
a far more rigorous lock on a host of factors, some with long lead time, leading to
genocide.
The term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ refers to those events occurring immediately
prior to and during possible genocide that can point to an ultimate legal judgment of
genocide but which should be recognized and used in a timely manner to galvanize
international action to intervene, be it diplomatically, economically, or militarily. My
primary concern is to employ a term that stimulates, rather than retards, effective
action by governments and international organizations, particularly the United
Nations, to stem the tide of genocide (whether or not, as a matter of law, what unfolds
in the field is ultimately concluded to be genocide). But in 1999, as a government
official struggling with dynamic events unfolding, I turned to the more familiar term
‘‘indicators,’’ without making a rigorous distinction between long-term and short-term
phenomena related to genocide, and used it in largely the same context as one now
would use the term ‘‘precursors.’’
On 28 March 1999, I convened an inter-agency meeting of intelligence, political,
and military analysts and lawyers at the State Department for several hours of
discussion about how the events unfolding in Kosovo should be described publicly.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:3 December 2006
232
In our review at the meeting, participants fairly rapidly concluded that Serb military
and paramilitary forces were committing crimes against humanity, given the
widespread and systematic character of the actions on the ground and the particular
violence being unleashed. We turned our attention to whether genocide was being
committed against the Kosovar Albanian population of Kosovo. As I later explained
in a press briefing on 9 April 1999, many of what I called ‘‘indicators of genocide’’ had
become apparent, and we believed it important, as a government, to state that
conclusion publicly. I described the indicators of genocide as including the then
historical context of the scorched-earth policy of death and destruction that had
already been recorded from the spring, summer, and fall of 1998 in Kosovo. I said,
The pattern was established in 1998. Indeed, one might consider what happened
in 1998, as a practice run for what was unleashed with remarkable speed and
thoroughness in the last few weeks [of March and April 1999]. Milosevic and the Serb
leadership are trying to bring to closure what they began in 1998. Now, the events of
the last few weeks exceed in magnitude and ferocity all that occurred in 1998. Without
question Serb assaults on the civilian population of Kosovo are widespread and
systematic.4
I reminded the press of the definition of crimes against humanity given in the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and of our
conclusion that many such crimes were being committed in Kosovo. I also pointed to
war crimes, including the destruction of civilian property.
I then extended the analysis into events that, when viewed within the context of
ongoing crimes against humanity and war crimes, pointed to the crime of genocide as
well. These indicators of genocide, occurring within a very short period (namely, the
previous three weeks), included5
1. The forced expulsion of large segments of the ethnic Albanian population, on
a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. I showed a map clearly
demonstrating that internal displacement and destruction of towns had
taken place almost entirely within the ethnic Albanian regions of Kosovo.
The map demonstrated the systematic way in which Kosovar Albanian
areas of Kosovo were assaulted ‘‘without much appreciable damage or
internally displaced populations from those areas that are largely populated
by Serbs.’’ As part of the destructive pattern, I noted the ‘‘forced removal of
Albanians from their homes at gun point; destruction of all official and
identifying documents; cramming of Albanians into trains; infliction of
unsanitary conditions on the trains, etc.’’ At the time we saw this kind of
conduct as reflecting, at a minimum, an article II(c) violation of the UNCG,
namely ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’’
2. The detention and summary execution of military-aged men and mass
executions. Refugees had provided accounts of summary executions in at least
fifty towns and villages throughout Kosovo. I reported that ‘‘some accounts
refer to large numbers of Kosovars being killed in apparent massacres.’’ The
reported killings included targeting of intellectuals and leaders; separating
fighting-aged men from the group and killing them; causing serious bodily
harm; and mass executions. These events reflected the possibility of violations
of article II(a) (‘‘killing members of the group’’) and article II(d) (‘‘imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group’’) of the UNCG.
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3. The ‘‘burning and destruction of civilian homes and villages.’’ I presented
a map of Kosovo showing 220 sites of village destruction and said that,
as of 9 April, the number had increased to 250 sites and continued to rise.
(By mid-May 1999, the number had risen to well over 600.) I described the
character of destruction in the villages, the lack of any battle damage, and the
ethnic objective that appeared evident in the pattern of destruction. This
destruction pointed to article II(c) of the UNCG (‘‘deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part’’) as well as article II(b) (‘‘causing serious bodily or mental
harm to the members of the group’’). The US government had received many
reports of injuries and killings, many of a sadistic character, occurring during
these destructive sweeps of villages and towns, and officials logically inferred
from such events that serious mental harm was being inflicted on the fleeing
Kosovar Albanians.
I concluded this analysis by saying that ‘‘if you take the totality of this information that
we have acquired so far, we believe that it creates the basis for stating that there are
indicators of genocide unfolding in Kosovo.’’ Toward the end of the press briefing, I was
asked by a reporter what difference it made that I believed that what was unfolding on
the ground in Kosovo must reflect a planned operation executed pursuant to a policy.
I responded,
Let’s just say that obviously, if you can demonstrate a well thought out plan that has an
intent behind it, then—that’s why we point to indicators of genocide. But I want to
emphasize that regardless, you can have a very well planned campaign of crimes
against humanity, and there is no question that that’s what’s unfolded in Kosovo.6
Following use of the term ‘‘indicators of genocide,’’ the pressure from the media to
describe the Kosovo events as genocide dissipated. In other words, I firmly believe that
as long as there is a credible acknowledgment that genocide may be unfolding, the
media and the public will not insist on a definitive finding of genocide quickly or as
a predicate to action by a government or organization. They do want to know that the
genocide factor is acknowledged, recognized in some fashion, and kept in the forefront
of policy making and decision making during an atrocity. Where a government, like the
US government in 1999, can at least confirm that precursors of genocide are apparent,
and that the government or organization (as the case may be) is responding to those
precursors of genocide, then the pressure to conclude that the crime of genocide has
occurred or is occurring becomes far less significant. What becomes important is the
action being taken to prevent genocide rather than the search for the crime of genocide.
In the case of Kosovo, the debate in April and May 1999 focused on whether to send
in ground troops, not on whether the crime of genocide was taking place.
It is that determination of precursors of genocide that permits a political, as
opposed to legal, judgment to surface far more rapidly among public officials. As shown
by my own remarks during the Kosovo conflict, one can state more definitively the
legal judgment of crimes against humanity and war crimes in real time, but specific
intent requirements make legal judgments about genocide far more difficult to arrive
at quickly. Governments should be liberated to use ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ in their
public statements once those indicators begin to emerge from the field and thus trigger
the UNCG’s obligation, under article I, to act to prevent genocide as quickly and
effectively as possible. What logic would that obligation convey if a government had to
wait until the crime of genocide is established to prevent it?
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One may liken this to the significance of saying that acts of genocide have occurred,
which the United States and the United Nations did regarding the Rwandan genocide
of 1994 before the term ‘‘genocide’’ was used.7 But I counsel against use of that term,
as it is a critical component of any legal determination about the crime of genocide.
The legal determination combines an act of genocide with the specific intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a designated group. In the public dialogue, however, I do not
believe that any good purpose is served by distinguishing between ‘‘acts of genocide’’
and ‘‘genocide’’; in other words, in public officials’ either trying to manipulate the
distinction to avoid the responsibility to act or being held accountable by the media for
innocent application of the two terms interchangeably, or absent sophisticated
knowledge of the distinction in law. In contrast, precursors of genocide can be
associated more readily with evidence of an inferred intent, although a finding of such
intent should not be a prerequisite to the use of the term ‘‘precursors of genocide.’’
Preventive action need not, as a matter of law, involve military action. A whole
range of tools is available, including diplomatic initiatives; economic sanctions; judicial
initiatives with international, hybrid, or national criminal tribunals; and, under
relevant circumstances, military action. Some might argue that the requirements of
the UN Charter and customary international law must be strictly complied with prior
to the use of force in response to genocide. No state would have ratified the UNCG
if it imposed an unyielding obligation for that state to use military force on foreign
territory every time genocide is claimed. There is the option, under article VIII of the
UNCG, for any contracting party to ‘‘call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III.’’ But there is no obligation to do so, and, as we know,
there is no certainty whatsoever that the ‘‘competent organ’’ of the United Nations,
which typically would be the Security Council, would indeed take any such action.
The use of the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ does not guarantee that the political
and legal obstacles to a humanitarian intervention in any particular situation will be
lowered. But greater reliance by governments and organizations on using this term
might weaken the all-too-familiar resistance to effective action from governments
seeking and relying on the long lead time required for a finding of genocide before
there is real pressure to respond to genocidal events. There must be a more serious
effort to break the back of the myth that governments and organizations are paralyzed,
prevented from acting, until a finding of genocide has been made, however important
that finding will ultimately be for any criminal prosecution and for critical historical
accounts of what actually happened. The pathway to action against genocide must
be simplified; governments must not be frozen into inaction while awaiting legal
determinations about atrocities that appear genocidal in character but which would
require intensive legal scrutiny and historical research before the crime of genocide
could be established.
In the case of Darfur, the precursors of genocide had begun to appear by early
2003.8 Even if it had taken, say, six months for a recognition that precursors of
genocide were apparent to spur governments into action, there would have been
a much better chance of reversing genocidal developments in Darfur by the end of
2003, rather than placing the people of Darfur in the untenable position in which they
find themselves today. Instead, governments, the United Nations, and the African
Union appeared dependent on the word ‘‘genocide’’ as the predicate to responsible
reaction to the events unfolding in Darfur. On the one hand, it is to the credit of the US
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government that it undertook a genocide analysis of Darfur in 2004 and, in September
of that year, determined that genocide was indeed occurring in Darfur. But, on the
other hand, that exercise retarded effective action on the ground to prevent further
genocide until the finding was released, and, not surprisingly, the finding of genocide
has raised the legal stakes so high that the response of the United States remains
limited.
If the United States had simply concluded in 2003, or even early 2004, that
precursors of genocide were present in Darfur, and then effectively acted, unilaterally
or multilaterally, to ensure that the crime of genocide would not commence or continue
thereafter, many lives would doubtless have been saved. The genocide analysis of the
summer of 2004 could still have been productively undertaken, but the preventive
action would have long preceded it, rather than trailing in the aftermath. Similarly,
the International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Darfur might have benefited from
employing the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ rather than concluding, as it did, that the
crime of genocide and the necessary individual criminal responsibility had not been
established and, thus, genocide could not be determined.9 In fact, the commission
found no policy of genocide in Sudan.10 Such a finding is puzzling because the evidence
appears to show that there are precursors of a policy of genocide that must be
recognized at the political level first, and thus trigger an effective response, before
there is enough information and evidence for a legal finding of the crime of genocide.
Unfortunately, the commission approached its task as a strictly legal one, as if its only
function was to reach determinations that would be admissible in a court of law.
It could have fulfilled an important political role by looking for information that
would point to precursors of genocide, describe it simply as such, and avoid, at least
temporarily, any firm conclusions that the crime of genocide had in fact occurred.
Instead, it left the door wide open for the Sudanese government to capitalize on the
commission’s finding that there is no policy of genocide.11
The COI’s finding that there have been war crimes and crimes against humanity
in Darfur, however, is commendable, as is the commission’s emphasis that these
crimes must be taken as seriously as genocide and justice be rendered with as much
determination as if genocide had been determined.12 That focus on war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in particular, should have had more impact on governments,
the Security Council, and the media and public. As it stands, the commission’s January
2005 finding that there is no policy of genocide in Sudan may one day be shown to have
been so debilitating to preventive and responsive actions as to have limited the flow of
resources to the African Union monitoring force, retarded efforts to introduce combat
troops on Darfurian territory, shifted primary focus to continued (although greatly
disrupted) humanitarian aid efforts, and complicated largely futile diplomacy by the
United Nations.
The primary objective in relying on a more liberal understanding of genocide,
however, is to establish state responsibility far more readily than is currently
possible under the criminal-intent requirements of individual accountability. Such an
understanding would give policy makers the freedom to point a finger at a state’s
responsibility for actions that appear genocidal in real time, without having to prove
the direct responsibility of any individual leader or military commander for the crime
of genocide—which is what appears to have so constrained the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.
Thus, one could point to acts of genocide, as defined by articles II and III of the
UNCG, and express the political point that a government appears to be committing
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such acts of genocide, which it must be prevented from continuing to commit,
regardless of who, within such a government or military or militia force, can be shown
to demonstrate the requisite specific intent required to convict an individual for
the crime of genocide. The state and the government must be seen to be responsible
for the acts of genocide, and the witnesses of these events must, at the governmental
and organizational levels, be empowered to allege that at least precursors of genocide
are apparent and that they merit strong political and, in all likelihood, military
responses. This divide—between the political reality of genocide and the criminal
character of genocide—must be more broadly accepted if there is to remain any chance
of preventing genocide from continuing once it has erupted in an atrocity zone.
The Terminological Imperative of ‘‘Atrocity Crimes’’
and ‘‘Atrocity Law’’
Having argued that governments and organizations should be permitted to apply the
more flexible term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ to certain unfolding atrocities that point to
the crime of genocide, I believe that it is imperative that there be introduced an even
more adaptable terminology to describe genocide and other atrocities meriting effective
governmental and organizational responses.
During the first pursuit scene in the movie The Fugitive, Dr. Richard Kimble
(played by Harrison Ford) yells, ‘‘I didn’t kill my wife!’’; US Deputy Marshal Samuel
Gerard (played by Tommy Lee Jones) responds, ‘‘I don’t care!’’13 I am reminded of that
exchange every time the genocide factor rears its head on the international scene.
Claims abound that there is no genocide, or that the government has not committed
genocide, or that there must be a determination as to whether or not genocide has
occurred before any further action can be taken.
The collective response to any political leader, any military or militia commander,
or any international or regional organization denying the existence of genocide or
balking at taking effective action, on the premise that a finding of genocide is first
required, should be, ‘‘We don’t care!’’ We should not care, because the crimes that make
up the subject-matter jurisdiction of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals
constituted since 1993 range far beyond the crime of genocide, and rightly so.
These tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, the permanent International Criminal Court, the special War
Crimes Chambers in Bosnia, the Iraqi High Criminal Court, and the special
war crimes courts established in Kosovo and East Timor—have jurisdiction over
atrocity crimes.
Just as the term ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ should be more easily invoked by
governments when confronted with apparent acts of genocide, so too should public
officials, military officers, the media, and academics be free to describe genocide,
crimes against humanity (including the emerging crime of ethnic cleansing), and
serious war crimes as atrocity crimes meriting timely and effective responses
in political, military, and judicial terms. Repeatedly, all manner of official documents,
public statements, and scholarly works struggle to find the right terminology for the
range of crimes associated with atrocities, and one is left with fragmentary and very
often inaccurate descriptions of the range of crimes involved. Should one refer to
‘‘genocide and crimes against humanity,’’ or perhaps ‘‘violations of international
humanitarian law,’’ or perhaps ‘‘genocide and war crimes,’’ or perhaps ‘‘genocide,
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes,’’ or perhaps just
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‘‘genocide’’? A certain sloppiness has infected public dialogue, official documents, and
even scholarly works. A unifying term is needed to easily and accurately describe the
totality of these crimes.14
I plead for a new category of crimes called ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and for a new field of
international law that describes the law covering atrocity crimes, both in the realm
of state responsibility and in the domain of individual accountability. That body of
law I would describe as ‘‘atrocity law,’’ which essentially encompasses the law of the
international and hybrid criminal tribunals. Just as the term ‘‘genocide’’ originally
captured what Raphael Lemkin recognized as the essence of a particular crime against
humanity requiring special identification in public, legal, and historical terms, so too
does the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ describe a basket of particularly heinous crimes that
are suitable for criminal prosecution before international tribunals and national courts
and for which states and certain non-state organizations and groups should be held
responsible. Atrocity crimes also are collectively executed crimes of such magnitude
and destructive character as to be particularly prominent and logically inconsistent
with the protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and
security in an increasingly interdependent and sophisticated global society.
Atrocity Crimes
The word ‘‘atrocity’’ (or ‘‘atrocities’’) derives from Roman military law. It described
illegal acts performed pursuant to military orders, acts that today might also prove
illegal unless shielded by a modern application of the ‘‘defense of superior orders.’’
Professor Mark Osiel, in his well-documented book Obeying Orders, writes that ‘‘This
word [atrocities] never became a legal term of art, however, with a settled meaning
distinct from ordinary Latin. It no longer occupies any place within the formal
language of international military law.’’15 For that reason there is a fairly clean slate
upon which to use the word ‘‘atrocity’’ as a legal term, particularly in light of what
has occurred since the early 1990s and the popular usage of the term ‘‘atrocity’’ by
governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the media.
Atrocity crimes fit the following profile of cumulative definitional characteristics,
all of which must exist for the term to be used accurately:
1. The crime must be of significant magnitude, meaning that its commission is
widespread or systematic or occurs as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes. The crime must involve a relatively large number of victims (e.g., a
fairly significant number of deaths or casualties), or impose other very severe
injury upon noncombatant populations (e.g., massive destruction of private
property), or subject a large number of combatants or prisoners of war to
violations of the laws and customs of war.
2. The crime may occur in time of war, or in time of peace, or in time of
violent societal upheaval of some organized character, and may be either
international or non-international in character.
3. The crime must be identifiable in conventional international criminal law as
the crime of genocide, a violation of the laws and customs of war, the crime of
aggression (if and when it is defined so as to give rise to clear individual
criminal culpability), the crime of international terrorism, a crime against
humanity (the precise definition of which has evolved in the development of
the criminal tribunals), or the emerging crime of ethnic cleansing.
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4. The crime must have been led, in its execution, by a ruling or otherwise
powerful elite in society (including rebel or terrorist leaders) who planned the
commission of the crime and were the leading perpetrators of the crime.
5. The law applicable to such crime, while it may impose state responsibility and
even remedies against states, is also regarded under customary international
law as holding individuals criminally liable for the commission of such crime,
thus enabling the prosecution of such individuals before a court duly
constituted for such purpose.
A crime that meets all five of these criteria would, in my view, be an atrocity crime.
In non-legal terms, these are high-impact crimes of severe gravity that are of an
orchestrated character, that shock the conscience of humankind, that result in a
significant number of victims, and that one would expect the international media and
the international community to focus on as meriting an international response holding
the lead perpetrators accountable before a competent court of law.
Here is the dilemma posed by the threshold of criminal conduct associated with
atrocity crimes. This issue has been confronted with genocide, which in a technical
sense can be found on the basis of the specific intent to kill one member of a designated
group but which, in practice and in the enforcement of the law, requires a larger
number of victims. Terms that describe the requirement well are ‘‘significant
magnitude,’’ ‘‘high threshold,’’ ‘‘extreme gravity,’’ and ‘‘significant numbers.’’ The
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court refers to ‘‘unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,’’ ‘‘such grave crimes [as] threaten the
peace, security and well-being of the world,’’ and ‘‘the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole.’’16
The resulting substantiality test provides a better understanding of atrocity
crimes and the magnitude required to so classify them. There exists an ever-growing
jurisprudence on the meaning of the terms ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and
‘‘war crimes,’’ and one part of that exercise before the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) has been to clarify the
substantiality test that must be met.
With respect to genocide, the ICTR held in the Akayesu case that actual
extermination of a group in its entirety is not required and that ‘‘a person could be
found guilty of genocide without necessarily having to establish that genocide had
taken place throughout the country concerned.’’17 But the ICTR Trial Chamber also
held, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment, that the reference to ‘‘in part’’ in the
legal requirement of ‘‘intent to destroy in whole or in part,’’ found in both the ICTR
Statute and the UNCG, ‘‘requires the intention to destroy a considerable number
of individuals who are part of the group.’’18 In the Bagilishema judgment, the Trial
Chamber agreed
with the statement of the International Law Commission, that ‘‘the intention must be to
destroy the group as such, meaning as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely
some individuals because of their membership in [a] particular group.’’ Although the
destruction sought need not be directed at every member of the targeted group, the
Chamber considers that the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part
of the group.19
The ICTY Trial Chamber held in the Krstic judgment that ‘‘an intent to destroy only part
of the group must nevertheless concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically
or qualitatively.’’20 In Jelisic, the Trial Chamber held that ‘‘it is widely acknowledged
that the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group.’’21
Genocide and Atrocity Crimes
239
One of the US understandings to its ratification of the UNCG was to qualify
‘‘destruction of part of a group’’ as meaning a ‘‘substantial part’’ of that group.22
That understanding has now, for all intents and purposes, become established
international law.
The ICTY, in its Jelisic decision, also elaborated two types of the substantiality
test:
Genocidal intent may . . . be manifest in two forms. It may consist of desiring the
extermination of a large number of the members of the group, in which case it would
constitute an intention to destroy a group en masse. However, it may also consist of the
desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected [i.e., leadership
of the group] for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival
of the group as such. This would then constitute an intention to destroy the group
‘‘selectively.’’23
In its Jelisic judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that ‘‘genocide may be
perpetrated in a limited geographic zone’’; for example, it may be ‘‘limited to the size of
a region or . . . a municipality.’’24 In Krstic, moreover, the court found that
the physical destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the
larger group because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction
as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at
issue.25
In the Appeals Chamber judgment of Krstic, the substantiality requirement
for genocide was a central finding regarding the Srebrenica massacre. The court
found that the ‘‘part’’ must be a substantial part of the group; the part targeted
must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole. The
court supported the Jelisic test of targeting at least a substantial part of the group,
as well as the test, developed in the Sikirica judgment, that there must be
evidence of an intention to destroy a substantial number relative to the total
population of the group and an intention that there be an impact on the overall
survival of the group.26
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the substantiality requirement is supported
by scholarly opinion. It cited Lemkin’s own view that the killing must be substantial,
or on a mass scale. And it noted the International Law Commission’s view that the
crime of genocide requires the intent to destroy at least a substantial part of a
particular group. The court then held that
The intent requirement under article 4 of the statute is therefore satisfied
where evidence shows that the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a
substantial part of the protected group. The number of individuals targeted should
be evaluated not only in absolute terms but also in relation to the overall size of the
entire group.27
The court subsequently focused on the issue of geographical area, finding that
the importance of the 40,000 Muslims in Srebrenica is not captured solely by
their numbers: ‘‘The capture and ethnic purification of Srebrenica would severely
undermine the military efforts of the Bosnian Muslim state to ensure its viability.
Elimination of the enclave would have accomplished the goal of purifying the entire
region of its Muslim population.’’28 Therefore, Srebrenica was important ‘‘due to its
prominence in the eyes of both the Bosnian Muslims and the international community
(as a ‘safe area’).’’29 Thus the ambit of the genocidal enterprise in Krstic was limited to
the area of Srebrenica.
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The Appeals Chamber also inferred from the actual killing of the protected
group, men of military age, the intent to destroy a substantial part of the targeted
group, the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. The defense argued that ethnic
cleansing is not genocide. The Trial Chamber had rejected the defense’s argument
that the killing of these men was motivated solely by the desire to eliminate them
as a potential military threat; the extermination was not driven solely by a military
rationale. The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber was entitled to consider
the long-term impact that the elimination of 7,000 to 8,000 men from Srebrenica
would have on the survival of that community. Such killings potentially consigned
the community to extinction, and the court considered this the type of physical
destruction that the UNCG is designed to prevent. Furthermore, the forcible transfer
could be an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the
Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica, as it prevented the Muslim community
from reconstituting itself. Killing women or children would have inflamed public
opinion.30
The Appeals Chamber found that while the intent to commit genocide must be
supported by the factual matrix, the offense of genocide does not require proof that the
perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying
the targeted part. In this case, the perpetrators adopted the method that would allow
them to implement the genocidal design while minimizing the risk of retribution. The
fact that forcible transfer does not, in and of itself, constitute a genocidal act did not
preclude the Trial Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of members
of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic). The genocidal
intent may be inferred, among other facts, from evidence of ‘‘other culpable acts
systematically directed against the same group.’’31
The Appeals Chamber also found that where direct evidence of genocidal intent is
absent, such intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime. In
the case of Srebrenica, the factual circumstances permit the inference that the killing
of the Bosnian Muslim men was done with genocidal intent. The scale of the killing,
combined with the VRS Main Staff ’s awareness of the detrimental consequences it
would have on the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica and with the other
actions the Main Staff took to ensure that community’s physical demise, is a sufficient
factual basis for the finding of specific intent.32
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the gravity of genocide is reflected in the
stringent requirements that must be satisfied for a conviction: ‘‘The demanding proof
of specific intent and the showing that the group was targeted for destruction in its
entirety or in substantial part, guard against a danger that convictions for this crime
will be imposed lightly.’’33 The court continued,
By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces
committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the 40,000 Bosnian Muslims living in
Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They
stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of
their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed
them solely on the basis of their identity. The Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when
they embarked on this genocidal venture, that the harm they caused would continue to
plague the Bosnian Muslims.34
The Appeals Chamber stated ‘‘unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate
terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its
proper name: genocide.’’35
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Although the Krstic Trial Chamber rejected only the cultural or social destruction
of a group as constituting genocide, it pointed out
that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous
attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well,
attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically
destroy the group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as
evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and
houses belonging to members of the group.36
The magnitude of such destruction can thus influence reaching a determination of
genocide. The Krstic Appeals Chamber noted the Trial Chamber’s observation and did
not reject the conclusion that such destruction can be taken into account as evidence of
intent to destroy the group.37
If one examines the substantiality requirement for crimes against humanity, one
finds that the tribunals have established levels of gravity requisite to merit description
as ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ Interestingly, article 5 of the ICTY Statute, which incorporates
crimes against humanity into the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, provides no
literal substantiality requirement. But the ICTY jurisprudence does. First, the court
has found that
It is sufficient to show that enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack,
or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was
in fact directed against a civilian ‘‘population,’’ rather than against a limited and
randomly selected number of individuals.38
The ICTY also reads into article 5 the requirement that the attack be
‘‘either widespread or systematic in nature.’’39 In Kordic and Cerkez, the court
found that ‘‘a crime may be widespread or committed on a large scale by the
‘cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane
act of extraordinary magnitude.’ ’’40 In Blaskic, the Trial Chamber ruled that
‘‘the widespread characteristic refers to the scale of the acts perpetrated and to
the number of victims.’’41 Also in Blaskic, the court articulated the elements of
a ‘‘systematic’’ attack:
The systematic character refers to four elements which . . . may be expressed as follows:
(1) the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is
perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute
or weaken a community; (2) the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large
scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous commission
of inhumane acts linked to one another; (3) the preparation and use of significant
public or private resources, whether military or other; (4) the implication of high-level
political and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the
methodical plan.42
In Kunarac, Kovac, and Vokovic and in Jelisic, the ICTY emphasized that factors used
to assess ‘‘widespread or systematic’’ include ‘‘the number of victims’’43 and ‘‘the
employment of considerable financial, military or other resources and the scale or
the repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the violence committed against
a particular civilian population.’’44
The crime of extermination, a long-standing crime against humanity, should
be of most interest to scholars of genocide because it constitutes an alternative
charge in an indictment that comes closest to the crime of genocide without
having to prove the specific intent required for genocide. The Kristic Trial
Chamber held that the definition ‘‘should be read as meaning the destruction of a
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numerically significant part of the population concerned.’’45 In Vasiljevic, the Trial
Chamber found
that criminal responsibility for ‘‘extermination’’ only attaches to those individuals
responsible for a large number of deaths, even if their part therein was remote or
indirect. Responsibility for one or for a limited number of such killings is insufficient.46
The Krstic Trial Chamber offered a caveat, however: ‘‘While extermination generally
involves a large number of victims, it may be constituted even where the number of
victims is limited.’’47 The Vasilijevic Trial Chamber further required that
‘‘extermination must be collective in nature rather than directed towards singled out
individuals.’’48
Regarding the crime of persecution, which also can be a key element of genocidal
intent, the ICTY, in Kordic and Cerkez, was careful to invoke the substantiality test,
listing by example two acts that ‘‘do not constitute persecution as a crime against
humanity because they do not rise to the same level of gravity as the other crimes
against humanity enumerated in Article 5’’ of the ICTY Statute. Those two examples
are ‘‘encouraging and promoting hatred on political grounds’’ and ‘‘dismissing and
removing Bosnian Muslims from government.’’49
The residual clause listing ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ must satisfy the substantiality
test as well. In Naletilic and Martinovic, the ICTY defined ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ as
acts that do not fall within any of the other sub-clause of Article 5 of the Statute but are
sufficiently similar in gravity to the other enumerated crimes . . . . As constituting
crimes against humanity, these acts must also be widespread or systematic.50
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, which incorporates crimes against humanity in
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR, explicitly invokes the language of
‘‘a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.’’ In the Akayesu
Trial Chamber decision, the court found that ‘‘the concept of ‘widespread’ may be
defined as massive, frequent, large scale, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a mutiplicity of victims.’’51 In Kayishema and
Ruzindana, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that ‘‘a widespread attack is one that
is directed against a multiplicity of victims.’’52 The attack on a civilian population
does not mean that the entire population of a given State or territory must be victimized
by these acts in order for the acts to constitute a crime against humanity . . . . Instead
the ‘‘population’’ element is intended to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus
excludes single or isolated acts which, although possibly constituting crimes under
national penal legislation, do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity.53
The specific crime of extermination requires that ‘‘the actor participates in the mass
killing of others or in the creation of conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of
others, through his act(s) or omission(s).’’54
Finally, the substantiality test for war crimes is of a different character.
Technically, there is no real substantiality test, other than that found in the 1949
Geneva Conventions for what constitutes a grave breach, and even then the issue
pertains to the individual victim or victims rather than to any particularly substantial
number of victims. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute incorporates into the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the court the commission of ‘‘serious violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions . . .’’ This has been interpreted to mean ‘‘grave consequences
for the victim.’’55 The ICTY has mirrored this finding. In Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic,
a violation of the laws or customs of war ‘‘must be serious, that is to say, it must
constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve
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grave consequences for the victim.’’56 Yet no indictment, and certainly no conviction,
before either tribunal on war-crimes charges has sought to proceed with respect to
isolated or singular violations of the Geneva Conventions or of the laws and customs
of war. There is always a larger context to the war-crimes charges that involves
a substantial degree of illegal conduct.
There are also important substantiality requirements built into the statutes of
the permanent International Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. With respect to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, US negotiators, myself included, sought
to require that war crimes be committed ‘‘as part of a plan or policy and as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes.’’ But we were rebuffed by other delegations
and ultimately settled on ‘‘war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’’57 This reflected
the interests of governments to ensure that the 1949 Geneva Conventions would not
become narrowly construed to apply only to planned or large-scale commissions of war
crimes but could also be enforced against perpetrators of individual grave breaches.
Yet the inference in all that was discussed and anticipated in the practice of
the International Criminal Court was for a substantiality test to be met either through
the execution of a policy or plan to commit war crimes (which infers a multiplicity of
criminal acts) or through a large-scale commission of war crimes.
Atrocity Law
There has been a revolution in international humanitarian and criminal law since
1993. In conventional legal terminology, however, no term describes precisely what
the international and hybrid criminal tribunals have the jurisdiction to prosecute. The
crimes in question are not only genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes;
they need a unifying term. The law applied by the criminal tribunals is not only
international humanitarian law, not only international criminal law, not only
international human-rights law, not only military law, and not only serious crimes
under international law.
The law of the criminal tribunals is uniquely crafted, the enforcement mechanism
is uniquely conceived, and the political mandate of each of these courts is uniquely
tailored. They need a truly relevant term to describe the reality of their jurisdiction
and their role in framing legal responses to war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and other heinous crimes.
The international community has faced this situation before. The crime of genocide
identified by Raphael Lemkin arose from his concern that the Holocaust could not
be properly defined or prosecuted as simply a crime against humanity. The constituent
parts of the crime were unique, and conventional international law did not address
those unique characteristics of intent, target, and context. With Lemkin’s persever-
ance, the UNCG defined the new crime of genocide.
Similarly, today we are confronted with an inadequate lexicon for the crimes and
law that underpin the criminal tribunals. In a fundamental way, the relatively rapid
establishment of these criminal tribunals has outstripped the capacity of the law
to remold itself into an easily identifiable legal weapon for them to wield. It is no
idle matter, this quest for terminology. Getting the terminology right is part of
the accuracy and integrity of the process, and it is part of the job of selling to the public
the credibility and utility of these judicial institutions. If public support for
international prosecution and military responses to atrocity crimes is lost because
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what is described appears threatening or incomprehensible to the average person, then
the entire venture will be undermined.
Atrocity law is the law applied to atrocity crimes; it is drawn from several
disciplines of international law: international criminal law, international humanitar-
ian law, international human-rights law, and the law of war; and it is applied
primarily by international and hybrid criminal tribunals.
An unfortunate inaccuracy appears repeatedly in UN Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions, in legislation by the US Congress and European
parliaments, and in the public pronouncements of governments and non-governmental
organizations. The body of law purportedly covering atrocity crimes is typically
referred to as ‘‘international humanitarian law’’ and the crimes described as
‘‘violations of international humanitarian law.’’ Such is not necessarily the case,
however. More often, the relevant criminal conduct engages several fields of
established law—international humanitarian law, international criminal law, inter-
national human-rights law, the laws and customs of war, and military law. For
any particular situation of atrocities and the subject-matter jurisdiction of any
particular criminal tribunal, however, there is one field of law—atrocity law—that
overlaps parts of each of these separate fields of law but never encompasses any one of
them entirely.
Briefly, international humanitarian law establishes norms to protect certain
categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them during the
course of an armed conflict of an international or non-international character. But it
can exclude some parts of the laws of war whose primary purpose is not humanitarian,
and it does not concern either genocide or crimes against humanity that occur outside
the ambit of armed conflict. Most of international humanitarian law cannot be
prosecuted against an individual and concerns state practice and state responsibility
in armed conflicts.
The conventions of international criminal law range far beyond atrocities. Less
than half of the at least twenty-four categories of international criminal law pertain
to atrocities. International criminal law does not incorporate most of international
humanitarian law or international human rights law. While international criminal
law will always apply to atrocity crimes and atrocity law, it would be deeply misleading
to use the term to describe the kind of actions and the kind of law that are of direct
concern to international criminal tribunals. The term fails the tests of magnitude,
of targeting the leading perpetrators, and of isolating only those crimes accurately
described as ‘‘atrocities.’’
International human-rights law is inappropriate to criminal tribunals, as it
has traditionally, in its relatively short history, concerned the political responsibility
of states for violations against individual victims, not the criminal responsibility
of individual perpetrators. Until relatively recently, human-rights law did not
seek to govern the conduct of states during warfare, which is the circumstance
that so often accompanies atrocities. There is now considerable tension between
human-rights law and the law of war as the former seeks to intrude more
aggressively into the domain of warfare. Much of human-rights law requires
the breathing space afforded by the absence of penal provisions. Atrocity law, as
I would define it, requires criminal sanction, and it concerns only those human-rights
violations that can be prosecuted as crimes and are committed on a scale and
in circumstances that only scratch the surface of the full range of human-rights
violations and law.
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Military or court-martial law and, in most respects, the law of war pertain solely to
war crimes and, through generically relevant crimes such as murder, to crimes against
humanity and genocide. But it is an entirely unsatisfactory body of law to cover the
criminality of individual perpetrators of atrocity crimes, particularly non-military
perpetrators.
The following characteristics of atrocity law draw from the international and
hybrid criminal tribunals:
 No two criminal tribunals share exactly the same law. The law is selected and
edited to conform to the circumstances of the crimes and to the context within
which they were committed. In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the special courts in
Kosovo and East Timor, and the Iraqi High Criminal Court, domestic law
also figures prominently. In fact, the principle of complementarity in the Rome
Statute of the ICC invites a significant and potentially exclusive role for
national criminal law in achieving the objectives of the permanent court.
 Personal jurisdiction is limited either implicitly, by virtue of the substantiality
test required of the crime and, one might argue, the practical limitations of the
tribunal (e.g., the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR), or explicitly by the terms of the
statute itself (e.g., the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).
 Some categories of atrocity law have evolved and acquired greater precision
with more recently established tribunals.
 One can look beyond the statutes of the tribunals to case law, as for the
substantiality test, for a further understanding of atrocity crimes and
atrocity law.
If ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ were to become part of the lexicon for the
crimes and law of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals, these terms would
help with several issues:
 The criminal tribunals are having the perhaps unintended effect of encouraging
a shift away from state responsibility toward individual criminal responsibility,
and a shift from low-magnitude crimes to high-magnitude crimes as the focus of
judicial enforcement. It is easier to charge a state with the commission of
atrocity crimes than it is to charge a particular type of atrocity crime. While the
criminal tribunals rightly act with great precision to prosecute the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes, there remains a
need to elevate once again the responsibility of governments not to commit
these crimes. An effective way of doing this would be to use the language of
atrocity crimes to describe what a state appears responsible for committing,
whether or not a specific atrocity crime can be identified quickly.
 Use of the terms ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law’’ would enhance the unique
character and accuracy of the conventional terminology, which otherwise risks
becoming blurred with overlapping applications and incomplete descriptions of
what the criminal tribunals actually enforce. In other words, one would not
have to misconstrue the terms ‘‘international humanitarian law,’’ ‘‘criminal
law,’’ or ‘‘the law of war’’ to describe the applicable law of the criminal tribunals.
Likewise, one would not need to misconstrue ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against
humanity,’’ or ‘‘war crimes’’ to describe the killings, violence, and destruction
actually taking place.
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 The presumption of the criminal tribunals is that the leading perpetrators
of the atrocity crimes will be prosecuted before the criminal tribunal,
whereas the mid- and lower-level perpetrators will either be prosecuted
before competent domestic courts or handled through a non-judicial
mechanism, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, determined
at the national or local level. By focusing on atrocity crimes and atrocity
law in describing the jurisdiction of the criminal tribunals, one can more
clearly delineate between the international and domestic mechanisms of
justice that are evolving. Theoretically, of course, a criminal tribunal should
have the legal tools to prosecute the foot soldier for a grave breach of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, or a local policeman for participating in mass
rape during a genocidal rampage. But the international community and
national governments are drawing a different line, using scarce resources
for criminal tribunals that prosecute crimes meeting the criteria that have
been set forth and encouraging alternative mechanisms at the national level
for the typically much larger number of mid- and low-level perpetrators.
Atrocity crimes and atrocity law better distinguish between those two levels
of justice and rehabilitation.
 Humanitarian intervention and the more recent articulation of a responsibility
to protect civilian populations at risk,58 both of which remain controversial
areas of international law, might be better understood and more supportable
politically if the objective of the intervention or action to protect were to end or
prevent an atrocity crime, rather than having politicians, military commanders,
and their government lawyers and spokespersons claim that such massive
military measures are required to confront war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or violations of international humanitarian law. The crime of
genocide can be left untethered as a powerful public rationale for humanitarian
intervention or an action to protect. But short of literally calling the situation
a genocide, which experience demonstrates is a struggle for governments and
international organizations, there is need for a powerful and accurate term that
can be readily understood as justifying the extraordinary and legally
controversial initiative of a humanitarian intervention or action to protect
civilian populations at risk. That term is ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ The technical use of
‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ or ‘‘war crimes’’ may be accurate in
a particular situation, but humanitarian interventions and actions under the
principle of responsibility to protect require the building of popular support, as
well as international support, to sustain them in times of great crisis and to
preserve for the states involved the right and ability to intervene for
humanitarian purposes again. The public might better appreciate the need for
military intervention if the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ was used in association with
responses to clearly horrific and unacceptable assaults on civilian populations,
rather than legal terminology (particularly ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ ‘‘ethnic
cleansing,’’ ‘‘war crimes,’’ and even ‘‘genocide’’) that can be understood by
lawyers as extremely meaningful (and horrific) but to the public remains foggy
at best. The legality of any particular humanitarian intervention or action to
protect is a separate debate. But there is great utility for a more focused and
easily understood jurisdictional description—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—for
governments, international organizations, and criminal tribunals in relation to
atrocity prevention and termination.
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The next step might be to incorporate such terms in UN Security Council
resolutions and UN reports and in legislative resolutions, as well as pleadings,
decisions, and judgments of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals. There
would be considerable utility in forging a UN General Assembly resolution that would
recommit the international community to react swiftly to the commission of atrocity
crimes, which could be expressly stated as such in the resolution and then described as
including genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes. But it may take
a number of years of use of the term ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ particularly by political leaders
and leading scholars, and the continued unleashing of atrocities without effective
response, for such codification of the term to occur.59
Conclusion
The prospect of the term ‘‘genocide’’ arising in policy making too often puts an
intimidating brake on effective responses. I have argued here that the political use of
the term should be separated from its legal definition as a crime of individual
responsibility. Governments and international organizations should be liberated to
apply the term ‘‘genocide’’ more readily, within a political context, to publicly describe
precursors of genocide and react rapidly either to prevent or to stop mass killings
or other acts of genocide. Precursors of genocide are those events occurring
immediately prior to and during a possible genocide that can point to an ultimate
legal judgment of genocide but which should be recognized and used in a timely
manner to galvanize international action to intervene, whether diplomatically,
economically, or militarily. Policy makers should not be constrained from acting by
the necessity of a prior legal finding that the crime of genocide in fact has occurred or
is occurring and, once that legal finding has been made, that any such finding would
automatically obligate governments to use military force in response.
There also is a critical need for a new term—‘‘atrocity crimes’’—and a new field of
international law—atrocity law—to achieve a similar objective, namely, to enable
public and academic discourse to describe genocide, crimes against humanity
(including ethnic cleansing), and war crimes with a single term that is easily
understood by the public and accurately reflects the magnitude and character of the
crimes adjudicated before international and hybrid criminal tribunals and of the law
being applied in practice by such tribunals and by governments and international
organizations. The purpose would be to simplify and yet render more accurate both
public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and other atrocity crimes.
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Labeling is critical for the framing, perception, and political implications of social
problems, genocide being a critical but overlooked example. For half a century
social-science theory has developed increasingly sophisticated paradigms for
understanding the process by which problems are recognized and addressed:
social constructionism, labeling theory, politico-linguistics, problem definition, and
tipping points. Yet rarely have these theoretical frameworks been applied to
genocide studies. When reconsidered in light of Sudan, these general frameworks
validate the constructionist argument that the recognized severity of political
problems—including government-organized or -sanctioned mass killings—is a
function of the socio-linguistic processing and naming of them. Anti-genocide
advocates, no less than scholars of genocide, can benefit from the adaptation and
application of policy frameworks deriving from constructionist analysis. The article
concludes with empirical data tracing the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ in the print
media with respect to Darfur.
Labeling Darfur ‘‘Genocide’’
Recent events in Sudan have revealed that the longer the Darfur conflict goes on,
the more it takes on an awful complexity, for which the notion of genocide may be too
dangerously simple.
—Lydia Polgreen, writing in The New York Times, 23 July 20061
For humanists sympathizing with the plight of innocent victims of African civil strife,
the question of whether or not to label the violence ‘‘genocide’’ is irrelevant. Killing is
killing, goes this line of thinking, and debating whether the mass killing in question
fits a purist’s definition of genocide is a callous exercise in semantics.
In the news article from which this essay’s epigraph is extracted, the journalist
focuses on two dying infants, one in Congo and the other in Darfur. The infant boy in
Darfur, who has pneumonia, eventually survives, thanks to the rudimentary health
services provided through international relief agencies. In Congo, the prognosis for the
barely breathing, ‘‘stick-thin’’ baby girl is grim. The inferred reason? The conflict in
Darfur has been labeled ‘‘genocide,’’ triggering humanitarian responses; mass violence
in the Congo, where the toll in innocent human life has been much greater than in
Darfur, has not been similarly registered in the world’s consciousness. As a result, the
sufferings of its population have been ignored. Whether the term ‘‘genocide’’ is applied
to individual theaters of violence, then, has life-and-death implications for non-combat
casualties. As the Times article also conveys, however, the determination of genocide
for a given conflict is not immutable: a recognition of genocide in Darfur in 2004 may,
by 2006, be undermined by fatal fighting within the erstwhile camps of both
perpetrators and victims.
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The media constitute one avenue for public consciousness of genocidal crises.
Diplomacy constitutes another. Both avenues, however, are two-way: both provide
contradictory answers to the question, ‘‘Is this a genocide?’’ Five months after US
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s September 2004 recognition of an ongoing genocide in
the Darfur region of Sudan, for example, the UN Security Council determined that
conflict there did not in fact rise to the level of genocide. To complicate matters further,
the State Department itself has sent mixed messages: in April 2005, Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Zoellick, during a trip to the capital of Sudan, held back when asked to
reaffirm his own department’s finding of genocide.
Political and legal factors played a role in this discrepancy. On the political side,
in the wake of the widely condemned US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq,
the international community was reluctant to follow the American lead in endorsing
a State Department finding that logically led to justifying another intervention.
From a legal perspective, a finding of genocide required evidence of actual intent by the
government of Sudan to destroy, in whole or in part, the inhabitants of western Sudan.
In the absence of incriminating documentation (and such is difficult to obtain, even
if perpetrators are brazen enough to commit their genocidal aims to paper), intent is
a difficult criterion to establish. International lawyers may be comfortable with
inferring intent from facts on the ground; diplomats in as highly politically charged
a chamber as the United States are less so.
The vagaries of politics influence but do not completely determine the framing
of issues and the application of terminology that triggers action. For half a century,
social-science theory has developed increasingly sophisticated paradigms for under-
standing the process by which problems are recognized and addressed. Framing
overseas conflicts as genocide has not, however, been a subject of this literature.
This article therefore examines the social-scientific dimensions of the competing and
contradictory findings with respect to Darfur.
Labeling the violence in Darfur as ‘‘genocide’’—or not so labeling it—has great
relevance for theories that have been well developed in the areas of epistemological
theory and American politics (including criminology) but rarely applied to comparative
and international politics. In terms of constructionism, labeling theory, agenda setting,
and problem definition, application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ has immense social import
that redounds on political calculations of intervention. As the contrast in responses
to Congo and Darfur illustrates, when these abstractions are distilled, they do have
life-and-death consequences for, inter alia, infants in Africa.
What Is Genocide?
Before tackling application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ to instances of mass political
violence, we need note that there is far from unanimity about its core definition.2
Much of the scholarly contribution in this domain has been a pushback against the
standard United Nations definition (derived from the work of Rafael Lemkin;
see below), which emphasizes only the ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion of a
victimized group. In an effort to achieve Cold War consensus, the UN conception
of genocide pointedly omitted political ideology or affiliation of a targeted group
as warranting an international indictment of genocide.
In response, Leo Kuper emphasizes the validity of political affiliation as a category
of victimhood.3 He also brings a sensitivity to genocidal crimes that occur under the
aegis of colonial rule. Helen Fein, also bristling from definitional restrictiveness,
emphasizes that the essence of genocide lies in its targeting of a human collectivity,
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regardless of supposed primordial identity.4 Roger Smith has long asserted that not
only the targeted group but all humankind is a victim when genocide is committed on
part of its universal body.5
Another pioneer in genocide studies, I.L. Horowitz, shifts the focus to the identity
of the perpetrator—in his view, the death-promoting state.6 Frank Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn also look to the perpetrator as the definer of the group slated for
extermination.7
So as to highlight the insufficiency of the single term genocide, other scholars have
proposed more specific terminology: democide,8 politicide,9 ethnocide.10 Both Ervin
Staub and Israel Charny, as befitting their professional disciplines, infuse their
etiological treatments of the ‘‘ultimate evil’’ from the perspective of psychology.11
Despite variation in definition, emphasis, and terminology, scholars seem to
recognize genocide when variations of it unfold ignominiously on the global scene. Less
clear is the extent to which the concept of genocide has penetrated the conceptual and
normative frameworks of ordinary citizens in democratic societies. For it is their
cognition of genocide that, ultimately, determines their governments’ disposition to
take action against it.
The Construction of Constructionism
The notion that naming an object or phenomenon imparts to it a reality it did not
previously possess harks back to the early empiricists, most prominently George
Berkeley (1685–1753).12 Berkeley’s subjective idealism created an epistemological
foundation which Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann would extend more broadly to
social reality writ large.13 Knowledge structures reality, Berger and Luckmann
argued, but the ways in which we gain knowledge are themselves a function of social
framing. Conceptualizing the Holocaust as it was unfolding, for instance, was made
immensely difficult by the absence of a socially recognized precedent. (When
confronted with first-hand evidence from concentration camp witness Jan Karski,
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter is reported to have said, ‘‘I don’t believe
you . . . I do not mean that you are lying. I simply said I cannot believe you.’’14) Since
the Shoah, our social knowledge has rendered representations of genocide all too
believable.
Concurrent with Berger and Luckmann’s sociological formulation of construction-
ism, H.S. Becker was advancing a parallel theory within the sub-field of social
deviance and criminology. ‘‘Deviance,’’ according to Becker, ‘‘is not a quality of the act a
person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and
sanctions to an ‘offender.’ ’’15 A reprehensible act is not a ‘‘crime’’ until society (usually
through its legal system) so defines it. By the same logic, repeated homicide—even
serial or mass murder—cannot be considered genocidal until society at large (1) has
incorporated the concept of genocide (social constructionism) and (2) is able to identify
perpetrators as ge´nocidaires (a term arising from 1994 Rwanda).
By focusing on the symbols and language of political discourse, Murray Edelman
transferred the philosophical and sociological foundations of constructionism to the
realm of political science. In his earliest elaboration, Edelman argued that language,
handmaiden to the actual needs of citizens, itself forms political reality and behavior:
‘‘concepts become meaningful when they are related to people’s affective demands.’’16
Edelman returned to this theme in his work devoted to political language per se: ‘‘It is
language about political events rather than the events themselves that everyone
experiences.’’17 With respect to our concern here, relatively few individuals are
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witnesses to mass killings; we are informed about them through words and images
(which are themselves commented upon). Whether or not the language describing
mass killings invokes the term ‘‘genocide’’ influences our responses to the information.
As harbinger to the school of problem definition, Edelman later maintained that,
in the realm of politics, conflicts have no independent status apart from the context
in which they are embedded and discussed. He also intimates a hierarchy of concern
that is also constructed. More specifically, he states that ‘‘problems come into discourse
and therefore into existence as reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because
they are there or because they are important for wellbeing . . . [T]hey create beliefs
about the relative importance of events and objects.’’18 If one conflict (Darfur)
is mentally assimilated with a recognized genocide (Rwanda), the response goes one
way; if no such structured connection is made (Congo), it goes another.
Edelman was well aware of the corrupting possibilities that follow from the power
to define. If, as argued here, it is critical in the social arena for public opinion shapers
and policy makers to be able to label specific patterns of violence as genocides, it is no
less true that other elites wield the power to justify genocide:
One of the most frequent recurring forms of political categorization is the definition of
some large group of people as so serious a threat that their physical existence, their
most characteristic ways of thought and feeling, or both must be exterminated or
ruthlessly repressed.19
Indeed, labeling theory has not adequately addressed the paradox that not only the
marginal and stigmatized are, according to the perpetrators, ‘‘deviants’’: in some
conditions, the labelers themselves, acting on behalf of society, become the morally
deviant.20 Nazi and Hutu Power leaders had the power to label Jews and Tutsis,
respectively, as ‘‘vermin’’ and ‘‘cockroaches.’’ Those sets of labels produced lethal
realities; the labelers were criminals of the highest order.
Problem Definition
With problem definition, constructionism moves from phenomenology and socio-
linguistics to agenda setting.21 International applications, however, are few and far
between.22 In the scholarly literature, linkages to genocide studies are even scarcer;
one notable exception is Herbert Hirsch’s outline of a general strategy for getting
genocide on the agenda of the US presidency and Congress.23
Problem definition recognizes that political language helps determine which issues
rise to the consciousness and agendas of policy makers.24 Yet there are other factors as
well. These other factors have implications for the recognition of genocide, and for
subsequent possibilities of intervention.
Politics, particularly in democratic polities, is characterized by a multiplicity
of groups competing for government action related to their respective causes. Problem
definition strives, in general, to explain what makes a public issue a matter
of governmental interest and possible action. (A sub-theme asks what keeps an issue
off the problem-solving agenda.25) Most problem-definition research to date has
focused on domestic agenda setting: homelessness, AIDS, drug abuse, sexual
harassment, pollution. Yet the framework can be adapted to asking, How is this
one problem in Africa (i.e., Darfur) defined to make it an issue for intergovernmental
interest and action? Three aspects of problem definition are of particular relevance
to our case at hand: problem ownership, crisis, and solution.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:3 December 2006
254
Problem Ownership
The term ‘‘problem ownership’’ refers to the identification of a recognized authority
or authorities to define an issue. (This is often referred to as the ‘‘community of
operatives.’’) When it comes to international conflict, such as characterizes Sudan,
there exists a host of competing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that not
only have separate institutional agendas but rarely have the opportunity to interact
directly. In this case, competing NGOs include human-rights organizations
(Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, the Coalition for International
Justice, the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human
Rights); multinational organizations (especially the less-than-expeditious United
Nations); diplomatic missions (with the US Agency for International Aid, for instance,
not necessarily seeing eye to eye with the State Department); and academics
(the Institute for the Study of Genocide, the International Association of Genocide
Scholars, the European Network of Genocide Studies). The freedom of such
disparate organizations to apply different standards (not to mention definitions) of
genocide aggravates the state of problem ownership. When, as here, different
governments and human-rights organizations disagree about labeling the crisis in
Darfur as genocide, the resultant confusion in problem ownership militates against
international action.
Crisis
When does a ‘‘problem’’ (a matter of concern but not necessarily action) get elevated
to the status of ‘‘crisis’’ (a concern that calls forth for action)? Echoing Edelman,
students of problem definition point to a ‘‘rhetoric of calamity’’ that betokens
a qualitative shift from problem to crisis. In the case of Sudan, it is noteworthy
that a much longer series of repressive military campaigns in the south, with
unmistakable ethnic and religious overtones (an Arab-speaking Muslim government
based in Khartoum versus Christian and animist black Africans in the South),
and resulting in many more civilian casualties, has not been elevated, in public
consciousness and US governmental notice, to a similar level of genocidal concern.
In a word, why Darfur and not the Dinka?
The Dinka, along with the Nuba, have long been recognized within the literature
of genocide. Ted Gurr identify them as a people ‘‘at risk.’’26 As early as 1981, Kuper
wrote of their being subject to ‘‘many episodes of genocidal massacre.’’27 The entry
for Sudan in Charney’s authoritative Encyclopedia of Genocide explicitly acknowl-
edges the genocide in southern Sudan. That Darfur has captured the attention of
the American and international community in a way that the destruction of the Nuba
and Dinka has not speaks to the critically important, and constructed, nature
of problem elevation to ‘‘crisis’’ status.28
Solution
Somewhat counterintuitively, problem-definition theory makes a strong case that
solutions help define the problem: governments are reluctant to add items to their
constantly filled agenda unless there is a plausible solution linked to the problem as
defined.
The US State Department’s unilateral finding of ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur speaks to
the risky nature of such a finding. What solution followed from this definition
of the problem, a definition that would be tacitly refuted by other governments and
by the United Nations itself ? In his declaration of findings, Secretary of State Powell
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was careful to deny that the finding demanded specific action on the part of his
government. Implicitly, his public definition of the Darfur problem undercut the usual
premise of an embedded solution.
From a US perspective, possible solutions to the Darfur problem included
sanctions against the Khartoum government; the establishment of a no-flight zone;
equipping, training, and transporting sufficient numbers of troops supplied by the
African Union; and direct intervention. In a post–Iraq invasion context in which the
usefulness of international sanctions had already been denigrated, and with the Iraqi
insurgency capturing a great portion of the foreign-relations agenda, these otherwise
reasonable solutions were off the table. Defining the situation in Darfur as a genocide
at a time when solutions to that problem were relatively unlikely undercut the
possibility of action. At the same time, it underscored the significance of embedding
solutions within problem definition.
Tipping Point
Although not yet included within the canon of scholarship, the perspective of ‘‘tipping
points,’’ as elaborated by Malcolm Gladwell, is relevant to this constructionist analysis
of genocide in Sudan.29 The notion of the tipping point—the ways in which an idea
or product captures the imagination of the public at large—broadens the inquiry into
the perception of genocide in Darfur from policy makers and other elites to that of
mass publics.
The question here is not only how, when, and why Darfur captured the
imagination of the American public as a genocide. That question can be easily,
if superficially, dispensed with by invocation of the ‘‘CNN effect,’’ or, less ephemeral,
the impact of the cover photo and story of Time magazine on 4 October 2004.
More significant is the popular spread of the idea that America must eradicate
genocide. That perspective, as Samantha Power illustrates, has been the antithesis
of American foreign policy beginning with the Armenian Genocide of 1915.30 As with
Jeffrey Sachs’s campaign to eradicate world poverty,31 with Darfur genocide
prevention has risen to the cusp of a tipping point in public consciousness
(and conscience). With contested views as to its actual status as genocide, however,
that threshold is not likely to be mounted soon.
Contesting the Label
The decision to label the violence in Darfur as genocide took on political overtones
when the US Congress passed a resolution to that effect in July 2004. One month
before, during a fact-finding trip to Sudan, the secretary of state had been asked
if genocide was occurring in Darfur. His response unwittingly evoked the importance
of labeling theory: ‘‘What we are seeing is a disaster, a catastrophe, and we can
find the right label for it later.’’ Powell’s tone of voice was dismissive, suggesting
that the question was a mere semantic problem. He did, however, add that, ‘‘regardless
of the words used to describe what is happening in Darfur, we are acting with
the utmost sense of urgency.’’
That ‘‘sense of urgency’’ became apparent only the following September, however,
when Powell endorsed the State Department’s Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT)
finding that the violence in Darfur did in fact constitute genocide. Powell’s declaration
was historic and unprecedented, in that it was the first time the executive branch
of the United States formally acknowledged the existence of a genocide, not
retroactively, but while it was ongoing.32
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Subsequent declarations by other governments departing from the ADT and
State Department (see Table 1) prompted international debate over what genocide
actually is. With the contrary finding of the UN’s International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur (COI), that debate took on ever more problematic dimensions.
On 25 January 2005, the COI, in its report to Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
‘‘concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.’’
Annan’s follow-up (and lengthy) report to the Security Council (31 January) avoided
the word entirely.33
Certainly, the COI did pointedly speak of ‘‘gross violations of human rights
perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control.’’ It also
admitted the possibility of Sudanese government officials’ ‘‘commit[ing] acts with
genocidal intent.’’ However, the killings and displacements of indigenes of Darfur
did not—using the language of the relevant UN treaty on genocide—constitute
‘‘a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial,
ethnic, national or religious grounds.’’34 Counter-insurgency, yes; genocide, no.
The COI maintained that, in light of evidence of crimes against humanity and
war crimes, its negative finding on genocide did not detract from the ‘‘gravity of the
crimes perpetrated’’ in Darfur. A constructionist analysis, on the other hand, points
to the likelihood that the ‘‘unlabeling’’ of violence in Darfur will indeed lead to
reduced interest in, coverage of, and action regarding the non-genocide.
In terms of international relations, the fact that two other relevant multinational
organizations (the European Union and the African Union) also explicitly declined
to adopt the genocide label, as did significant UN members (Russia, China, Pakistan),
put the United States in the disadvantageous position of outlier labeler. Yet it was not
only in the community of nations that such disagreements arose. Among human-rights
NGOs, there is a split between those willing to recognize officially that genocide
in Darfur is occurring (e.g., Physicians for Human Rights, International Crisis Group)
and those not willing to do so (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch).35
However justified for tactical reasons, such labeling disharmony within the human-
rights community, no less than among the community of nations, tends toward
functional paralysis. Such discrepancy also raises important questions about the
process of ‘‘labeling’’ mass murder as genocide. Until there is a universally constructed
consensus on the applicability of the label among mass publics as well as among
governments and NGOs, concerted anti-genocidal intervention is unlikely. Even then,
as suggested at the beginning of this article, the possibility arises that what
passes the ‘‘G-test’’ at one point in time may fail later, as binary conflict on the
ground spirals into intramural bloodshed. When distinctions between victim and
Table 1: Characterizations of violence in Darfur
‘‘Genocide’’ ‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’ No (or not quite) genocide
United States United Nations (prior to 01/05) United Nations (as of 01/05)
European Union
African Union
Arab League
Pakistan
Russia
China
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perpetrator groups blur, it is hard to maintain a consensual finding that the violence
still constitutes a genocide.
Elite Print Media Use of ‘‘Genocide’’
Primed to the importance of the media in constructing mass public understanding
of overseas atrocities, Walter Ezell undertook the first quantitative study of newspaper
coverage of genocidal conflict in Africa (Burundi and Mozambique) and Iraq
(Kurdistan). Based on column-inch counts in five leading newspapers, Ezell concludes
that ‘‘events involving great human suffering and loss of life tend to be covered
in spurts’’ and that it is critical to resolve ambiguity early, ‘‘thus allowing onlookers
to decide quickly whether and how to act on the basis of reliable information.’’36
He also acknowledges the power of the reporter in changing (and, indeed, nullifying)
the intended message of an article’s source.
Inspired by Ezell, and in an effort to gauge the penetration of the genocide label
among the newspaper reading public, my research assistant and I tracked
the incidence of the word ‘‘genocide’’ in articles relating to Darfur in (1) the
New York Times and the Washington Post between January and August 2004 and
(2) those same newspapers, plus the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, and
the Financial Times, between September 2004 and March 2005. The results are
plotted in Figures 1 and 2. They do not include editorials or op-ed pieces.
We chose January 2004 as the starting point for newspaper tracking to provide
a measure of change over time from before official US recognition of the crisis as
genocide. Because the New York Times is the US paper of record, its treatment of
a topic is critical; as index of governmental interest in a topic, coverage by
The Washington Post is also key. Figure 1 thus shows the results from those two
elite newspapers on their own.
The Boston Globe and the Los Angeles Times reflect coverage for more local
readerships. Prior to September 2004, their coverage of genocide in Sudan was
quite limited in scope. The same can be said for London’s Financial Times, which
was chosen for tracking to provide a comparative perspective. By March 2005,
the controversy over dueling determinations (US vs. UN) regarding the genocidal
nature of the conflict in Darfur had largely faded from public discussion and memory.
In the first two months of 2004, coverage of Darfur was negligible, with
the government of Sudan taking active steps to ensure that it remained so.37 Some
initial uses of the term ‘‘genocide’’ appeared in articles beginning in March. Spikes
were evident with Colin Powell’s June visit and Congress’s July declaration.
Interestingly, there are significant discrepancies with respect to scope of coverage
and incidence of word usage, with the Washington Post more focused on the
secretary of state’s June visit and the New York Times more fluid with the word
as a result of the Congressional statement.
A significant spike in newspaper usage of ‘‘genocide’’ coincided with Powell’s
own admission in September 2004 that that word does properly characterize violence
in Darfur. Compared with more regional newspapers (Los Angeles Times, Boston
Globe), the Post and the Times maintained a leadership position with respect
to keeping the ‘‘G-word’’ in their regular readers’ vocabulary. This is not surprising,
given their greater overall commitment to international coverage and the
national political dimension that the State Department’s and Congress’s embracing
of the issue assumed. More surprising is the limited response that the United Nations’
null finding generated in US newspapers, as compared with the (relatively late)
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interest of the one European control paper, the Financial Times. (FT invocation of
the word peaked in the two weeks preceding and two weeks following the release of
the UN report.)
This print media use of ‘‘genocide’’ did not necessarily indicate publishers’
or columnists’ official endorsement of the appropriateness of the term; it primarily
reflected the domestic and international debate over its application. (New York
Times columnist Nicholas Kristof ’s Pulitzer-winning series of poignant and pointedly
‘‘pro-G-word use’’ essays, for example, do not figure in the tallies presented here.)
Nonetheless, the very debate over the use of the term by national and international
authorities, as reported by the newspapers, itself preserved the salience of Darfur
as an issue within the (admittedly elite print) readership.
In this context, it is useful to recall Edelman’s reflection on the signs and signifiers
that permeate political language:
Every instance of language and action resonates with the memory, the fear, or the
anticipation of other signifiers, so that there are radiating networks of meaning . . . 38
Whether or not editorialists, columnists, or newscasters deliberately make
the case, to readers, listeners, and viewers, ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur signifies more than
tribal or ethnic warfare in Africa. It conjures (or, in Edelman’s terminology, signifies)
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor. Depending on the citizen’s age,
the term resonates with these other tragedies, thereby placing Darfur (but not, as
we have demonstrated, southern Sudan) in the same moral universe of opprobrium,
or, at least, at a commensurate level of importance.
Journalists and editors for at least one of the elite newspapers—the New York
Times—appear to have been verbally stymied by the COI finding that events in
Darfur do not constitute genocide. With the passage of time, articles dealing with
Darfur came to invoke the ‘‘G-word’’ less consistently. While continuing to provide
factual reports of events in and developments with respect to Sudan, at least until
the Polgreen piece writers and editors preferred to avoid the conceptual issue
surrounding the genocide label: should the ‘‘G-word’’ be used or not? Following
from the previous arguments with respect to labeling theory, political language,
and problem definition, avoidance of the signifying label ‘‘genocide’’ in the media leads
to a downgrading of attention to, and salience of, Darfur among the public at large,
their elected representatives, and policy makers.
Conclusion: Lemkin, Labeling, and Constructionism
Coining of the word ‘‘genocide’’ is attributed to the Polish legal scholar, Holocaust
survivor, and United Nations gadfly Rafael Lemkin. Lemkin is remembered for
his indefatigability in prodding the United Nations to draft a genocide convention
and to have states ratify it. But first he had to get the UN to accept his word for the
purpose of international criminalization. In this respect, it is quite relevant that
Lemkin was originally trained (at the University of Lvov) as a linguist.
Lemkin spent considerable time and energy weighing the respective connotations
of common words that predated his neologism. ‘‘Mass murder,’’ ‘‘barbarity,’’ ‘‘atrocity,’’
‘‘brutality’’—while all evocative of highly odious behavior, these terms failed to capture
the conceptual singularity of the state-organized attempt to exterminate an entire
ethnic, national, or religious group.39 By joining philology to criminal justice, Lemkin
paved the way for a rethinking of the juridical role of state responsibility for foreign
nationals in international law.
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Application of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been highly imperfect. That it was ratified
by the United States only in 1986 (taking another two years for the inclusion
of reservations prior to full passage) indubitably diluted its overall impact on the
international community. Still, the very existence of such a convention reinforces
public acknowledgement of genocide’s special status, not only as a matter of criminal
law but as a moral outrage to humanity.
By helping to construct a social, psychological, and linguistic space for a novel
consciousness of genocide, Lemkin was also a forerunner and practitioner of labeling
theory. Like adherents of constructionism, Lemkin (while himself a jurist) understood
that legislation is an insufficient means of modifying social thought and behavior.
The framing and solution of political problems, international no less than domestic,
require a panoply of tools. Some of these tools are conceptual, others strategic: problem
definition and agenda setting are particularly promising tool sets for activists
frustrated with pure analysis and ‘‘mere’’ polemics. To the question, ‘‘What are the
moral, legal, and political implications of an unheralded US finding of contempora-
neous genocide?’’ social science provides multiple answers. The challenge is to
act before genocide itself degenerates into a violence so fractious and multifaceted
that even the most sympathetic of observers—as represented by the frontline
New York Times reporter in the epigraph—are paralyzed with frustration.
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Anti-Haitianism, Historical Memory, and
the Potential for Genocidal Violence in
the Dominican Republic
Edward Paulino
History Department, CUNY/John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Following the 2005 murder of a Dominican woman near the border between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, Haitian communities were deported en masse and
their homes violently ransacked by Dominican civilians seeking revenge. These
violent expulsions were not only human-rights violations but part of a historic
pattern of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic that originated in the
nineteenth century. This article calls attention to the possibility of genocidal
violence in the Dominican Republic by examining the violent 2005 attacks on the
Haitian community there. It suggests that an anti-Haitian legacy that includes the
1937 Haitian Massacre and the contemporary and systematic denial of Dominican
citizenship to Dominicans of Haitian descent are important but understudied
indicators that raise the potential for an escalation of mass violence against the
largest ethnic and racial minority in the Dominican Republic.
Between May and September 2005, nearly 3,000 Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic were deported to Haiti.1 These massive deportations came on the heels of the
murder of a Dominican woman near the Dominican–Haitian border. The murder
sparked a series of pogrom-like attacks against Haitian communities throughout the
Dominican Republic. Men, women, and children were forcibly removed from their
homes by the Dominican military, many of them stripped of their identity papers, and
herded onto trucks and school buses. In several towns, Dominican civilians looted the
abandoned wooden shacks that Haitians called home, taking anything of value.
Unwanted items were removed from the houses and burned.2 The deportees were
taken to various towns along the border by the Dominican military. Upon arrival, they
waited for hours under the unforgiving Caribbean sun, without food or water.
Eventually, the military ordered the Haitian passengers to exit the buses and walk
across the border into Haiti—a nation many had never visited.
Many of the ‘‘Haitian’’ deportees were not immigrants. They were born and raised
in the Dominican Republic: bicultural and bilingual persons, Dominican-Haitians,
whose parents were long-time residents on Dominican soil. Although Haitians have
been living in the Dominican Republic for more than a century, and constitute the
nation’s largest ethnic minority, they are excluded from the right to Dominican
citizenship.3
At birth, Dominicans of Haitian descent are systematically denied birth
certificates—the prerequisite for obtaining la cedula, the national ID card. Without
this card, which contains biographical information such as blood type, skin complexion,
height, and weight, a person is unable to obtain important government documents such
as passports or drivers’ licenses. For the most part, Dominicans of Haitian descent also
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cannot vote or otherwise participate in the political life of the country. In short, they are
unable to integrate into the Dominican body politic.
At the same time, ethnic Haitians in the Dominican Republic represent an
indispensable source of labor to be exploited. In the agricultural, home-construction,
and private-security sectors, Haitian labor is ubiquitous and an essential part of the
Dominican economy. The Haitian presence is evident in any major Dominican city
or small town, and this demographic reality is not new. Their presence is a result
of a long history of intra-island movement and collaboration, specifically along
the 300-mile border that separates the two republics. For example, twice a week,
Dominican border towns host market days, during which Haitians can enter freely to
trade with Dominican merchants. This is a remarkable example of mutual cooperation
and a vibrant local economic enterprise that dates back to the eighteenth century.
Notwithstanding this collaborative history, there is also a genocidal history that
precedes the most recent attacks on the Haitian community and points to an ominous
future. The year 1937 saw the most violent attack on Haitians in Dominican history.
The Dominican military conducted a genocidal campaign to remove all Haitians from
the Dominican Republic; thousands of Haitians were killed or fled into neighboring
Haiti, becoming political refugees. Ordered by the dictator Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961),
this event marked the modernization of anti-Haitianism: the state sponsored
institutional and ideological campaign to turn Haitians into the official enemy of the
Dominican state. Although anti-Haitianism has its historical roots in the early 1800s,
Trujillo and his intellectuals would, in unprecedented fashion, crystallize a historic but
diffuse anti-Haitian sentiment into official government discourse. Starting after the
massacre in 1937 and lasting through 1946, this nationalistic state doctrine sought to
erase the historic and collaborative history between the two peoples while promoting
xenophobic government policies along the border.4 Unfortunately, this anti-Haitian
sentiment outlived the dictatorship, remaining solidly entrenched in Dominican
society for subsequent generations.
For the last sixty years, the Dominican government has been unwilling to accept
the legacy of the 1937 massacre and its moral responsibility for this crime against
humanity. Moreover, along with the rhetoric of opportunistic politicians who
manipulate anti-Haitian rhetoric, this violent past partly explains why a systematic
government policy to scapegoat and deport Haitians has emerged and intensified
in recent times. Dominican authorities contend that, like other sovereign nations
(they often cite the US policy of deporting immigrants), the Dominican Republic has
the right to expel persons whom authorities believe to have entered the country
illegally. Yet this latest round of deportations is disturbing, both because of their
spontaneous grassroots intensity and because they were sanctioned by government
policies that reject the inclusion of Haitian ethnicity as part of a larger pluralistic
Dominican society.
The focus of this article is to expose the recent and ongoing hostility against
Haitians in the Dominican Republic and to argue that this violence merits special
attention because of its proto-genocidal nature. The recent anti-Haitian violence in the
Dominican Republic should not be seen as an isolated event, as a case in which the
majority population simply deports a racial and ethnic minority. Anti-Haitian
prejudice and discrimination, combined with anti-black racism, permeates all levels
of Dominican society. Haitians are viewed as the black ‘‘other,’’ culturally incapable of
assimilating. The situation is more ominous today because the Dominican Republic
has many features generally considered key prerequisites for the organization and
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perpetration of mass murder: the existence of a stigmatized racial/ethnic minority
group within the dominant society; the political and economic disenfranchisement
of that minority group; and the historical precedent of state-sponsored mass murder.
Taking these and other factors into account, I argue that unless preventive measures
are taken to integrate this minority group, the current state policy of violent
deportations or ethnic cleansing will mean that future and more intensified genocidal
violence against Haitians cannot be ruled out in the Dominican Republic.5
A Murder Awakens Historic Animosities
In early May 2005, several Haitians in the Dominican border town of Hatillo Palma
invaded the home of Domingo Luna and his wife, Maritza Nu´n˜ez, both in their
early thirties. The assailants knew their victims; they were neighbors and on friendly
terms. Unfortunately, familiarity and goodwill ended in a violent death that would
reverberate across the nation. In the confrontation, Maritza was killed; her husband
barely survived teeth-crushing machete blows to his mouth. The assailants were
eventually captured. But what happened next is all too familiar in the realm of ethnic
violence.
Stirred by the murder, Dominican residents of Hatillo Palma retaliated by
expelling all of their town’s Haitian residents. The word spread quickly, and Haitian
residents throughout the community were told they had until 6:00 p.m. to leave town.
Fearing for their lives, Haitians abandoned their homes. As they fled, their Dominican
neighbors descended upon the abandoned wooden shacks previously rented to Haitian
workers and began looting their possessions. Unwanted items were removed from the
houses and burned. According to local residents, the murder represented the breaking
point in a series of violent Haitian attacks on Dominicans over the previous
year.6 Apparently, Maritza’s murder was the straw that broke the camel’s back.
By the time I arrived in the town on 29 May, almost three weeks after the murder
and civilian rampage, there were no Haitians left. In a town where Haitians had
constituted a significant percentage of the population and economy, the scene was
surreal. One long-time Dominican resident told me, ‘‘I will pay you money, if you see
a Haitian walking down the street. We don’t want Haitians here. We don’t want them!’’
The action was not without its costs, however. Echoing many who told me that
the expulsion of the Haitian community represented an economic blow to the town,
one resident, an employee of a betting parlor, told me the following story: ‘‘Before the
expulsion, I used to sell $1,000 RD [US$35] daily in lotto tickets. Now, I sell about $600
RD [US$21]. But I am glad they are gone. You can only take so much.’’
Fueled by relentless nationwide media reports describing the murder of
a defenseless Dominican woman by Haitians, the violent attacks spread to other
towns.
In response to the attacks on Hatillo Palma and the surrounding areas, the army
and immigration officials began rounding up Haitians throughout the Dominican
border region, under the pretense of ‘‘protecting’’ them from vigilante mobs.7 I visited
several semi-urban and rural Haitian communities from which long-time residents
had been deported. Every story was heart wrenching. Take, for example, the case
of one-year-old Mari, a Dominican-Haitian who, along with most of her community
near the northwestern border, was removed to Haiti during the initial deportations of
May 2005. With the help of organizations such as Solidaridad Fronteriza, many
deportees, including Mari, were able to return to the Dominican Republic.8 Others,
Mari’s mother among them, were not so fortunate. At the time, Solidaridad Fronteriza
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was petitioning the Dominican government to allow persons like Mari’s mother
to return to the Dominican Republic. But the scars that these deportations had
inflicted were already evident in the faces of the children. According to a Dominican
neighbor who was caring for Mari, the little girl had fallen physically ill and was
mentally distraught at the loss of her mother.
Many of Mari’s adult neighbors, who worked and raised families in the Dominican
Republic, had also been deported. Even those who had some form of legal documentation
had their identity papers taken from them or destroyed. An example is the case of Pedro.
During the deportation raids, Pedro, a Haitian father of eleven and a farmer, awoke to
the sight of Dominican soldiers, brandishing rifles, who had forced themselves into his
small wooden shack. The soldiers handcuffed him and deported his entire family.
He says that in the early-morning raids of 13 May, the army stole his entire
savings—$6,000 RD, the equivalent of about US$200 at the time.9 Like many deportees
who endured several grueling days in Haiti, Pedro’s family returned to the Dominican
Republic with the help of religious and human-rights organizations. But Pedro did not
have his identity cards, given by the immigration department, because the soldiers had
ripped them up during the initial raids. Despite having resided for many years
in Dominican territory, he was deported. He ultimately did make his way back into the
Dominican Republic to rejoin his family, but not without first injuring his leg in
the process. Others who owned businesses, such as small stores, were also deported.
Such arbitrary deportations of Haitians and their descendants have been occurring with
growing frequency since the early 1990s. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has summed up
the situation as follows:
Suspected Haitians are targeted for deportation based on the color of their skin, and are
given little opportunity to prove their legal status or their claim to citizenship. As a
rule, people facing deportation from the Dominican Republic have no chance to contact
their families, to collect their belongings, or to prepare for departure in any way. They
are frequently dropped at the Haitian border within a matter of hours after their initial
detention, sometimes with nothing more than the clothes on their back.10
The Maritza Nu´n˜ez murder—the killing of a Dominican woman by Haitians—
provoked such intense anger that it inspired violent and unprecedented civilian
backlash. In the southern border region, in the town of Enriquillo, near the major
southwestern city of Barahona, Father Jesus Alvarez, a Spanish priest who works for
the Spanish Institute of Foreign Missions in defense of Dominican and Haitian rights,
reported that following the murder of Maritza, a mob of over 100 people mobilized in
the town to search for Haitians. The mob, disproportionately composed of adolescents,
carried bats and sticks and wore hoods to hide their identity. Father Alvarez himself
was threatened for denouncing the nationwide deportations of Haitians.11 The attacks
prompted the editorial staff of one Dominican daily to write,
It is the obligation of all to condemn vehemently the violence that is carried out in the
Northwest (border region) against Haitian immigrants, documented or undocumented,
because the Ku Klux Klan hood does not suit Dominicans.12
But why should Dominicans retaliate so violently against their Haitian neighbors?
Where does this Dominican fear and contempt for Haitians originate? As the next
section shows, the recent mass expulsions of Haitians represent the latest chapter in
the historical legacy of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic. Indeed, part of the
explanation lies in how the Dominican Republic emerged as an independent nation
in the nineteenth century.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:3 December 2006
268
A History of Antagonism
Historically, Dominicans have viewed Haiti, and Haitians migrating to their country,
as a profound threat. The 1791 slave revolt in Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti)
terrified slave-owning societies throughout the Americas.13 No society felt the
repercussions of this tumultuous political upheaval more than the Spanish colony of
Santo Domingo, on the eastern end of the island of Hispaniola.
By 1801, Toussaint L’Ouverture had marched into Santo Domingo in the east
and captured the city, intent on the unification of the island. About 2,000 Santo
Domingo residents fled the city, fearing the worst.14 In 1802, Napoleon sent an
expedition to restore slavery on Hispaniola. Toussaint and his army fled Santo
Domingo but would subsequently defeat the French troops, eventually declaring the
birth of the Republic of Haiti in 1804. A year after Haiti’s declaration of national
independence, Haitian forces under J.J. Dessalines marched eastward across the
island to expel the French forces that had remained in Santo Domingo after
Toussaint’s flight in 1802. The Haitian logic was clear: to oppose a potential future
European invasion and the restoration of slavery through the unprotected eastern
part of the island. Haitian forces were unable to capture the city, but in their retreat
westward, the army left a bloody trail of carnage. Haitian soldiers wreaked havoc
in the Dominican countryside, destroying several cities and massacring many of
their inhabitants.15 This event, underscored by future Dominican historians,
would mark the origins of future Dominican antipathy toward Haiti.16 But the
nineteenth-century event that would forever engrain itself in the Dominican
memory, and influenced its view of Haiti, was the unification of the island by
Haitian forces from 1822 to 1844.
What Haitians called ‘‘unification’’ was designed to protect their country from
re-enslavement. But the Spanish colonists (particularly the white and mulatto
slave owners) on the eastern end of the island saw it as an invasion. This ‘‘invasion’’
sparked a Dominican Creole–led movement for national independence, which was
attained in 1844 and is to this day celebrated every 27 February in the Dominican
Republic.17
From its inception, then, the Dominican nation (particularly as constructed
by its elites) has literally been based on the rejection of Haiti. The Dominican
Republic is the only country in the Americas to have gained its independence
from another former colony: Haiti. Between 1844 and 1856, the Dominican
Republic repelled three unsuccessful Haitian military invasions; it then
willingly returned to the colonial fold, annexing itself to Spain in 1861. It became
permanently independent in 1865, after a successful national liberation move-
ment (1863–1865) which threw off the shackles of European colonialism once and
for all.18 Nevertheless, it was the expulsion of the Haitians in 1844 that became the
seed of Dominican nationhood. It was this event that, through manipulation by the
country’s elite, would endure in the Dominican historical memory: Haitians as
invaders.
In the modern (post-1900) era, Dominican anti-Haitianism can be traced most
importantly to the 1937 massacre of Haitians—arguably one of the most egregious
genocidal massacres in the Western hemisphere in the twentieth century.
Although estimates of civilians killed range from as low as 4,000 to as high as 35,000,
we will never know with certainty the exact number of casualties.19
The dictator Rafael Trujillo and his government bear full responsibility for the
thousands of ethnic Haitians murdered in 1937. One of the most damning archival
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documents of this era comes from US Ambassador Henry Norweb, who wrote to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt about the atrocities:
apparently with the approval of President Trujillo, a systematic campaign of
extermination was directed against all Haitian residents in an area from some thirty
kilometers south of Dajabo´n north to Monte Cristi. The drive was conducted with
ruthless efficiency by the National Police and Army.20
The killings were not limited to the border but occurred throughout the country, except
on US-owned sugar mills and plantations, where Haitian workers were spared.
Neither Trujillo nor subsequent administrations ever faced charges for this crime
against humanity, let alone accepted responsibility.
On 31 January 1938, a few months after the massacre, the Dominican and Haitian
governments formally and peacefully settled their differences. But Trujillo refused to
acknowledge responsibility for his government’s complicity in the killings. According
to the League of Nations treaty,
The Dominican government which for its part does not admit that the Dominican State
is in any way responsible, but will on this point abide by the findings of the
judicial inquiry, which is not yet concluded, agrees to terminate by a settlement all
dispute.21
The same agreement also ‘‘liquidates and terminates definitively by means of
a settlement all claims whatsoever on the part of the Haitian Government or
persons of Haitian nationality against the Dominican Government or against persons
of Dominican nationality.’’22 This settlement legally absolved Trujillo of any
responsibility for his complicity in mass murder and staved off potential future
lawsuits.
Sixty years after the massacre, there are neither commemoration ceremonies nor
monuments dedicated to the victims and legacy of this event.23 The massacre is mostly
seen as a manifestation of a dictatorial government. Dominicans believe that they
should not be held accountable for this brutal act. Moreover, during the recent wave of
deportations, many Dominicans, in numerous conversations, eerily and nostalgically
recalled the 1937 massacre as a valid response to the overwhelming and unwanted
Haitian presence in their country.24 The failure to apologize and publicly assume
responsibility for the massacre has left an anti-Haitian legacy whereby the political
exclusion and physical removal of Haitians from the Dominican nation is generally
justified and condoned. The legacy of the 1937 massacre and deportations, combined
with a pervasive stigmatization of the Haitian minority and recurring economic crises
in Dominican society, supply many of the ingredients that could lead to a future
outbreak of genocidal violence.
Applying a Genocide Early Warning System to the Dominican Republic
There is no clear indicator to forecast mass murder. However, Israel Charny has
proposed a Genocide Early Warning System (GEWS) that offers to ‘‘continuously
monitor information on violations of human rights and . . . to learn how to predict and
alert people to the increasing dangers of mass murders in different societies before
they occur.’’25 Applied to the Dominican Republic today, GEWS social indicators
suggest that a real potential for future anti-Haitian genocidal violence exists.
These social indicators are
(1) Orientation toward force for self-defense and solution of conflicts: turning
threats into an exercise of self-defense
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(2) Overt violence and destructiveness
(3) Dehumanization of a potential victim target group
(4) Perception of victim groups as dangerous
(5) Legitimization of victimization by leadership individuals and institutions
The situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic today conforms with many
of these indicators. Let us examine each in turn.
(1) Orientation toward Force for Self-Defense and Resolution of Conflicts:
Turning Threats into an Exercise of Self-Defense
Current anti-Haitian policies continue to seek the reduction, if not the erasure, of
Haitians from the Dominican landscape. Haitian migrants and their Dominican-born
children are consistently stigmatized for their poverty, ethnicity, and dark skin,
in a society that perversely values whiteness and in which racist acts occur with
impunity. There is also a virulent and influential anti-Haitian discourse promoted by
certain political elites. A strong sentiment exists among many in Dominican society
that a new Haitian invasion is underway. ‘‘Self-defense’’ means reinforcing the
Dominican–Haitian border to limit the flow of Haitian immigrants.
Like the current immigration debate in the United States, in which the US–Mexico
border is seen as ground zero, the Dominican government sees its border as the
nation’s most vulnerable site to be defended. Ever since the era of the Trujillo
dictatorship, the security of the Dominican border has been the responsibility of the
army. Today, partly as a reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 and the ‘‘War on
Terror,’’ the Dominican government has created a Special Forces Commando Unit: an
elite group drawn from the country’s navy, air force, army, and national police.
This multifaceted unit will provide additional support to the army in patrolling the
border.26 Yet, despite the militarization of the region, the border, more than 300 miles
long, remains highly porous. One of the main responsibilities for the Dominican Army
along the border is to apprehend and repatriate undocumented persons, and
particularly Haitians. In one month in 2004 alone, the Dominican Army,
in conjunction with immigration authorities, apprehended and repatriated nearly
2,000 Haitians along the border.27 As we have seen, the threat of being overwhelmed
by Haiti and her people has been a common trope in Dominican security discourse
since 1844.
(2) Overt Violence and Destructiveness
Colloquial references to a ‘‘silent invasion’’ from what the late and anti-Haitian
president Joaquı´n Balaguer referred to as la isla al reve´s28 (‘‘the backward island’’)
are commonly used to describe both the consistent migratory flow from Haiti and the
long-standing and demographically significant Haitian community within the
Dominican Republic. Many Dominicans believe that the estimated one million
Haitians already living in the country represent a threat to the Dominican nation
and her people. There is no shortage of hyperbole, whether in the Dominican press or
in public discourse, warning readers of the dangers that Haitian immigrants pose to
the nation. Many Dominicans cloak their anti-Haitianism in either nationalistic
rhetoric or talk of Haiti’s economic and political malaise, arguing, as one Dominican
congressman said to me, that Haiti ‘‘lacks state institutions, [that] its society
is disintegrating and therefore [it] is not a viable country.’’29
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Many Dominicans fear that the political, economic, and environmental anarchy
that has gripped Haiti will spill over across the border in the form of more Haitian
migration. They often point as well to the catastrophic levels of deforestation that can
be seen more markedly on the Haitian side of the border, where there is almost
complete erosion, while the Dominican side is comparatively green and lush.30 They
point to this as just one more example of Haitians’ inability to govern and administer
their society.
As Ervin Staub has written, ‘‘Given a preexisting devaluation and history of
mistreatment, recent increases [in discrimination, harm and violence] represent an
immediate danger signal.’’31 In the Dominican case, as the sensationalist portrayal of
Maritza’s murder by the Dominican media intensified, the deportations provoked a
violent backlash against Haitians. Three days after Maritza’s murder, two Haitian
corpses were found in Santiago, the nation’s second-largest city. According to the
coroner, these men died of internal hemorrhage and shock caused by gunshot
wounds.32 The attacks on Haitians were not limited to the northern border, where
Maritza’s murder occurred. Throughout the border region and beyond, the attacks on
Haitians were alarming for their quantity and cruelty. In late May, the decapitated
body of a Haitian man was found in the southern border town of Pedernales. His wife,
who was five months pregnant at the time, survived the attack but sustained multiple
injuries.33
Although these attacks failed to register with most American mainstream media,
international human-rights organizations denounced the incidents, even labeling
them explicitly as ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’34
The murderous attacks and roundups that followed the Maritza murder were not
limited to poor Haitians living and working in rural areas; Haitian university students
in the Dominican Republic were also targeted for deportation and abuse. At a large
student gathering at one of the major universities, the Universidad Tecnolo´gico del
Cibao (UTESA), Haitian students voiced to immigration authorities their fear of being
targeted by the arbitrary deportations and xenophobia gripping the nation at the time.
According to Jean Ferdino, president of the Haitian Student Committee, ‘‘We have
come legally to this country to study. We are not responsible for the criminal acts
committed by other Haitians. We need spiritual and emotional tranquility to study.’’35
Between May and August 2005, more sporadic attacks against Haitians took place.
In mid-August, the most shocking of such assaults occurred in the capital, Santo
Domingo: four Haitian immigrants were attacked and set on fire. Three of the four
succumbed to their injuries.36 Tensions ran high between the countries as a result of
these attacks. Haiti even recalled its top diplomat (at the time, the charge´ d’affaires) to
protest the brutal killings, which, on the heels of the deportations, seemed to many
observers to signal open season on Haitians in the Dominican Republic.37
By this time, the prominent non-profit organization known as El Movimiento de
Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana (Movement of Dominican-Haitian Women, or MUDHA)
was already investigating many of the violent incidents in Haitian and Dominican-
Haitian communities. In September 2005 alone, nine Haitians and Dominicans
of Haitian descent were murdered, apparently as part of the wave of violent anti-
Haitianism.38 Two attacks reminiscent of that in Hatillo Palma took place in August
and December 2005. In one, the lifeless body of a seven-year-old Haitian girl was found
brutally raped and dismembered in the province of Valverde, near the border.
Dominican residents attacked a Haitian community, setting fire to their homes and
injuring several with machetes and clubs. In another case a ‘‘rampage followed the
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discovery of the body of thirteen-year-old Dominican Dio´medes (or Dico´rides) de
Jesu´s Caba, reportedly stabbed to death by an undocumented Haitian whose name
is given as ‘Federico Pierre.’ ’’39
In December, a similar retaliatory pogrom to that of Hatillo Palma occurred in the
central Cibao region, near the town of Moca. In response to the killing by Haitians of a
well-known and beloved Dominican moneychanger in the small town of Villa Trina, a
mob of local Dominicans descended upon a nearby Haitian hamlet. According to
sources, thirty-five houses were burned in this once-vibrant community, which served
as a labor pool for the surrounding coffee plantations.40
No clearer example of overt violence and sheer destructiveness as a warning signal
for the escalation of ethnic conflict can be found than what occurred following the
murder of Dominican Maritza Nu´n˜ez. Between May and December 2005, aided by a
media campaign that repeatedly ran articles on the porous border with Haiti, Haitians
and their communities were attacked violently throughout the country by Dominicans
eager to exact revenge or settle local scores. The eight-month assault by civilians and
government authorities left dozens of Haitian men, women, and children dead,
countless displaced and their homes destroyed.
(3) Dehumanization of Potential Victim Target Group
The modern and graphic dehumanization of Haitians in the Dominican Republic
begins with the 1937 Haitian Massacre. For its speed and intensity, this was the
largest killing of black people en masse in the Americas in the twentieth century, and,
as I have shown, it established a dangerous legacy of anti-Haitianism that has
persisted to the present.41 In a seminal study on anti-Haitian prejudice conducted in
the second-largest Dominican city, Santiago, researchers found that the anti-
Haitianism that had existed since the inception of the Dominican nation intensified
after the genocidal massacre of 1937. This quantitative and qualitative study
concluded that anti-Haitianism consists of three types of prejudice: ethnic, class,
and racial.42 At the core of anti-Haitian prejudice is anti-black racism. Ever since
the successful Haitian Revolution in 1804, residents, and particularly elites, of
the eastern end of the island have viewed Haitians as the perennial and dangerous
‘‘black other.’’ This
racism involves prejudice and discrimination. It may be personal or institutional, felt or
unrecognized, but it is normally based on a stereotype that people of a particular
genetic background all behave in some unappealing way; they all do, they have no
choice, it is in the genes.43
The dehumanization of Haitians and their descendants takes many forms. One of
the most famous cases of blatant anti-Haitianism involved a former presidential
candidate, now deceased, named Jose´ Francisco Pen˜a Gomez. A former mayor of Santo
Domingo, a nationalistic student who protested against the 1965 US invasion, and a
high-ranking member of the International Socialist Party, Pen˜a Gomez was poised to
win the 1994 presidential elections against the octogenarian neo-Trujillista incum-
bent, Joaquı´n Balaguer. He ultimately lost to Leonel Fernandez, the current president,
whose PLD party made the crucial and historic pact with Balaguer (the ‘‘Pact of
Democracy’’) to acquire the critical votes to win the presidency. Aside from political
intrigue and voter fraud, the dark-skinned Pen˜a Gomez was the object of a vicious
racial campaign. His political opponents labeled him as either Haitian or of Haitian
descent. They warned Dominicans that history would repeat itself if a ‘‘Haitian’’
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became president, and that this would usher in another Haitian invasion of the
eastern end of the island.44
Perhaps the most effective example of Haitian dehumanization in the Dominican
Republic, aside from the government’s policy of deportation, is the guiding principle
and ubiquitous practice of political disenfranchisement. Long-term Haitian residents
and their children are systematically denied the right to Dominican citizenship;
many are undocumented in the only country they have ever known. Of course, there is
also the additional problem of under-documentation for non-Haitian Dominicans.
According to a spokesperson for the Centro Dominicano de Asesorı´a e Investigaciones
Legales (Dominican Center for Consulting and Legal Investigations, or CEDAIL),
‘‘there are entire communities in the southern part of the country where there are as
many as 50,000 people with no birth certificates’’; ‘‘up to the present, there has been no
attempt to create a mass registration of the undocumented persons.’’45 For Haitians,
however, the situation is qualitatively different. For example, unlike non-Haitian
Dominicans and those of lighter hue, Haitian women giving birth on Dominican soil
must register their children at the Haitian consulate.46 Although pregnant Haitian
women are admitted to Dominican hospitals to give birth, the emotional and
psychological toll is very high. For example, in 2003, I accompanied my wife’s uncle
to the maternity ward at the Robert Reid Cabral Hospital in Santo Domingo. He was
the senior doctor on call. I inquired whether there were any Haitian women who had
given birth, and some nurses pointed to a woman in the ward. We approached her, and
my wife’s uncle asked the woman if she was Haitian. The tears rolling down her
cheeks, as she nursed her infant child, confirmed that she was frightened of us and
feared being deported.
In 2000, an immigration bill (Article 166) was submitted to the Dominican
Congress that would prohibit hospitals or clinics in the Dominican Republic from
admitting foreign pregnant women.47 The legislation was clearly meant to deny
Haitian women the human right to give birth. As one commentator facetiously wrote
about this illogical legislation, ‘‘You would have to place guards at the entrances of the
emergency rooms with the mission of intercepting every woman with an advanced
state of pregnancy that exhibits a Haitian ‘appearance.’ ’’48 The bill did not become law,
but Haitian immigration is still seen as exacerbating already declining conditions in
Dominican hospitals. In the maternity ward at Santiago’s Hospital Regional Jose´
Marı´a Cabral y Baez, 45% of all women giving birth in 2004 were Haitian.49 According
to one doctor, ‘‘When all these patients arrive together, our budget is very limited, and
then it appears that we would have grave difficulties.’’50 And then there is the
contentious issue of citizenship.
According to article 11 of the Dominican constitution, Dominican citizens are all
those born in Dominican Republic, except children of diplomats or people ‘‘in transit.’’51
It is this latter category that has been used by numerous Dominican governments to
discriminate against Haitians. According to a 2002 HRW report,
People who lived in the country for years, even decades, are thus squeezed into
a category designed for brief and casual visitors. Some authorities even claim that
all Haitian migrant workers, whether in the country legally or illegally, are ‘‘in transit’’
for the purposes of citizenship rules . . . Crucially, because all Haitians are
considered ‘‘in transit,’’ their Dominican-born children are not entitled to Dominican
citizenship.52
In the 1990s, sensing a gross misinterpretation of the constitution, several NGOs
filed a suit against the Dominican government for systematically excluding the
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Dominican-Haitian community from citizenship. In October 2005, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in Costa Rica ruled unanimously that the Dominican
government had discriminated against two young Dominican girls of Haitian descent
by denying them birth certificates.53 The court ordered the Dominican government to
issue birth certificates to these girls, along with a total indemnity payment of $22,000
and an official apology.54
For many human-rights activists, the Inter-American Court ruling was
groundbreaking, because it offered a first step toward recognizing the rights
of Dominican-Haitians. Unfortunately, the ruling did not deter the Dominican
government from cementing the political exclusion of this minority population.
Just two months later, the Dominican Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that ‘‘children of undocumented [Haitian] immigrants born and raised in the
Dominican Republic are not entitled to citizenship.’’55 This ruling from the
Dominican Republic’s highest court reveals a society in which international standards
of inclusion and democracy, at least with respect to the Haitian minority, are
irrelevant.
For Haitians in the workforce, this lack of legal documentation leads to
exploitation. Haitians are exploited for their cheap labor, and this condition is
exacerbated by their inability to denounce the abuses they experience. The most
famous case is that of the sugar-cane industry, where conditions have been described
as modern-day slavery.56 Sugar-plantation authorities threaten Haitian cane cutters
with deportations and often use this mechanism to avoid paying their workers. Among
the many Haitians who migrate to the Dominican Republic, children are exposed to
abuse by unscrupulous scouts (resembling the ‘‘coyotes’’ along the US-Mexican border)
who are paid to escort undocumented persons across the border. The trafficking of
Haitian children is a thriving market in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
Apparently, it is quite easy to buy children’s services. According to one observer,
‘‘You just ask around town. People know who the scouts are. You just tell them what
kind of child you are looking for and they can bring across whatever it is that
you want.’’57
As the ‘‘coyote’’ analogy suggests, Haitian migrants are not unlike Mexicans trying
to enter the United States in search of employment. Members of both groups will risk
their lives to achieve socioeconomic progress. But in the skewed and rancorous anti-
Haitian discourse that prevails in the Dominican Republic, immigrant lives take a
back seat to nationalist posturing. The terms of the debate are only undermined when
tragedy strikes. Reminiscent of the tragedy in which nineteen Latin Americans were
asphyxiated in a trailer truck near Victoria, Texas, in early 2006, twenty-four Haitians
were found suffocated in the Dominican Republic.58 There is one important difference
between Mexican and Haitian immigrants, however: the former benefit from a large
and organized Mexican/Latino community (many of them citizens) in the United
States, which lobbies effectively against anti-immigrant policies, whereas the Haitian
community in the Dominican Republic enjoys no comparative organizational
advantage and is not able to exercise the political or economic power to influence
Dominican lawmakers.
The victimization of Haitians and their children is legally, economically,
and socially pervasive. From the state exclusion denying citizenship, to
deportations, to exploitative working conditions and a social prejudice that permeates
all levels of Dominican society, bigotry and discrimination are both de facto
and de jure.
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(4) Perception of Victim Group as Dangerous; (5) Legitimization of
Victimization by Leadership Individuals and Institutions
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, ethnic violence in general results
from two factors: ‘‘Tensions structured or perceived along ethnic lines, often
intensified by misinformation that spreads quickly in times of crisis; and
political leadership that promotes it or fails to halt it.’’59 There is no doubt that
in times of political and economic crises, ethnic minorities are targeted as
scapegoats. In the Dominican Republic, Haitians and their descendants are
targeted and stereotypically portrayed as foreign invaders taking away jobs
from Dominicans. Dominican leaders often stoke the embers of anti-Haitian
antagonism in the press. Consider the statements of current Dominican President
Leonel Fernandez. While on a stumping trip to Puerto Rico, trying to mobilize
support for his 2004 presidential bid, Fernandez—himself once an immigrant in
New York—openly supported general amnesty for the thousands of undocumented
Dominicans residing in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Yet he neglected to mention
the hundreds of thousands of long-term Haitian residents or the Dominicans of
Haitian descent born and raised in the Dominican Republic, who are denied
citizenship. He even warned Dominicans in Puerto Rico that, if illegal Haitian
immigration was not stopped, there would be ‘‘an ethnic war something akin to what
occurred in Kosovo.’’60
For Fernandez the politician, then, all immigrant groups are not equal. Dominican
immigrants who live abroad (e.g., in Puerto Rico), and who have access to US dollars,
should be treated fairly—especially those who are of ‘‘good character.’’ But it seems
that for Fernandez, particularly during a political campaign, there are no Haitians of
good character. He echoes the fear of many Dominicans that their country will be
overwhelmed by Haitian immigrants.61
Unfortunately, Fernandez is not alone in this scare-mongering. Dozens of
newspapers and magazine articles echo his sentiment that Haitians represent
a threat to Dominican national security. In an op-ed piece entitled ‘‘Kosovo and
Haiti,’’ a Dominican company executive writes angrily of the Dominican dependency
on Haitian labor and warns of a future when Haitians will take over the Dominican
Republic. He uses the Yugoslav model to illustrate his point:
As we can see, a simple Serbian province (Kosovo) at a determined time, and
because of a government as well as the general Serbian population’s carelessness,
discovered suddenly that the Albanians were the majority who demanded their
independence.62
In his weekly newspaper column, a well-known former Trujillo aide shares his
anecdotes as a young man meeting the dictator and hearing him talk about the
‘‘Haitian question.’’ He writes that Trujillo ‘‘showed us his hands as testimonial
evidence to tell us, ‘they are stained with blood, to save your generation from the
Haitianization of the nation.’ ’’63 Such xenophobic rhetoric is more alarming when one
considers that the 1937 massacre is very much part of the immigration discourse
deployed today in response to Haitian immigration.
A similar article echoes the warning of another Kosovo, speculating that Haitian
immigration might become a sort of fifth column in the Dominican Republic. The fear
among many Dominican nationalists (as they define themselves) who propose an end
to this immigration is that, if unchecked, these Haitian migrants will become
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permanent residents in the country and eventually, as a bloc, secede from the
Dominican Republic through the ballot box:
Let’s suppose that Haitians for example become the majority in Barahona [a southern
Dominican province near the border] and tomorrow allege, in their condition of ethnic
majority and [with] some legal claims, to demand its annexation to Haiti or to declare
some type of provincial autonomy. Would we Dominicans be in a position to give up part
of our territory or declare the autonomy of some province for these reasons? The
moment requires Dominicans to pay serious attention. The situation in Kosovo is not as
distant as it seems.64
Even more worrisome is that these articles and public comments do not issue from
extremist or marginal voices within Dominican society; the authors are very much part
of the mainstream, often high-ranking officials. For example, Joaquı´n Ricardo, a
former secretary of foreign relations, writes that ‘‘the problem is there and becomes
thornier and more complex because everyday we have more Haitians in Dominican
territory.’’65 Not only are politicians warning of being overwhelmed by Haitian
immigration, but individuals in the military have also voiced their concerns.
The former head of the Dominican Armed Forces, General Jose´ Miguel Soto
Jimenez, has argued in an article entitled ‘‘Grave Amenaza’’ (‘‘Grave Threat’’) that,
rather than illegal drugs or weapons, it is Haitian immigration that represents the
most serious threat to the security of the Dominican Republic.66
Many high-ranking officials and ordinary Dominicans support the removal of
Haitians through deportations. The former president of the Universidad Auto´noma
de Santo Domingo (UASD), Roberto Santana, ticked off a litany of individuals who
support a deportation policy.67 Ironically, even international observers, such as the
former head of the United Nations in the Dominican Republic, Dr. Pablo Oberti, have
supported (indirectly) the repatriations of Haitians. Oberti urged the Dominican
authorities to conduct the repatriations with ‘‘sensitivity and comprehension.’’68
Bernardo Vega, a former Dominican ambassador to the United States and author
of several important Dominican-Haitian-themed books, also voiced his opinion during
the deportations of the 1990s:
I consider that the presence of that [Haitian] labor is not advantageous for the
Dominican Republic; with the help of organizations like the United Nations, a peaceful
and civilized repatriation of Haitians who are illegally in my country should be
promoted.69
For Vega, the presence of Haitian labor in the Dominican Republic ‘‘promotes
Dominican anti-Haitianism.’’ He offers three seemingly simple recommendations for
‘‘an efficient deportation mechanism.’’ First, Vega recommends a policy of voluntary
return to Haiti, with the assistance of community and religious groups. Second, and
subsequently, Dominican industries would be inspected to discover those employing
undocumented Haitians, and employers would be fined if found in violation
of immigration laws. Third, a policy of forced deportation would be instituted. Of all
these stages, Vega finds the last the most difficult. Aside from forcing people (often
violently) from a country that they may have resided in for years and called home, he
recognizes that the difficulty in enforcing this policy is ‘‘defining who really is [a]
Haitian who resides illegally in the country.’’70 Unfortunately, the deportation of
Dominicans of Haitian decent has already occurred and is continuing; but these
egregious human-rights violations have also drawn the attention and ire of the
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Dominican and Haitian diasporas in the United States. The violent deportations in the
Dominican Republic after May 2005 prompted a member of the New York City Council
to draw up a resolution condemning the attacks on Haitians:
At home here in the United States and in my native country of the Dominican Republic,
I am always proud to lend my voice to the causes of fair immigration policy, due process
and the protection of worker rights. It is critical that we have solidarity to support such
basic human rights, and this resolution is a vehicle for the New York City Council to do
just that.71
Dominicans living abroad and their children clearly see through the hypocrisy of
Dominican immigration policy toward Haitians. The struggle for identity and place in
the United States has politically galvanized the Dominican and Haitian communities,
which have seen their families separated by deportations.
Conclusion
This article has shown that contemporary anti-Haitian violence in the Dominican
Republic has its roots in the nineteenth-century Wars of Independence and the 1937
Haitian Massacre. What can be done to ensure that current policies of ethnic
cleansing, such as deportations and denial of citizenship to long-term Haitians and
their children in the Dominican Republic, do not intensify in the future? I believe that
the fundamental responsibility lies with the political, economic, and military decision
makers in the Dominican Republic itself. A paradigm shift is in order.
The Dominican Republic, a country where globalization is embraced by govern-
ment and private industry alike, has failed to globalize the way in which it preserves
its past, particularly in relation to its historic relationship with Haiti and the 1937
massacre. Unlike other countries such as Peru, Germany, Guatemala, Cambodia, and
Rwanda, the Dominican Republic has failed to apologize as a nation for its
participation in one of the hemisphere’s most egregious twentieth-century examples
of ethnic cleansing.
Dominican immigration policy must cease to depict Haitians as the historic
enemy. Popular anti-Haitian discourse manipulated by xenophobic elites must be
challenged by the state, and more institutional bilateral projects on the model of
Fwontye` Nou – Nuestra Frontera should be established.72 Such programs could
reduce and potentially eliminate the enmity to which every generation of Dominicans
has been exposed, from the nineteenth century onward. This will be difficult, of course,
since the roots of anti-Haitianism lie at the very heart of Dominican nationalism
and patriotism: the creation of the Dominican nation involved a rejection of Haiti.
A new type of Dominican nationalism and identity must emerge in order for all
Dominicans to view Haiti as their long-term partners. A first step would be to initiate a
cathartic national discussion about the role of Dominicans in the 1937 killings, which,
despite being factually incorporated in the academic historiography, are remembered
as solely the responsibility of the dictator Trujillo.
Debates similar to those in other countries about historic participation in the
destruction of ethnic minority groups must take place in the Dominican Republic.
The most recognizable example of such negotiations over historical memory is German
society’s attempt to comprehend why their ancestors participated in the killing of
Jews and other minorities. Dominicans, too, must ask, How could our countrymen
and -women have participated, in 1937 and in more recent times, in the killing,
burning, maiming, and deportations of their Haitian and Dominican-Haitian
neighbors?73 The 1937 massacre should also be remembered by Americans,
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who especially should be made aware of this event because President Roosevelt, as is
painfully evident in the diplomatic correspondence, was aware of the killings—and
chose not to interfere.74
In the last ten years, there has been a global movement to acknowledge the
historical wrongs of national pasts. From the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in
Guatemala and South Africa to breaking the silence of forgotten massacres, such as
El Mozote in El Salvador and Trieste in Italy, the need to remember and come to terms
with one’s national past has gained momentum.75 Benedict Anderson has described
how important it is for citizens to feel and express shame for their nation’s past
mistakes and crimes. Using the case of America’s role during the Vietnam
War, Anderson writes that Americans ‘‘felt ashamed that ‘their’ country’s history
was being stained by cruelties, lies, and betrayals. So they went to work in protest,
not merely as advocates of universal human rights, but as Americans who loved the
common American project.’’ He adds that ‘‘this kind of political shame is very good and
always needed.’’76 Dominicans need to explore this collective shame, not only in
relation to Trujillo’s genocidal policy against Haitians in 1937 but also in relation to
the human-rights violations that continue today. At a minimum, this type of discourse
will go a long way toward changing the dynamic of the current policy concerning
Haitians.
The Dominican Republic, like many countries around the world, has its share of
xenophobic politicians and ultra-nationalists, who see Haitian immigration as a threat
to their cherished way of life. Such nativistic responses are echoed, for example, in
Europe, where politicians such as Austria’s Jorg Haider or France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen
have made a name for themselves advocating punitive anti-immigrant and racist
policies. On African immigration to his town, the mayor of Treviso, near Venice, has
stated that Italians ‘‘have a 2,000-year-old civilization,’’ while African immigrants to
his town ‘‘know only the civilization of the savanna and the jungle’’—comments
thoroughly reminiscent of anti-Haitian discourse in the Dominican Republic.77
Many Dominicans I interviewed shared heart-wrenching anecdotes about growing
up black and of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic. Many spoke of seeing
friends and family deported and experiencing real prejudice on an everyday basis.78
My interviewees spanned the spectrum of Dominican-Haitian life in the Dominican
Republic: lawyers, NGO workers, students, and day laborers. Without exception, they
had all experienced directly or indirectly racist behavior by Dominicans, from racial
slurs to deportations. Perhaps the statement that best captures the Dominican-
Haitian desire to become part of the Dominican nation is that of Sonia Pierre, the
executive director of MUDHA. Her struggle for equal rights is emblematic of
a community that seeks democratic integration into the Dominican nation but
is institutionally excluded:
We are here and for as much as we are not recognized as a group, they [the government]
sees us [as] dangerous. The fact that we are a minority, that enrages people, but, well,
we understand that we, children of Haitian immigrants, are a minority. We were
born here. We are trying to educate ourselves here; we want to participate, we want
to contribute . . . but we want to be recognized; there is a segregation here, if you
will, toward this [Haitian] population, and so we are not seen as part of the
Dominican identity, we are not seen as part of that [cultural] syncretism; it’s much
easier to accept any Dominican of any origin than a Dominican of Haitian origin.79
For many in the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s weak or absent institutions and the
country’s political turmoil represent a ‘‘grave threat.’’80 But portraying Haiti as
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a threat to Dominican society is the wrong way to conceptualize the future of both
nations. Rather than seeing Haiti as a security challenge or as a burden, Dominican
policy makers should, at every level, invest in a re-conceptualization of their
relationship with their neighbor that will address the following questions: How can
we create and implement a long-term and sustainable vision for both nations? What
are the policies that need to be implemented today in order to sustain population
increases tomorrow?
According to the US State Department, there are at least 8,833,634 people in
the Dominican Republic, and at least 7,656,166 in Haiti, for a total of 16,489,800
people on an island whose surface area is the equivalent of the American state of
Maryland plus two New Hampshires. What will the population of Hispaniola be in
2030? In 2050? How will population growth affect the island’s resources, such as
water?81 How can the Dominican Republic, which shares the same ecosystem with
Haiti, contribute to the reversal of the latter’s man-made catastrophe of deforestation?
How can both nations jointly address the staggering, and still growing, HIV epidemic,
particularly when the World Bank states that the ‘‘Dominican Republic and Haiti
together account for 85 percent of the total number of HIV/AIDS cases in the
Caribbean’’?82
Former Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was fond of saying that Haiti
and the Dominican Republic are wings of the same bird; if one wing is broken, the bird
cannot fly. He was referring to the more than 200 years of shared collaborative and
local economic and social history between Dominicans and Haitians. But the elites of
both countries have portrayed each other as geographically and racially distinctive
people. I contend that Aristide was right: the metaphorical bird of Hispaniola cannot
fly with broken wings. No matter how many more paved roads, modern tourist resorts,
and quasi-white Miss Universe contestants the Dominican Republic proclaims to
demonstrate its eternal superiority over Haiti, it too is a broken wing. An inclusive and
generous vision may, by contrast, finally allow both halves of Hispaniola to take
ethereal and triumphant flight. Let us hope.
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1. By mid-May 2005, Dominican newspapers reported more than 2,500 persons deported.
See ‘‘Denuncia persecucio´n indiscriminada: Obispo Mao pide detener repatriacio´n de
haitianos,’’ Hoy.com, 16 May 2005, www.hoy.com.do (accessed 16 May 2005). By mid-June,
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y las heridas que recibio´ su esposo Domingo Antonio Luna, en un asalto en su vivienda y
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household goods were reduced to ashes by the actions of local residents who decided to
avenge the death of Maritza Nu´n˜ez and the injuries received by her husband, Domingo
Antonio Luna, in an attack on their home and store Luna early on Monday morning.].
See ‘‘Arrasan casuchas haitianas en Hatillo,’’ El Nacional, 11 May 2005, www.elnacio
nal.com.do (accessed 11 May 2005). I personally saw and photographed the looted
homes. Even three weeks after my arrival, the debris mentioned in this article was
visible lying outside the homes where, just a month before, Haitians had been living.
3. Of the 9,183,984 residents of the Dominican Republic (July 2006 estimate), one million
are estimated to be Haitians and their descendants. For Dominican population figures,
see the CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/dr.html
(accessed 6 October 2006); for more information on the range of Haitian population
figures in the Dominican Republic, see Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Background,’’ in ‘‘Illegal
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in the air, saying they were guards. When people [Haitians] walked outside, the men
started swinging their machetes.’’ See Peter Prengaman, ‘‘Attacks Strain Haitian–
Dominican Relations,’’ Chicago Sun-Times/Associated Press, 11 June 2005.
7. At the time, the running debate between human-rights and government officials centered
on the use of deportations. Human-rights officials denounced the arbitrary deportations of
entire communities following the Maritza Nu´n˜ez murder; conversely, immigration and
local-government officials argued that the deportations were necessary to save Haitians
from vigilante mobs seeking revenge. The mayor of Hatillo Palma, Joselı´n Espinal,
asserted that she personally authorized the vehicles to transport Haitians from the town to
avoid a massacre: ‘‘No me arrepiento de haber socorrido a los Haitianos, ya que si no eran
auxiliados, los muertos se iban a contar por muchos [I do not regret saving the Haitians
because if not, many dead people would be counted].’’ See ‘‘Opina solo el tiempo resolvera´
problema haitianos en Hatillo,’’ El Nacional, 13 May 2005, www.elnacional.com.do
(accessed 13 May 2005).
8. I have changed the names of the Haitians and Dominican-Haitians for their protection.
Solidaridad Fronteriza is a community border organization headed by Father Regino
Martinez. See Solidaridad Fronteriza, http://solidaridadfronteriza.blogspot.com/(accessed
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The Restless World of Leonardo Alishan
(March 1951–January 2005): A Burnt
Offering on the Altar of the Armenian
Genocide
Rubina Peroomian
In his short career as a writer, poet, and literary critic, Leonardo Alishan left a rich
literary legacy, a legacy that is not widely known. This article attempts to shed light
on an important segment of his literary output: his creations in the genre of
genocide literature. Alishan was a third-generation survivor of the Armenian
Genocide, the inheritor of his grandmother’s devastating memories, living in the
grip of the nightmare of the Catastrophe, never able to transcend it. The ever-
present pain that dragged his grandmother from one mental hospital to another
reverberated in his literary work, painting a microcosm of a victim nation’s
suffering. As an artist in pursuit of beauty in art, Alishan faced the challenge of
overcoming the chaotic world of genocide for the sake of order and perceptual
harmony. He was not able to solve, and no one has, the dichotomy between the
fragmentation forced upon his art as the characteristic of genocide literature and
coherence as a condition of beauty in art.
‘‘The Lady-Bug and the Persian Rug,’’ a story depicting a post-mortem dialogue
between the author and his dead grandmother, begins with this touching testimony:
‘‘Granny had four grandchildren, but she couldn’t very well divide herself into four
parts. So she chose me. After all, when a house burns down, everyone doesn’t
necessarily burn with it. I got burned when I was about nine years old.’’1
At first reading, I believed this to be a gloomily pictorial metaphor for Leonardo
Alishan’s life and his existence, a burnt offering on the altar of the memory of genocide.
Now, years later, the story sounds dreadfully sinister. Was this a macabre prediction of
a torturous end befitting a torturous life?
Alishan described himself as an Armenian Iranian American, in that order, when
prodded to speak about his intellectual identity. He was indeed an Armenian Iranian
American writer, poet, and literary critic. He wrote in English and in Persian, but
mostly in English, and he dreamed, loved, and yearned in Armenian. He always had
difficulty defining his identity: who he was, or, as he wrote, what he was, and why he
chose to write in English. In a poem significantly titled ‘‘Refuge,’’ he writes,
I need structure
I need form
when the poet is a mad Armenian priest
when the poet is a drunk Iranian cleric
I need clean English
I need Alexander Pope.2
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The English language was a refuge to shelter him from the torrential flow of
the emotionally laden Armenian and Persian poetic traditions. But it must have
been more than that. It was Alexander Pope’s fascination with classical tradition
and its literary giants that inspired Alishan and guided his own creations:
disciplined, concise, with no need for ornaments to hide his want of art, as
Alexander Pope would say. ‘‘Words are like leaves, and where they most
abound/Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found,’’ Pope advised poets,3 and
Leonardo Alishan followed that advice.
Alishan was born to Armenian parents in Tehran and immigrated to the United
States in 1973 to pursue higher education. With a PhD from the University of Texas
(1981), he taught Persian literature and comparative literature at the University of
Utah, Salt Lake City, from 1978 to 1997. He married and had three children. But in
the last years of his life he lived alone with his ailing mother, who died a few months
before he did. His wife had divorced him and lived in Los Angeles with the children.
His family life of nineteen years was shattered, his nest ruined, and he was thrown
into a life of ephemeral love affairs and alcohol.
One pillow on my bed
after nineteen years
only one pillow on my bed
filled with nineteen thousand feathers
from the wings of nineteen thousand birds
flown from your hair.4
But that was only the circumstantial or physical outcome. This deadly blow in his
life had caused a ‘‘metaphysical discontinuity,’’ alienating him from the natural world,
from everything but the self. In memoriam for Vahe´ Oshagan5 he wrote, ‘‘When the
self also becomes a complete stranger, the result is madness.’’6 How ironic, as, at times,
Leonardo truly was a madman. But were those not the moments when his creative
volcano was erupting? Quoting Michel Foucault’s observation, it is Leonardo for Vahe´
again: ‘‘Where there is a work of art, there is no madness.’’7 And Leonardo’s works are
truly literary gems.
His poetry, fiction, and essays were published widely in national and international
journals. His two collections of poetry, Dancing Barefoot on Broken Glass (1991) and
Through a Dewdrop (2000), earned him fame and recognition. He also translated a
number of contemporary Persian poems by Nima Yushij, Mehdi Akhavan-Sales,
Ahmad Shamlu, and others into English. He was fascinated with Persian poetry, rich
with cultural, mythological, and Islamic elements. He was proud of Persian history
and heritage, a heritage he grew up with and longed for in his voluntary exile after the
Iranian Revolution. He joined poetry-reading sessions with fellow Persian poets,
refugees like himself, whose poetry, like his, was full of rage and fury reflecting a deep-
seated frustration:
For we bite the hand that feeds us!
But know that if we do
it is only because we still remember
after thousands of years, days
when we did not need
to seek safety away from home,
nor to be fed.8
Alishan lived with his memories of an innocent childhood in the beautiful Iran of
yesteryear. These memories took on an exaggerated aura, becoming increasingly more
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beautiful and enticing: ‘‘Exile is the master surgeon of the past. It consistently and
continuously works on improving the appearance of the past. Until after a quarter of a
century, the past becomes as distant and as beautiful as the Garden of Eden itself.’’
(The piece from which these words are drawn is curiously titled ‘‘Salome´’s Scars.’’)9 He
never ceased dreaming about Isfahan and the richness of its cultural heritage, a city
that embodied all the sweet, innocent memories of a carefree childhood. Isfahan was a
haven, Iran a paradise:
Hell was not in Isfahan,
Nor longing. Nor death
. . .
Grape leaves: green hands
made emerald with sunlit rain,
memories crystallized
into clusters of gems . . ..’’10
Instead of a entering into a thorough review of Alishan’s literary legacy, this
article will only highlight his output in the genre of genocide literature, as, above and
beyond his homesickness and yearning for his birthplace, Alishan was a third-
generation survivor of the Armenian Genocide, one who lived in the grip of the
nightmare of the Catastrophe. He was never able to transcend—or, rather, never tried
to transcend—the tragedy that was his grandmother’s, the tragedy that became his
fate at the age of nine. And he struggled in vain to tell the world the story of that
colossal tragedy, his grandmother’s story. ‘‘The artist is caught between serving his art
and convincing people of his own people’s collective catastrophe. He plays both the role
of the detached artist and the passionate propagandist. Consequently, there is a
chaotic confusion of genres and roles, resulting in a frustrated failure,’’ he confessed
during an emotional presentation at a 1989 conference at UCLA dedicated to the
Armenian Genocide.11
This presentation was strangely titled, ‘‘An Exercise on a Genre for Genocide and
Exorcism.’’ To strive to find a proper genre for artistic expression in genocide literature
is quite understandable; but why ‘‘Exorcism’’? What kind of action did Alishan have in
mind, and what was he trying to achieve by that action? He speaks of this again in a
story even more strangely titled ‘‘The Lady, the Demon, and the Little Exorcist,’’12
which returns to his special bond with his grandmother: ‘‘Granny was also mother to
me. She was my caretaker, my beloved, my teacher, as well as my guardian angel.’’ He
recalls the day when his grandmother told him her story for the first time. From then
on, he admits, he lost his innocence; he was possessed. ‘‘The Genocide had entered my
heart and mind. It flowed in my blood and covered my soul. My soul henceforth became
as red as Granny’s scarf had been when she was fourteen. I now fully felt the presence
of that Demon in my life. I still do.’’ An anonymous eleventh-century Persian text on
exorcism provided him with the answer to his suffering. ‘‘Maybe by telling me she had
exorcised the Demon and I, by hearing her, by just being there, had become the new
host. Maybe all the poems, stories, essays I have written on this subject are my feeble
attempts at exorcising myself. All I know for a fact is that I have failed.’’ Writing did
not release him, did not offer catharsis. The Demon continued to live with him, within
him: ‘‘Writing relieves me momentarily,’’ he writes in that same story, ‘‘as drinking did
before it became fuel for the Demon. But writing does not scare the Demon away.’’
Critics with a psychological approach to literature would argue the opposite and
emphasize the cathartic nature of writing, especially writing about a collective
traumatic experience. In fact, writing about such experiences allowed ancient and
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medieval Jewish prophets and scribes and Armenian historiographers to explain
historical catastrophes and to reach catharsis for themselves and their readers. For
Alishan, such a catharsis was never reached. The Demon of the memories of the
genocide never loosened its grip on his soul.
In ‘‘The Lady-Bug and the Persian Rug,’’ Alishan speaks of the heavy burden of his
‘‘mission’’ to tell his grandmother’s story. She and one of her brothers were the only
members of their family who survived, having left sixty-two relatives dead on the road
of deportation in the Syrian Desert. Alishan grew up with the horrible stories of how
Granny’s family members perished, but it was the story of the red scarf that made the
deepest impact on his psyche. His grandmother, Gayane´, was only fourteen at the time
of the experience, and after that she stopped living. The torture, the devastating
memories of that dreadful trek, haunted her all her life. She ‘‘stopped being a girl and
became the statue of Guilt.’’ She cried when she was alone, or when she thought she
was alone, as Leonardo remembers, and was periodically taken to a mental clinic for
rehabilitation. Leonardo was only nine years old when she chose to tell him why she
was so miserable and why she cried all the time:
One day the Turkish captain rode past her on a dappled horse. She was wearing a red
scarf which was her most cherished possession. The captain said, ‘Tonight I will come
for you.’ An old woman told Granny to throw her scarf away. She did. That evening she
saw the captain ride away with a girl who had picked up Granny’s red scarf and had
worn it. The captain returned without the girl. Granny cried tears of relief on that night
for which she paid with tears of remorse for the rest of her life.13
The theme of shame and remorse for having survived at the price of others’ deaths is a
rare occurrence in Armenian Genocide literature, but, curiously, one encounters these
ever-torturing feelings in oral interviews of survivors. Perhaps these are raw,
untreated emotions that subside in literary responses to genocide.
Alishan’s strongest literary creations are about his ‘‘Granny’’ and ‘‘bearing witness
to her agony.’’ He shares her agony; he is a part of it.
I try to be a spectator of that tragedy which culminated in a London hospital room in
1978 where Granny saw Turkish horsemen around her bed before she died. But, alas,
I am not the spectator. I am a character caught in that play which never, never, never
reaches its equilibrium.14
‘‘Gayane´, the living martyr,’’ as he pictures his grandmother, governs his life and
his emotions. She is a constant presence in his dreams, in his waking thoughts. It is
through his grandmother that, like most third-generation writers, Alishan sees the
Armenian suffering, the Genocide. Similarly, Carol Edgarian, Peter Balakian, and
Micheline Aharonian Marcom, among others, have written powerful novels based on
their grandmothers’ stories. These young writers chose to learn about the dreadful
past of their grandparents, a past often covered up and forgotten by their parents.
With the distance of time and space from the event on their side, and with acquired
skill in the poetics of genocide, they eternalized a fragment of the story of the
Armenian Genocide.
‘‘Seventy-five percent of my poems are either about Armenia or Granny. And
Granny is the Genocide. She is also Armenia,’’ Alishan notes.15 His love for Armenia
turned into a tangible inspiration when, together with a group of scholars, he traveled
to Yerevan in the fall of 1991 to take part in a symposium organized jointly by the
UCLA Narekatsi Chair of Armenian Studies and the Yerevan State University
Department of Literature, where he presented a paper titled ‘‘The Return of the Great
Goddess in the Hayrens of Nahapet Kuchak.’’ That experience was both a torturous
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and a happy one for him. He was anxious about delivering his paper in Armenian;
he was intimidated by the presence of Armenologists who would look down on him for
his lack of fluency and his faltering delivery. He correctly anticipated that there would
be many know-it-alls in the audience who would not pay attention to the content, the
novelty of approach, and the deep insight of his research, who would smile in contempt
at his struggle to produce Armenian words. But he had to make that journey; he ‘‘had
to return to [his] mother.’’16 And he returned. He deeply impressed those Armenian
scholars who could see beyond his student-like shyness and simple delivery of the
Armenian language.
Alishan fell in love with every stone in Armenia. He was astonished to see an
eighteen-year-old Armenian prostitute waiting for clients in a dark and almost empty
bar in Yerevan. When she told her sad story, how she had to sell her body for seventy
rubles (about two US dollars, at that time) to earn a living, he wept and gave her all
the money he had in his pocket.
Leonardo’s choice to present a paper on Nahapet Kuchak’s world of poetry
must have been a conscious decision, as he ended his presentation by drawing
a parallel between Kuchak’s return to the Mother Goddess of the world of
heathen Armenia and his own return to his sacred mother, Armenia. Both their
journeys were painful, and the centuries-old longings had remained unquenched.17
Armenia had revealed herself to him in all her beauty and ugliness, as a reality
that had no congruity with the land of dreams he had sung in his many poems
dedicated to Armenia. Armenia had been to him ‘‘a strange child of love and pain,’’
his Granny incarnate, everything she represented: ‘‘the tears of Granny,’’ instilling
melancholy in his young and innocent soul, ‘‘the hands of Granny,’’ inspiring security
and serenity in a frail and timid boy.18 And now he faced a reality full of life, not of
‘‘Broken bridges. Burnt books. / Shells filled with sharp shrieks,/Madmen wandering in
tattered shirts/dragging shackled dreams along,’’ as he envisioned her in
‘‘My Armenian History Book.’’ Armenia had now become, for Alishan, a ‘‘private
double-edged sword: a painful historical past and a loving utopian future.’’19 She had
lost her symbolism to a reality that was appealing and alien at the same time. And
Leonardo did not belong to that life: ‘‘I now knew, I knew, I knew that I did not
belong.’’20 Alishan was a Diasporan Armenian, unfamiliar with Soviet Armenian
society and the influence of seventy years of Soviet rule on the Armenian lifestyle,
outlook, and identity. His experience, however, was not unprecedented. Hakob
Karapents, another Diasporan Armenian writer, remembers his first encounter with
fellow Armenians in their stormy circle-dance in the story ‘‘Haykakan shourjpar’’
(‘‘Armenian Circle-Dance’’). He tries to participate, but the music and the movements
come from the depths of the Armenian soil, and he is only a visitor who has lost
the rhythm in the streets of America. He is a stranger with awkward movements.
He does not belong there.21
Alishan’s diffuse and dispirited thoughts reverberate in ‘‘From Dream to Reality:
Don Quixote with a Dead Horse and Windmills with No Wind,’’ his travelogue of his
first and last encounter with Armenia. ‘‘Who was I now?’’ he asks himself again in this
artistic self-analysis and assessment. And the answer is, ‘‘A man with an American
passport who taught Persian literature and Iranian culture and civilization in an
American university, and said I love you in Armenian to his children and dreamt in
Armenian.’’ He reiterates his poem about why he has chosen to write in English. In an
interview with Ara Oshagan in 1992, asked where he would place himself among other
Armenian poets writing in English, he responded, ‘‘My sensibility in poetry is probably
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Persian, content often Armenian, expression ‘‘American. . . . I know I dream’’ in
Armenian, I teach Persian, write English. What am I, I don’t know.’’22
What he knew for certain was that he ‘‘had wrongly sought a sense of security and
serenity in an external phenomenon such as Armenia, instead of searching for it
within the dark waters of [his] own soul.’’ He knew why he kept yearning for a sense of
belonging, for security and serenity: ‘‘I have been homesick in all my homes,’’ he
writes. ‘‘I must have been the sick limb of an old god, amputated and dumped into this
world.’’23 The reality he discovered in Armenia and his constant search for deliverance
did not alleviate the ever-present pain of a traumatic past transmitted to him by his
grandmother—the pain of his butchered family, his butchered nation, but, above all,
the pain of having a mission to tell the world about that colossal injustice, the genocide,
and failing in his mission.
Gayane´ remained the embodiment of the Armenian Genocide and her story
the microcosm of a victim nation’s suffering. She became the omnipotent face of
the nation’s suffering, appearing in Leonardo’s poetry as a mad woman who sees
Turkish horsemen around her deathbed in a mental hospital in London.24 She is a
ladybug living on the Persian rug in his bedroom, talking to him, nagging him
about why he is so inept in telling the world her story and about the tragedy that
befell her nation.25 She is a hungry tigress ready to consume the Mahasattva.26 She
becomes God’s daughter Antigone (Antigone is in fact the daughter of King
Oedipus in Greek mythology), as God blinds himself and becomes a wanderer
after helplessly watching the Armenian deportations.27 She is the statue of Mary ever
burning, ever weeping tears like drops of burning wax, charring his dreams and his
consciousness:
In the center of my dream
there is a church of stone in Van
sealed from outside
exhaling screams and smoke from the inside,
its congregation of Armenian folk
replacing the candles with their flesh.
There is a church in my dream
made with the bones of dead gods,
babies and parrots’ prayers;
always, all night, in flames
but never burning to the ground.
And in the church burns a statue of Mary
With my Granny’s face, wax dripping down her eyes
drop by drop, on the skin of my dreams . . .28
In order to fully grasp the meaning of Alishan’s writings, it is important to know
the Bible, in addition to Greek, Persian, and Armenian mythology and classical
literature, as well as modern international literature and literary criticism. Alishan
made frequent reference to all these sources in parallel or contrasting situations, or
simply to draw metaphors. He was a master of all these traditions, yet did not adopt
any of them as his own. He searched constantly for the most powerful poetic form. He
was not only a master of artistic expression but also strove to reach that ultimate depth
of intended effect with the smallest number of words, much like a master painter who
can create the mood and effect of a meticulously painted landscape with just a few
strokes of his brush. He once wrote about poetry, ‘‘A good poetry is a Japanese
painting: Ladies Taking a Stroll on a Summer Day. We see their kimonos in motion,
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hence the stroll; their fans, also in motion, hence summer.’’29 He was a master of
strong effects in brevity. This is why he was drawn to tanka, haiku, and senryu.30
Through a Dewdrop, published in 2000, is a two-part collection of haiku, senryu, and
tanka.31
The first part of Through a Dewdrop, titled ‘‘THESE DYING DAUGHTERS,’’ embodies
Alishan’s somber thoughts on a variety of themes. These are three-line poems,
mostly haiku and some senryu. Predominant in these poems is the shadow of
death casting its pall over the most enchanting images of nature, death as a threat
to his rarely achieved peace of mind and serenity, as an invitation to put an end
to the unending sufferings, as a temptation to suicide:
death has taken
the day off
to baby-sit me32
A senryu with a touch of satire for his torturous life:
it’s spring, not a time to die
I tell the snowman
and hope he will confirm33
Or,
a blade of grass
grown through a rock
thwarts thoughts of suicide34
The last haiku at the end of the first part is a return to the mysterious title, ‘‘THESE
DYING DAUGHTERS.’’ It brings closure to the obscure psychic complex of emotions of loneliness,
of his hopeless love for his one and only wife, of his refuge in the world of alcohol:
incurable disease
these dying daughters
my hands35
His hands are a part of the whole, representing the whole, the Alishan person, the
body, the soul, the psyche, tangled in insurmountable hardship, with death as the only
salvation.
Then comes a series of five-liners in tanka form in the second part, titled
‘‘MY INERT HANDS’’; the hand symbol persists. The atmosphere remains the same; the
themes are more variegated, more enigmatic, with some insinuating lewd (lascivious)
imagery, left to the reader’s interpretation. Some of the tankas are very simple
depictions contrasting his complex obsession with life and death:
green green, yellow green
yellow yellow, yellow red
red red
dead
the falling maple leaf 36
Others paint the cruelty of this unjust world:
children
silently starving to death
the light in their eyes
as pale as the childhood memory
of a just God37
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The tanka entitled ‘‘Utilitarianism’’ reflects the cruelness of his own fate, the sad
story of his own family:
mom’s gone to church
the more loved ones she loses
the more she loves God
I feel God loves her love so much
He’s going to take me too38
And again, the last tanka returns to the title and depicts once again the irony of
Alishan’s meaningless life:
at night
I change the flint
add lighter fluid to my zippo
and tell my inert hands
at least we have done something today39
In Through a Dewdrop, thoughts and images converge to form a beautiful tapestry,
the extraordinary, the unconventional, the crazy life of a gifted poet. Even in this
unfamiliar new form, as his reviewers Jane and Werner Reichhold attest, ‘‘he remains
true to his heritage and background by bending the spirit of the form to fit him instead
of folding himself and his impressions into Japanese poetry.’’40
Why this fascination with these Japanese forms of poetry? Perhaps it was a drive
to try his hand at a borrowed genre in American poetry in which very few had
succeeded, to show his talent and flexibility to adapt to any mold to pour out his
thoughts, to create. It is more plausible, however, to think that what attracted Alishan
to these genres was the challenge of poetic expression par excellence. I compare this
motivation to the Armenian literary trend of composing quatrains in the late
nineteenth century. It is not easy to mold one’s thoughts, didactic, philosophic, or
purely emotional, in four lines; it took a Hovannes Tumanian to achieve it. Haiku,
tanka, senryu, or quatrain, Alishan’s poetry is always concise, without a superfluous
word, always focused, always to the point. Remove a word, an adjective, a metaphor,
and the structure will collapse. His fascination, however, goes beyond the form.
On a photocopied page of a tanka poem titled ‘‘Kingfisher,’’ composed of five separate
five-liners, published in the Tanka Journal of Tokyo in 2000,41 he jotted down in
Farsi, ‘‘Each one (each five lines) is a separate poem; yet, in a whole, they carry
common denominators. Important is the theme of literature and visual arts of the
Far East.’’
Alishan remained obsessed with the untold story of the Armenian Genocide.
He remained obsessed with the love, the fate, the horrible stories of human suffering.
He was a humanitarian, a sensitive soul whose heart embraced all human sufferings,
all children living in abject misery and threatened with death by starvation in the far
corners of the world:
If I had hands
as big as my heart
I would take all small
and big flags of all the big
and small nations and I would
sew them with my big hands
into the biggest blanket and tent
the world has ever seen
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for all her naked children—
I wish I had hands
As big as my mouth!42
He was outraged by the ongoing NATO-led military campaign in Afghanistan,
where innocent men, women, and children were falling victim not only to the hypocrisy
of American humanitarianism but, even more so, the hypocrisy of God, the
omnipresent but helpless God watching the carnage with shredded heart:
They have buried ten million mines
in Afghanistan, one land mine
for every two or three Afghans,
regardless of age or ethnic background.
They have planted death in the womb
of the mother. Prosthetic limbs are airdropped
with food. They have planted a mine
under God’s pillow and his dreams of doves.
Every night a new dark dream spreads
its wings in my sleep. This morning I woke
with a throbbing headache. I woke tired.
I had defused or detonated mines all night.
A dream so real, I checked my limbs.
They were still mine. A dream so dark
I checked my heart. God was still there.
But also still mine and also still there
was the problem of ten million mines,
ten million limbs, ten million lives, ten million
dreams, blown apart in the heart of a God
who plows with the farmers and lives in my heart.43
Alishan’s prose covers a wide range of topics. His profound knowledge in Eastern
philosophy, encapsulated in traditional tales and proverbs, provided him with raw
material for his didactic and philosophical parallels. It gave him the opportunity to
delve into the deepest layers of human nature, its hidden desires and animal instincts
overpowering will and controlled behavior. But again, when it came to telling the story
of the Armenian Genocide, the challenge remained insurmountable. He kept on
striving to find the proper means of expression for telling that story to the world, for
best picturing the inexplicable truth of genocide. ‘‘There is no proper genre for giving
an artistic expression to the genocide,’’ he complained. ‘‘The novel comes closest but
that too does not suffice. The particular bears witness to the general. But though this
witness tells the truth and nothing but the truth, it fails to tell the whole truth.’’44 He
never tried his hand at that particular genre. Poetry was his forte; even his prose was a
musical unrhymed poetry.
The Red Scarf (2000), the only play he wrote, flows like poetry and, not
surprisingly, is about his grandmother’s ordeal in 1915, at the age of fourteen, a
young girl wearing an Erzurum costume and a red scarf over her long hair. In the play,
she appears as an apparition that only Aram, the main character, can see. The Red
Scarf is staged in a contemporary setting; the events occur in 1978 (the year Alishan’s
grandmother died in a London hospital). The play is the fictionalized reflection of
Alishan’s own life as a university professor, a family man with a turbulent married life,
whose grandmother lives with his family but is now sick in hospital. Alishan adopts
the form of ancient Greek tragedy, yet another indication of his admiration of classical
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tradition: a chorus onstage intervenes to facilitate the flow of the present-day story.
In this case the chorus is composed of three women, perhaps representing the
three women in his life: his teenage daughter (the Girl), his beautiful wife
(the Younger Woman), and his mother (the Older Woman). But then, perhaps, they
also represent the three stages of Gayane´’s life. The chorus begins,
Older Woman: . . . Could we be the generations,
not just ours, but all the nations.
Could we speak for all the dead
Younger Woman and Girl: . . . those who lived and begged for bread;
those with bedrooms filled with ghosts,
and molded skulls on new bed posts?
Older Woman, Younger Woman and Girl: Let us stay and let us see
If any of them can be free.45
The stage is set for the play to unfold. Can Alishan himself be set free at the end,
liberated from his nightmares and apparitions? Is there a way to set free generations of
survivors of collective trauma anywhere in the world?
Alishan gives fictitious names to the main character (Aram) and his wife and
daughter, but he does not attempt to change his grandmother’s name, Gayane´; the
imprint of that name was too deep to be easily replaced. Names and persons, it seems,
can be changeable, interchangeable, and dispensable for Alishan—but not Granny, not
her, not her name. She is a symbol; she is his creator, a goddess, the goddess of pain
and suffering whom he worships as pagan priests worship their gods.
Aram’s grandmother is a seventy-eight-year-old woman (the age of Granny when
she died) living the last days of her life in a mental hospital, removed from the reality
around her, aware only of her flashbacks of 1915. No one understands why Aram is so
much engulfed in these flashbacks himself, why he cannot forget the past and go on
living his life. To a question from Granny’s Jewish nurse, Aram replies, ‘‘Well, Rachel,
maybe it’s because while history has accepted the reality of your catastrophe and
you’ve been able to go on and write successful books and make good movies about your
tragedy, while for you, that holocaust is raw material for making movies or writing
books, for us it’s still undigested history.’’46 This explanation encapsulates Alishan’s
own viewpoint as he compares the Jewish and Armenian experiences and their effect
on survivor generations. It draws on the author’s belief that the Jews enjoy
reconciliation, and can create art from the ashes of the Holocaust, because the
Holocaust is a recognized truth, while Armenians still have to struggle for the
recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
Combining all possible genres of artistic expression, and with the help of the Bible
and appropriate psalms, choral interventions, flashbacks, and dialogue, Alishan
presents a detailed picture of his own life in relation to his family’s past history—the
genocide at its core—his mother, his wife, and, of course, his grandmother. He does not
shrink from quoting his own poetry or the stories of Gayane´’s red scarf that he has
heard ‘‘a thousand times,’’ the tragic event on which he has ‘‘published a poem, a story,
an essay. . .’’ But here the story, especially Gayane´’s last flashback in her dying
moments, is staged with nightmarish dramatization, as the climax of the play.
The scene opens in a bar as Gayane´’s nurse walks in to give Aram the news of
his grandmother’s death. The chorus sings the finale. The Older Woman tells
of the death of the body that went on living and growing old after the little girl died at
the age of fourteen; the body is now joining with her real self. The Younger Woman
mourns her own happiness and beauty, which was wasted because of
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the extraordinary love between a man and his grandmother, both victims
of the undying pangs of morbid memories. ‘‘Is she gone? Is it done?’’ she asks
the Older Woman. She doubts whether Granny’s death—that is, her physical
absence—can mitigate emotions and painful memories to bring normality into an
insane relationship. The Girl wants to live. She wants to forget everything and live
her life as a normal human being, without the burden of the past weighing heavily on
her soul.
The play concludes; yet a question still haunts the minds of the spectators.
In the beginning, the chorus sang, ‘‘Let us stay and let us see/ if any of them can
be free.’’ Who is truly set free, now that Gayane´, ‘‘the living martyr,’’ is no more?
Now that her story has spilled out, will there be deliverance? Aram leaves the bar with
a brown bag containing a bottle of liquor under his arm. He is taking home a red
shawl, a gift from the barman to his daughter. The story of the red scarf/shawl
continues. The Girl leaves the stage shouting, ‘‘This isn’t fair!’’47 The prospect of
a normal life in the future for her is dim. Aram and his wife face each other
without seeing each other. Ominous shadows cast their spell on their future family life.
No one is free! No one is delivered from the burden of the past!
To my knowledge, Alishan never published this play, despite many encourage-
ments. The piece promised to deliver him from his burden of ‘‘guilt,’’ but it did not. He
continued to think that he had betrayed his grandmother; he had broken his promise
to her; he had deprived himself of her love because he had failed to fulfill the mission
she entrusted him with in his dreams, in his waking thoughts, in his soliloquy with her
ghost. The imaginary words, the celestial mission, Granny’s conditional love for him,
reverberates in his creations:
‘‘. . . My darling, if you want me to love you
forever and ever, you must be shed
as the tears of the tribe; you must
become, my son, the voice of the dead.’’48
There was no deliverance. The burden was his to carry for life:
. . . I search hopelessly for some shade
in this ashen April desert
to put my Granny down and rest.
She is heavy and I am old now
and feel the weariness.
And it does not seem to matter that I first began
to carry Granny on my back
when she was thin and fourteen
and I was barely nine years old.49
Alishan’s agony and his obsession with the untold story of the Armenian Genocide,
indeed, intensified every year as the month of April neared—more so in his last years,
when he lived in his mother’s duplex and slept in the basement, when he felt deeply
the effects of ‘‘metaphysical discontinuity,’’ when he felt he had failed his family, his
children:
April,
why is there so much life with you
and with me the living dead?
This is the first stanza of the poem ‘‘April, Since 1915,’’ the second of the sequence of
four unpublished poems titled ‘‘Victims: The Return of the Cruelest Month.’’ In this
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poem Alishan remembers how he wept when he heard that a fanatic had splashed acid
on the face of a pretty girl because she had not covered her face with the Islamic veil.
Drawing a powerful analogy, he asks,
Sweet April, if I pitied her
why do I question you
when I should be weeping for you
and questioning the Turk
for what he’s done to your face?
For Alishan, April was indeed a month to go absolutely crazy, out of control,
drunk and out of touch, with constant phone calls to his friends, conversations
that he did not remember the next day, and desperate attempts at suicide. But
the result, almost always, was a masterpiece, a poem or a series of poems as
sacrificial lambs to the memory of his dead, all one-and-a-half million of them,
who seemed to rise from their nonexistent graves and fill his room and his soul with
their shadows:
The Armenians driven from their homes
to the desert and repatriated to the world
of spirits eighty-seven years ago, do not
wait for me only in April and only
on the 24th. That is merely the day
they congregate into an army of ghosts
and hound my hours . . ..50
He begs to be set free:
I’ve heard the stories these ghosts tell:
I’ve heard those other ghosts as well.
Dear God please do your best
to put all my ghosts to rest.51
And in every piece he writes, Granny is a presence:
It’s April
She is the hungry tigress again
and I, as some Bodhisattva, Mahasattva,
serve myself to her again.52
Sometimes Alishan annotated the poems he sent his friends. I received ‘‘April,
Since 1915’’ on 15 May 1999 with a few lines attached:
While you were away I was nursing my pregnancy which resulted in the birth of this
poem. Every time I think I’m done, I am not done—I have more. It is the longest poem
I’ve ever written. I happen to think it is also one of the best.
In this long twelve-part poem, Alishan appears not only as a selfless being who
sacrifices himself for his beloved Granny but also as a sculptor, a blacksmith, a
diamond cutter, and so on as he tries to forge the history of his tribe. But this history
speaks only about injustice, about torture, about God’s inability to intervene. And then
there is Granny again, this time as the queen of King Oedipus. This reference to the
legend of Oedipus is curious and inexplicable:
Granny, queen of my heart,
heart of every April,
may my eyes be pierced with your pin
if I ever turn my back on you, my love.53
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He concludes ‘‘April 24, 1915’’ with a subtle hint of Buddhist morality:
But darling,
if I succeed to emancipate you
from the swollen stomach of time’s corpse,
I emancipate myself
from yours;
we emancipate everyone
everywhere,
so that man may not do
what they do
ever again.
Leonardo Alishan was a passionate person. He related and reacted to everything
around him passionately. He fell passionately in love with his kindergarten teacher,
resulting in an embarrassing scene that he could not forget for the rest of his life.54 His
love for Granny crushed his stability and equilibrium, throwing him onto a roller
coaster of emotions from which he was never able to disembark. He fell in love with
anything beautiful—a work of art, a piece of music, a beautiful woman. His longing for
beauty, his quest for perceptual harmony and order, stood in stark contrast with the
chaotic world that engulfed him, the world of genocide, where order and harmony had
no meaning. As an artist in pursuit of beauty in art, Alishan faced that impossibility
and declared his failure to overcome the challenge. He was not able to solve, and no one
has, the dichotomy between the fragmentation forced upon his art as the characteristic
of genocide literature and coherence as a condition of beauty in art.
In his painful trek, there was a bridge he often crossed between his passions and
obsessions. He remained haunted by the ghosts of his dead, the victims of the
Armenian Genocide, ‘‘The unacknowledged ghosts of 1915’’—ghosts who never left
him, not in April nor in the rest of the year:
. . . my ghosts
hide in places where one
would expect them the least;
like in the ‘‘I love you’’ a failed father
finds in a card he opens
when he has been drinking all day
to forget it’s Father’s Day.55
Leonardo Alishan died on 9 January 2005, when a fire tore through his Salt Lake
City home. The house burned down, and he, the lone habitant, burned up with it. His
macabre prediction had come true: he had met a torturous end befitting his torturous
life, the life and death of a burnt offering on the altar of the memory of genocide.
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Despite attempts at cleansing the Ottoman archives, after the armistice of 1918,
of material incriminating the Young Turk government in planning to annihilate
the Armenians, the prime ministerial archive (Bas bakanl|k Ars ivi, or BOA) in
Istanbul still contains invaluable documentation on the Armenian Genocide.
Contrary to the common belief, which suggests that the Ottoman documents in the
BOA were created solely in order to obscure the actions of the Ottoman government,
the author argues that this archive contains information that runs completely
counter to the official Turkish denial thesis and actually elucidates both the intent
of Ottoman authorities and how the genocide was organized. Based solely on
Ottoman materials, the author demonstrates that the treatment of the Armenian
population during World War I was different from that of other minorities at the
time.
Mirroring the dissent over the Armenian Genocide itself, two factions have formed
around different assessments of the Ottoman materials in the Prime Ministerial
Archive (BOA).1 For those who defend the ‘‘official Turkish thesis,’’ the events of 1915
cannot be considered genocide but, rather, were unexpected consequences of the
relocation of Armenians during the war years. To support this claim, they rely
exclusively on the Ottoman documents in the BOA as the only trustworthy source.
This faction distrusts not only American, British, German, and Austrian documents
but also the materials documented by the Military Tribunal proceedings in Istanbul
as politically motivated distortions of the events. On the other hand, some critical
Western scholars maintain that only the Western archives are reliable, since some
documents from the BOA were produced in order to color events, while others have
been purged in order to cover up the genocide.
The common logic underlying both of these positions is that the two sets of
documents are mutually contradictory. Each faction insists on the exclusive use of its
own favored archival sources. I will argue here that both extremes are missing the
point. It is erroneous to assume that the Ottoman documents from the BOA were
created solely in order to obscure the actions of the Ottoman government. In fact, they
contain information that runs completely counter to the official Turkish thesis,
elucidating the intent of Ottoman authorities and documenting how the genocide was
organized. Ottoman materials found in the BOA in Istanbul support and corroborate
the narrative of the Armenian Genocide as documented in Western Archival sources.
Taner Akc¸am, ‘‘Deportation and Massacres in the Cipher Telegrams of the Interior Ministry in the Prime
Ministerial Archive (Bas bakanl|k Ars ivi).’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, 3 (December 2006): 305–325.
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Critical scholars regard the Ottoman documents as unreliable and trivialize their
importance for six main interrelated reasons. First, as I have shown in a previous
publication,2 there is strong evidence suggesting that the archives were purged of
documents relating to the Armenian Genocide. Second, the method by which some of
these documents were produced is dubious. As Vahakn Dadrian has shown, during the
preparation and implementation phase of the genocide, Ottoman authorities ‘‘resorted
to questionable methods in securing the documentation for episodes involving the
deportation of the Armenian population.’’3 Third, scholars cannot rely on the extant
collections because of the selective publication of Ottoman documents that appear to
support Turkish claims.4 The ‘‘two-track’’ communication system used during the
implementation of the genocide enabled such selective publication. The telegrams
attributed to Talaˆt Pasha sent to the local governors call for special attention in this
respect (see below). Fourth, omissions in the cataloging of the archival materials raise
suspicions that many documents have been consciously withheld from the public.5
Fifth, working conditions in the Ottoman archives have been an issue in the past.
Problems included difficulty in obtaining catalogs, the arbitrary rejection of requests to
photocopy documents, the dismissal of ‘‘suspicious’’ people from the archives, and the
theft of research materials from visitors.6 The final reason is a natural result of some of
the factors mentioned above: no scholars have had complete access to the documents,
and so no one has been able to establish a general overview of their content.
As a result, most critical scholars maintain that the Ottoman documents have been
purged in order to cover up the genocide, and are thus unreliable.7 My central
argument here is that we need to reassess the idea that Ottoman archival materials
contradict Western archival materials. They are not mutually exclusive; on the
contrary, they are in compliance with each other.
Despite attempts to separate official deportation practices from the annihilation
and purging the official records of any trace of an intention to annihilate, the
remaining documents in the BOA in Istanbul, especially the telegrams belonging to
the Cipher Office of the Interior Ministry, show two important aspects of the Armenian
deportations and killings. One is that the deportations and killings of Armenians were
a part of a larger population policy. The other is that this population policy was
implemented categorically differently toward the Armenians than toward other ethno-
religious groups within the empire, a difference that can be characterized as genocidal
intent.
Talaˆt Pasha and His Telegrams
Talaˆt Pasha’s telegrams on the smooth operation of the deportation of the Armenians
are used by Turkish sources as proof that state policy never envisioned the complete
annihilation of the Armenians. First, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP)
made sure to maintain an appearance of a lawful framework during the execution of
the policy, so as to create the image of legally justified action. Ottoman leaders felt
compelled to disguise their actions from their own allies. However, as reports of
slaughter from Anatolia started to multiply, the German and Austrian ambassadors
began to make pointed demands in the very presence of the Ottoman state
administration. The German state, for example, made very firm demands that at
least the Protestant and Catholic Armenians be spared from the deportation. When
their demands were not heeded, and the reports of killings continued unabated, they
issued several diplomatic memos protesting the treatment of Armenians and
requesting an improvement of their situation.8
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This and other similar outside interference forced Talaˆt Pasha to provide evidence
of smooth operation in the region. He issued many telegrams, one after the other and
presented them to foreign governments as evidence of the correctness of his policy.
Despite all Talaˆt’s promises, the German consular offices continued to send out news of
the massacres occurring in their regions. For example, German Ambassador Ernst
Langenburg Hohenlohe, writing to Berlin on 25 September 1915, stated that ‘‘the news
from the consulates . . . [is that] the orders which were supposedly sent by the Sublime
Porte, aimed at amending the losses being suffered by the deported Armenians . . . are
proven to have not reached their destinations.’’9 Such incidents would be repeated, and
Talaˆt Pasha would continue to claim that the massacres were not happening and that
he was doing everything he possibly could.
In the German ambassador’s reports, Talaˆt would be referred to as a liar,
‘‘heartless,’’ and a ‘‘hypocrite.’’10 For the Austrian ambassador, Count Johann
Pallavicini, Talaˆt was ‘‘playing both sides.’’11 It is possible to gain an understanding
of how these duplicitous games were played by reading the documents connected with
German requests to spare Protestant and Catholic Armenians. The first document is a
telegram sent by Talaˆt to various regions on 4 August 1915. In this telegram he orders
a stop to the deportation of any remaining Catholic Armenians.12 A similar telegram
was sent on 15 August 1915 concerning the remaining Protestant Armenians.13 (It is
worth highlighting the fact that, until these dates, Catholic and Protestant Armenians
were deported without any consideration of their confessional ties.) In each case, Talaˆt
then immediately sent a second telegram to the regions, ordering that the first
telegram be ignored and that the deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians
continue.14 In order to ensure the continuation of the deportations, and to avoid
confusion about his intentions, Talaˆt sent a telegram on 11 August 1915 to certain
regions.15
The German regional consuls continued to express concerns about the deportation
of Catholic and Protestant Armenians. Eventually, in response to this pressure,
on 29 August 1915, Talaˆt sent a new set of telegrams to the regions, calling for
a halt to the deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians.16 After sending
this order, Talaˆt took it to the German ambassador as evidence of his compliance.17
Soon thereafter, however (on 2 September 1915), Talaˆt sent a second coded
telegram ordering the deportation of any remaining Catholic and Protestant
Armenians with their families.18 Leaving no room for confusion, on 24 October
1915 Talaˆt sent a telegram confirming his earlier orders, issued on 5 August and
2 September 1915, to continue the deportation of Catholic and Protestant
Armenians.19
We can further follow this duplicity in additional German sources that show that,
unsatisfied with these telegrams, Talaˆt sent special envoys to the regions to facilitate
the continuing deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians. In a report sent by
the German consul in Adana, we read that
The notification dated 29 August concerning the Armenians and given to the
Imperial Embassy from the Porte is merely an audacious deception of the embassy,
because, at the instigation of Inspector Ali Mu¨nif Bey, who was sent here, the
Porte later completely revoked this order. The authorities, of course, are only
carrying out the second instruction and continuing with the deportation without
considering denomination or creed. The number of Armenians ordered to be
murdered probably already exceeds the amount of victims in the Young Turk
Massacre of 1909.20
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In his memoirs, Ali Mu¨nif confesses that he prepared the list of Armenians to be
deported himself. Some copies of those lists would end up in the hands of the British
when they searched his home during the Armistice.21
Evidence of similar tactics used by Talaˆt in other circumstances (the deportation of
the Greeks)—that is, an initial formal telegram, sent to appease foreign ambassadors
or minority members, followed by a coded telegram explicitly nullifying the previous
one—can be found among the coded telegrams from the Interior Ministry. In a
telegram sent on 16 April 1915 to the governor’s office of Tekfurdagˇi (now known as
Tekirdagˇ), Talaˆt Pasha states quite openly,
Upon the application of the town of Vize’s Bishop, a group of four to five people from the
Patriarchate are being sent; the content of the actual notice sent by open telegram and
the memo given to the group on yesterday’s date to be ignored and the refugees from
Eregˇli are to be removed by ship with haste outside of Eregˇli and all your efforts should
be to ensure that the aforementioned group is kept under observation, that their efforts
remain fruitless and that they have no hint of any of this.22
There are many other Turkish sources in which Talaˆt is described as a liar; it
seems that there is a consensus on Talaˆt’s personal character among Turkish writers.
For example, noted Turkish historian and chronicler I˙smail Hami Danismend
describes Talaˆt as a man ‘‘whose special reputation as a liar . . . kept growing
progressively (bilhassa yalanc|l|k s o¨hreti genis lemis tir).23 The editor of the Turkish
newspaper Sabah wrote that ‘‘Talaˆt lied like a machine.’’24 Su¨leyman Naz|f, a famous
writer, publicist, and governor of several provinces, after Talaˆt’s escape from Istanbul,
described him in following way: ‘‘He, Talaˆt, had no other talent than just being tricky’’
(hileden bas ka meziyeti olmayan Talaat).25
It should not be surprising, then, that Talaˆt’s close political friends did not hesitate
to refer to him as a ‘‘liar.’’ His closest friend, Hu¨seyin Cahit, remarked that Talaˆt
‘‘would lie in both state and political matters.’’26 According to Falih R|fk| Atay, who
worked in the Interior Ministry with Talaˆt Pasha in 1913–1914, Talaˆt was a person
‘‘who did not view lies or cruelty as immoral.’’ Atay relates that the issuance of a second
coded telegram nullifying whatever order Talaˆt had just sent by official telegram was
an ordinary, everyday occurrence.27 We learn from the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau
and Halil Mentes e that Talaˆt, a former telegrapher, had a special private telegraphic
line run to his house from which he directed his communications.28
The cancellation of an order sent by official telegram through the issuing of a
second telegram was a method used quite frequently by Ottoman administrators. Hans
Von Seekt, who had served as the Ottoman Army’s chief of staff, relates that it was a
general rule that secret orders and clues to indicate invalidity would follow previously
sent official orders.29 In his memoirs, Ottoman officer Selahattin explains how Enver
Pasha often canceled the official orders he had sent, by official channels, to appease the
Germans by following them up with telegrams sent from the private telegraph office
set up in his house.30
The 5–10% Regulation
The documents available in the Istanbul archive explicitly show that the government
ordered the regional authorities to ensure that any relocated group (Muslim or non-
Muslim) not exceed 5–10% of the population in their new location. This is an important
indicator that there was a calculated social policy behind the deportations. Until
recently, some scholars, myself included, knew about this policy from a document
cited in most official Turkish sources but interpreted it as a diversion tactic by the
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Ottoman authorities.31 However, newly discovered documents from the Interior
Ministry archives indicate that this was not a diversion strategy but, rather,
a calculated policy applied not only to the relocation of Armenians, but also that of
Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, and others. For example, a telegram sent from
the Interior Ministry to various provinces in May 1916 demands that the Kurds
be separated from their religious leaders and sheiks and that they be settled in
Anatolia in numbers not exceeding 5% of the indigenous population.32 Another
telegram, sent by Talaˆt Pasha to Ankara on 1 October 1915, indicates that the
Albanians and Bosnians should be dispersed among the Turkish population so as not
to exceed 10% of the native population.33
Other telegrams also state that in regions where the number of Armenians is not
significant, no relocation is necessary.34 In each region, the government kept continual
track of population percentages, constantly asking for the numbers both of expelled
groups and of the remaining relocated groups in a particular place. For example,
a telegram to Canik district asks how many Greeks have been moved out of the
province, where they have been sent, and how many remain.35
In regions to which Armenians were deported, this rule ensured that they would
not represent more than 10% of the population in their new location.36 In the region of
Der Zor, for example, the Armenian population exceeded 10%; the Interior Ministry
sent telegrams to the governors of Adana, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Aleppo, saying that the
percentage of Armenians in Der Zor had passed 10% and that it was not suitable to
send more Armenians there.37 German sources also confirm that the local Ottoman
authorities in these areas followed this policy closely.38
I would like to point out two important consequences that can be inferred from the
above-mentioned information. First, if the assertion is correct that Armenians should
not represent more than 10% of the indigenous population of their new location, what
was done with those Armenians in Syria and Iraq who were over the 10% limit?
According to Ottoman statistics, the number of deported Armenians was around one
million, a number that would far exceed 10% of the indigenous population of Syria and
Iraq. The population of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces in 1914 (mostly modern
Iraq and Syria) could be estimated at between 2 and 2.5 million, including the
Christian population.39 The Ottoman documents themselves speak against the
Turkish state’s thesis that there was no planned genocide, because they cannot
answer the question of how approximately one million Armenians could fail to exceed
5–10% of the local population. If one adheres to this official thesis, the only way to
explain the variation in numbers is to posit that the Armenians simply evaporated.40
The second important point that we can infer from these documents is that the loss
of Armenian life was not due to logistical and wartime complications of the deporta-
tions, as the official histories claim, but was a direct consequence of this relocation
policy. This becomes clear when we see that, according to Ottoman documents, the
resettlement of roughly one million Muslims into the evacuated Armenian and Greek
villages was largely successful and was accomplished without great loss of life.
Documents Revealing Different Treatment of Armenians
The documents from the BOA paint a very clear picture of different treatment for the
Armenians, some of which can be used as direct evidence of the genocidal intent of the
Ottoman authorities. Among these records, Talaˆt Pasha’s coded telegram dated
12 July 1915 and sent to Diyarbekir is the most notorious. In this telegram he
relates how the news has reached him that, along with the Armenians in the region,
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other Christians are also being murdered. He states that he has heard that the number
of dead has reached an estimated 2,000 and then adds,
Whereas it is categorically forbidden for other Christians to be included under the
disciplinary and political measures adopted in regard to the Armenians, an immediate
stop should be put to this sort of occurrence, which will have a bad effect on public
opinion, and will indiscriminately place the lives of Christians in extraordinary danger,
and the reality of the situation [should be] reported.41
The language could not be clearer. People, many of them employed as civil servants by
the state, were being killed at the behest of the governor’s office. This, however, was
not really the point for Talaˆt; in fact, he was complaining that a policy that was to have
been applied to Armenians alone had in fact spread to other Christians. It is for this
reason that the telegram demands that the killing of other Christians stop.42
The fate of the governor of Diyarbekir, Res it Bey, reveals to a great extent the
reality of state policy toward the Armenians. According to the BOA documents, the
killing continued anyway, and so Talaˆt sent additional requests (on 22 July and 2
August 1915) to Res it Bey to cease the indiscriminate killing of Christians, reminding
him of his personal responsibility in the matter.43 Despite these threats, there was
never any inquiry into the governor’s responsibility for the deaths. However, Res it was
eventually taken to task for expropriating the wealth of his victims, especially the
Armenians. In a telegram dated 6 October 1915, Talaˆt inquires about the jewelry and
other possessions taken from the deportees, demanding that the wealth be sent to
Istanbul.44 Later Res it was promoted to Ankara. When he subsequently tried to buy
a villa beyond his obvious means, he was immediately removed from his position.
After the war, when Res it Bey committed suicide, wartime governor and newspaper
editor Su¨leyman Nafiz exposed this story in the former governor’s obituary,
commenting that Talaˆt Pasha had no qualms about his capacity for killing but could
not abide his theft.45
Other documents in the BOA can also be seen to show the genocidal intent of the
Ottoman authorities. A telegram was sent from Istanbul by the Directorate of General
Security (EUM) on 12 January 1916 to the regional office in Ankara, demanding
‘‘information as to whether the Armenians, whose names are known, are alive, and if
so, their whereabouts following the deportation operation.’’46 It reveals the kind of
anxiety the administrators in Istanbul were experiencing. What they wanted to learn
was whether those Armenians they had identified were alive, and, if so, where they
were. Similarly, anxiety in the regions of Erzurum, Mamuretu¨laziz, Diyarbekir, and
Bitlis is shown in a telegram stating that
there’s word spreading that after the Armenians are annihilated in Dersim and the
surrounding areas, the Kurds are going to be next. All precautions necessary must be
taken to prevent the spread of these kinds of rumors.47
Besides the obvious anxieties shown above, the documents of the Cipher Office of
the Interior Ministry also provide important circumstantial evidence of the genocidal
intent of the Ottoman authorities. As we know, the 1948 UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide counts among the elements of
genocide the forcible transfer of children of one group to another.48 Among the
documents in the BOA are many that show such intentional acts. We learn from these
documents that Armenian children were taken from their families, sent to Muslim
villages where there were no Armenians, married off to Muslims, or settled in
orphanages with explicit instructions that they were to be raised in a manner
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consistent with Muslim norms and customs. For example, a telegram sent by the
Interior Ministry’s Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants (AMMU)49 to various
provincial offices on 30 April 1916, after stating that ‘‘those families who have no one
and are unprotected should be sent to villages and towns where there are no foreigners
or Armenians,’’ goes on to urge that
young and widowed women should be married off, children up to the age of twelve
should be settled into orphanages, and if an adequate space in the orphanage is not
available, then they should be settled with Muslim families and raised with that
community’s values and customs.50
A telegram sent by Talaˆt Pasha himself, on 30 December 1915, to the governor’s
office in Nigˇde makes his demands quite explicit:
on the condition that they be raised as Muslims, the children should be settled in
Muslim villages where there are no Armenians or foreigners, or settled into
orphanages. The young women and girls must be married off to Muslims.51
The document shows that it was considered a necessity that the Armenians as a group
be prevented from maintaining their identity. In yet another telegram, we see that the
aim is to tear families apart by taking the men away. This telegram asks that those
families who have had their males taken away be ‘‘moved to villages and towns where
there are no Armenians or foreigners so that they can be settled away from each
other.’’52 These records show that the CUP leaders intended to destroy the conditions
under which the Armenians had maintained their lives.
The Seizure of Armenian Property
In addition to the issue of the deportation of Armenians themselves, it is important to
understand what happened to their personal and real property. The treatment of
Armenians’ material goods shows the two-track organization of the deportations. On
the one hand there are obvious and explicit legal and financial rules for the treatment
of such property; on the other, we can see from the BOA documents that these goods
were in fact controlled in other ways that contradict the legal framework. My
argument here is essentially that the seizure of Armenian property, and the manner in
which it was utilized, proves incontrovertibly that the CUP agenda was to rid Anatolia
of Armenian life and culture by pulling them out by the roots.
The fact that many laws and regulations were promulgated for the purpose of
managing the use of, sale of, and later compensation for the property the Armenians
left behind is commonly used by Turkish authorities to argue that deportation was
never meant to lead to annihilation. It is claimed that instances of abuse and unlawful
seizure of goods were isolated incidents, and that the state took Armenian property
and goods under its protection and later compensated the owners when they were
settled at their ultimate destinations. It is true that, on the subject of protection and
compensation, many temporary laws and regulations were issued.53
The first attempt at regulatory organization occurred on 30 May 1915, with a
decision issued by the cabinet ministers. According to this decision, the Armenians
would be ‘‘distributed property and land’’ in the places where they were resettled, and
the ‘‘property and furnishings or valuables’’ they had left behind ‘‘would be returned to
them in some shape or manner.’’ In furtherance of this goal, in order to set out
‘‘the acquisition, protection and management of abandoned property and the treatment
of, the settlement of, and effects to and organization, examination, and inspection of
peoples,’’ various commissions in the regions were to be established by the Ministries
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of the Interior and of Finance. This instructional notice, issued by the Office of Tribal
and Refugee Settlement (IAMM) of the Interior Ministry, contained fifteen separate
clauses outlining how the settlement and maintenance of all these people was to take
place.54 On 31 May 1915 this instructional notice was sent, along with a letter, to the
Ministries of the Interior, War, and Finance for the purpose of implementation of the
regulations.55
The second organizational attempt took place on 10 June 1915.56 The very long
instructional manual was made up of thirty-four separate clauses. Because of the
disorganization and confusion of the operational stage, and the frequent need for
answers to questions from the local administrators, telegram after telegram was
issued, and new instructions had to be sent out.57 Besides the looting and
embezzlement that occurred at the local level, there was a bigger problem that had
not been addressed by the instructional manual. How were the many foreign
companies—German ones being at the top of the list—to be compensated for their
accounts receivable from the Armenians who had been deported? Germany, which had
been making attempts to address the problem from the beginning and later issued an
ultimatum on 8 August 1915 stating that it would ‘‘hold the Ottomans liable for the
losses being suffered,’’ finally issued an official memo in protest on 16 September 1915,
when it became obvious that previous attempts to be heard were futile.58 Finally, on
26 September 1915, two days before the opening of the next Assembly session, the
cabinet ministers issued a temporary law to organize the use of Armenian property.
Later this law, which changed the decree of 30 May with the aim of ‘‘liquidating
all Armenian goods and property,’’ would be harshly criticized in the Senate by Ahmet
R|za.59 In order to execute the law, a new proposal would be put forth on 8 November
1915 and an official decree on the subject would be published.60 The salience of
these organizational efforts is that official status was accorded to the newly established
regional commissions to manage the abandoned properties.
Those who argue that there was no intent on the part of the Ottoman rulers to
annihilate the Armenians attribute great importance to these detailed and extensive
regulations. This evidence is problematic, however, because there is not one document
to verify that the policy was ever actually realized. Until now not a single record has
been found in the Ottoman Archives to show that any Armenian who was forcibly
moved ever received compensation from the sale of his property.61
There is no evidence to show that the land, houses, seeds, and tools that the laws
and regulations promised to the Armenians once they were resettled were ever
actually granted. One would expect thousands of records in the archives to document
how many Armenians were resettled, and in what areas, and the kinds of difficulties
they encountered. One would also expect thousands of documents on the amount of
income realized, how that income was returned, the resources distributed to the
Armenians in the places where they were resettled, and so on. But there is not one
piece of paper to document any of this. While the telegrams sent by the Interior
Ministry to the regions where Armenians were deported, asking ‘‘How many people
have been sent away, how many Armenians remain?’’ number in the hundreds, it
cannot be a coincidence that there is not a single telegram asking about their condition
in the places where they were moved.
It is not a coincidence, then, that there are hundreds of records showing who
received the Armenian properties that were left behind, how they were sold, what
income was realized from their sale, and what was done with that income. The reality
reflected in these records is that the Ottoman administrators pursued a very
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systematic and orderly policy on how to manage the property and possessions left
behind by deported Armenians. The only principle that cannot be found in this
systematic and orderly policy is any intention to return just compensation of these
properties to their rightful owners, or to make an effort to deal with their problems of
settlement once they were deported.
What the records show is that the Ottoman administrators used Armenian
property in five principal ways.
1. To Meet the Needs of Newly Arrived Muslim Immigrants
Property left behind by the Armenians was distributed among the Muslims resettled in
the areas formerly occupied by Armenians. This intention was openly declared in both
the 30 May and the 15 June organizational proposals. To illustrate this, here are
several communications sent to various regional offices at the time:
 A telegram sent by the Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement (IAMM) of
the Ministry of the Interior to the regional offices of Ankara, Adana, Aleppo,
Hu¨davendigar, and others, along with the governor’s offices of Izmit, Urfa,
Canik, and others, about assigning Armenians’ empty houses to the coming
immigrants.62
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Trabzon Commission for
Liquidation, directing that the refugees in the region be clothed with the goods
left behind in the warehouses and stores of the region.63
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the regional offices of Ankara, Adana, Aleppo,
and others, along with the governors’ offices of Izmit, Eskis ehir, Urfa, and
others, directing that refugees from the war zone, who were in need and
without support, be settled into abandoned properties and that they be provided
with property and provisions and placed in a variety of jobs.64
2. To Support the Growth of a Muslim Bourgeoisie
Much of the property left behind by the Armenians was distributed among Muslim
individuals or companies in the region for the purpose of creating a Muslim bourgeois
class, often without demand for payment in kind or on terms of very low payment or
payment in installments. Here are some examples of such activities from the Cipher
Office of the Interior Ministry:
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to Adana (Do¨rtyol) and from the Directorate of
General Security (EUM) to Diyarbekir regional offices states that ‘‘it may be
suitable that the properties of Armenians owned prior to the deportation be sold
and transferred at a reasonable exchange to the Muslim population.’’65
 Telegrams sent by the IAMM to the regional offices of Erzurum, Adana, Edirne,
and others; to the governors’ offices of Urfa, Izmit, Kayseri, Maras , and others;
and the Presidencies of the Commissions for Liquidation in Tekfurdagˇ, Adana,
Aleppo, Gemlik, and others, states that, for the purpose of increasing the
number of Muslim businesses, the properties left by Armenians should be
transferred by way of issuance of shares that may be acquired by business
owners and farmers and that, in furtherance of this aim, whatever needs to be
done should be done so that intra-Muslim trade is thereby developed.66
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for
Liquidation in Trabzon states that ‘‘in order to transfer the business of artisans
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and trade to Muslims, abandoned contents of stores should be sold to honorable
young people by installment.’’67
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for
Liquidation in the district of Ordu outlines how the businesses of Armenian
artisans and tradesmen should be transferred to Muslims, and to whom they
should be transferred.68
 A supplemental telegram sent to the regional offices of Edirne, Adana, Ankara,
and others, along with the governors’ offices of Kayseri, Canik, and others and
the Presidencies of the Commissions for Liquidation of Adana, Aleppo, Izmit,
and others, contains instructions for the low-cost rental of factories, stores, and
manufacturing facilities left by the Armenians to Muslim companies, so that
they do not lie vacant and unused.69
3. To Meet Military Needs
One of the most important needs met by Armenian properties was that of the armed
forces. Military needs were met either by commandeering of buildings, which were
used by the military during their operations, or by selling commodities produced by
the fields and lands abandoned by Armenians. It must be added that the policy of
using abandoned property for military purposes was not confined to Armenians; the
abandoned property of Greeks met the same fate. Here are a few examples of the
communications sent in connection with military use of abandoned property:
 A telegram from the IAMM to the governor’s office of Urfa discusses the milling
and processing of abandoned crops transferred from the Armenians and the
consignment of the resulting commodities to the military.70
 A telegram sent by the Office of Communications, Ministry of War, to the
governor’s office of Ku¨tahya asking, for the purpose of being used by the
military, for the price, type, and amount of property and goods.71
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the governor’s office of Kala-| Sultaniyeye
(modern C¸anakkale), in furtherance of an official report, discusses the delivery
to the military, after appraisal, of the value of grapes from abandoned
vineyards.72
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the regional offices of Aydin and
Hu¨davendigar, along with the governor’s office of Karasi and the Presidency
of the Commissions for Liquidation at Bursa and Karasi, pertains to the
delivery of the harvest of grapes and figs from abandoned Greek properties
to the military.73
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the governor’s office of Mentes e directs that
the abandoned properties of Greeks, in accordance with the proposal, be
consigned to the Muslim refugees (muhacir) and the army, with the exception of
live animals, which should be distributed to the local population.74
4. To Cover the Expense of Deporting the Armenians
The records in my possession show that income received from the sale of property left
behind by the Armenians was used to compensate the state for the expenses associated
with deporting them.75
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for the
Administration of Abandoned Property in Aleppo concerns the use of part of the
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income received from the sale of abandoned livestock for the deportation and
maintenance of Armenians.76
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Director of Immigrants, S u¨kru¨ Bey, in
Aleppo orders the use of the income derived from the profits of abandoned
property left in Aleppo, along with the monies to be sent from Eskis ehir,
for the purposes of meeting the expenses of deporting and maintaining
Armenians.77
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the office of the deputy governor of Aleppo
directs that the income from the profits of abandoned property be consigned to
the finance treasury for the purpose of meeting the expenses of maintaining and
deporting Armenians.78
Some of these documents discuss the fact that some of the state’s expenses in
connection with deporting Armenians could not be met and explicitly indicate that
Armenian properties would have to be used for this purpose and that state expenses
would therefore be compensated:
Since the maintenance of the Armenians deported from Zeytunlu cannot be
appropriately met by the state alone, they must provide their own sustenance. Please
specify the amount spent for their maintenance thus far and how many kurus [units of
Ottoman currency] are needed to continue the resettlement.79
5. For Various Other State Needs
In some circumstances, Armenian-owned buildings were used either as prisons or for
various other state needs. Examples of communications regarding the need for prison
facilities are the following:
 A telegram sent by the Directorate of State Real Estate and the Office of Prisons
to the regional and governors’ offices of Edirne, Adana, Ankara, Ic¸el, Nigˇde, and
others inquires about the presence of abandoned buildings large enough to be
converted to prisons and their state of repair.80
 A telegram from the General Health Office (S|hh|ye Mu¨diriyeti Umumiyesi) to
local offices in Erzurum, Bitlis, and Sivas provinces, among others, reserves
buildings and health equipment left behind after the deportation of non-
Muslims for the use of health offices in these regions.81
What all these documents tell us is that the Ottoman government had a systematic
policy toward the properties left behind—those that could be saved from looting—
which was in furtherance of specific purposes. After the property, and the income that
could be derived from it, had been used for the state’s various needs, there was nothing
left to be returned to its lawful owners, the Armenians.
Investigating the Deportation
One of the primary pieces of evidence used to support the notion that the deportation
was not a means to annihilate the Armenians of Anatolia are the investigations
initiated during World War I. According to this argument, there were isolated
incidents of abuse by local officials and administrators, but ‘‘by forming special
investigative commissions . . . the guilty were prosecuted by administrative courts.’’82
Similarly, a large proportion of the 1,397 people who were investigated are supposed
eventually to have been prosecuted and sentenced to various punishments, including
execution.83 The figure of 1,397, originally given by Kamuraˆn Gu¨ru¨n, has been
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repeated in every source. This repetition of unsubstantiated points has become one of
the main arguments of official Turkish state policy. But Gu¨ru¨n has neither published
any single document in support of this figure nor even quoted from any document.
Repeating Gu¨ru¨n’s number, Halac¸ogˇlu asserts that the state officials found guilty for
their crimes ‘‘were tried in Military Tribunals and were punished by hard sentences,’’
including the death penalty.84 Halac¸ogˇlu cites twelve different documents in support of
his thesis, but only their catalogue numbers; he neither reproduces nor quotes any part
of any of these telegrams. Presumably this is because none of the documents that he
cites supports his claim. In fact, none of these documents contains the information that
any officer was either tried or sentenced for any crime against Armenian life.
The same documents, however, do make it clear that the sensitivity not shown
toward Armenians as human beings was nevertheless exhibited by the Ottoman
government toward their property. The state, which intended to make systematic use
of the abandoned property, made every effort to prevent it from falling into the hands
of individual looters. Prosecutions were, in fact, initiated against those accused of
looting or abusing authority over property. The above-mentioned telegrams cited by
Halac¸ogˇlu all deal with embezzlement and malfeasance related to how to handle the
remaining property. A telegram sent to Mamuretu¨laziz province, granting permission
for the interrogation of the Kaymakam Besni Edhem Kadri Bey, can be given as an
example.85 The great expenditure of effort to prevent individuals from laying claim to
Armenian property points to the state’s intention to keep all of that property as booty.
It was, in fact, because state officials saw abuse of abandoned property, and
recognized that they were losing control of the looting, that a spate of telegrams was
sent from the central office to the regional offices with orders to form investigative
commissions. The fact that these commissions were formed is used as evidence to prove
that the government did not promote a policy of murder and annihilation of
Armenians, asserting that the state did what it could to take control of the abuses.
On the contrary, however, a statement made in December 1918, after the Armistice, by
an official who worked in one of the commissions reveals that the earlier commissions
were formed as a result of pressure by foreign governments and that their authority
was limited to investigating the looting and abuses associated with abandoned
property. Additionally, the commissions were not granted the authority to investigate
high-ranking officials, nor to consign them to the investigating authority of the
military tribunals. In fact, the commissions often did not even bother to investigate the
regions for which they were supposedly responsible. The same official noted that
unfortunately the reports were not taken seriously at the time. Since the commissions
were formed with officials appropriate for basic investigations only, with limited
authority, only low-ranking civil servants, middle-level suspects, were sent to the
military tribunals for prosecution. As for the others, one could say, the reports which
were submitted had absolutely no effect.86
The ineffectiveness of these commissions was confirmed by testimony from the
wartime Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha. In his testimony before the Parliamentary
Investigative Commission, known as the ‘‘Fifth Branch,’’ which had been formed in
November 1918, Halim Pasha stated that,
following the massacres of the Armenians, investigative commissions were formed.
Pursuant to their duties, these commissions turned in their findings. Nevertheless, the
Interior Ministry did not want to reveal the results of the investigation. Despite all my
urgings and persistence, they obstinately dragged their feet concealing the real facts.
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So long as Talaˆt Pasha was part of the Interior Ministry, it was obvious that there
would be nothing coming from the investigations.87
As a result, these commissions, formed solely for the purpose of lessening pressure by
foreign states, were not even successful in fulfilling their limited authority to
investigate abuses and irregularities.
Another reality revealed by an examination of the records of the Interior Ministry’s
Cipher Office is that there were investigations brought against state agents who saved
Armenians, albeit through bribery, from the deportations. The following records show
the extent to which the Ottoman government acted with fastidiousness on the subject
of Armenian property, a quality lacking in its actions toward the Armenians
themselves. The last two examples are of investigations of civil servants accused of
helping Armenians to escape.
(1) A telegram was sent from the IAMM to the Mamuretu¨laziz regional offices and
office of the Presidency for the Commission for Abandoned Property about the
investigation of the news that officials and gendarmerie in Malatya and
Akc¸adagˇ had looted abandoned property worth about five million lira.88
(2) A telegram was sent by the EUM to Muhtar (Elder) Bey, Inspector of Civil
Servants for Ankara, regarding the need to travel to Izmit for the
investigation of irregularities and abuses arising in connection with the sale of
property belonging to Armenians who had been expelled from Izmit,
Adapazar|, and Bahc¸ecik.89
(3) A telegram sent from the EUM to the governor’s office of Diyarbekir relates to
the establishment of a commission to investigate abuse and neglect by civil
servants during the expulsion of the Armenians and to submit these to the
Military Tribunal for prosecution.90
(4) A telegram sent from the EUM to the Konya regional offices concerns the
investigation and prosecution of the deportation official of Konya station,
Mu¨laz|m Tahsin Efendi, who was accused of smuggling Armenians to Istanbul
using fake identification.91
(5) A telegram was sent from the EUM to the Aleppo regional office in connection
with transferring files to the military tribunal of gendarmerie guards who, in
exchange for money, had released some Armenians on the road to Der Zor
from Istanbul and Aleppo.92
The Matter of Deportees from Istanbul and Izmir
One of the other main arguments used to refute the idea that the deportation of
Armenians in 1915 was carried out with the purpose of ultimately annihilating them
that there were no deportations out of Istanbul or Izmir.93 However, the records of the
Cipher Office in the Interior Ministry give ample evidence that, in fact, there were
deportations from both these cities. (It is important to clarify that when we speak of
deportations from Istanbul in particular, in this instance, we are not referring to the
intellectuals arrested on 24 April 1915; that first group had been expelled to Ayagˇ and
C¸ank|r|.)94
There are extensive reports of a large deportation, apart from the initial arrests of
intellectuals, in British, American, and German sources that can be confirmed by
similar reports in the Cipher Office of the Interior Ministry. Below are some
summarized accounts of various archival sources that confirm deportations from
Istanbul and Izmir.
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The first record is presented in the ‘‘Blue Book’’ published in 1916 by Arnold
Toynbee. It is a letter written by the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, dated 15 August
1915. Speaking about the deportees from Istanbul, he states that
now it’s Constantinople’s turn. People are in a panic waiting for their bad luck to
descend upon them. Innumerable people have been arrested and sent outside of
Istanbul. Most will certainly die. Up until now those who had been deported were born
in the provinces but now it is the shop owners of Istanbul . . . no matter what it takes, we
are going to fight to save the Armenians of Istanbul from this horrible destruction . . .95
In another letter from the Balkan division of the Dashnak organization, dated
18 October 1915, information is given that
after giving everything they had, including their shoes to the gendarmerie, thousands
of poor Armenians who had been deported from Istanbul were sent walking from Izmit
towards Konya. Anyone who was rich enough to have money for the train was cheated
out of it by the gendarmerie, who took everything they had.96
The American missionary William S. Dodd, who was in Konya at the time,
repeated similar information:
another method of deportation was in making people walk and it was applied to a great
extent to the males who were deported from Istanbul. Their families were living in the
[Anatolian] villages and towns and they had been working in Istanbul, living without
their families. While the Turkish government engages in continuous propaganda over
how they haven’t deported anyone from Istanbul, they arrest thousands [in Istanbul]
who are working to support their families and deport them.97
German records from the same period document extensive deportations from
Istanbul. On 5 December 1915, the German foreign affairs secretary, Gottlieb von
Jagow, relayed news he had received from the Armenian Sofia Dashnak Committee to
Ambassador Metternich. According to Jagow,
contrary to their earlier promises, the Turkish government has started deporting the
Armenians from Constantinople. Supposedly 10,000 have been deported thus far, and
most of them have been killed in the hills of Izmit. There’s a list of 70,000 that’s been
drawn up.
Jagow sent Metternich the directive that ‘‘if this information is correct, please engage
in a forceful protest.’’98
Metternich, who responded to this telegram on 7 December 1915, reported that,
according to the Directorate of Security (EUM) in Istanbul, the number of Armenians
deported was around 30,000:
Based upon reliable information which I urge you to keep secret, after the 30,000 who
have been deported and 30,000 who have escaped during the past summer months,
there have been 4,000 Armenians deported from Constantinople to Anatolia and of the
80,000 who continue to live in Constantinople, it is planned that they be dispatched
piecemeal.99
What can be understood from these documents is that the deportations from
Istanbul occurred episodically. The newly available documents in the BOA support the
claim that there were, in fact, deportations from Istanbul and that they were carried
out according to specific criteria. We can infer from these documents that there were
four categories of deportees: unmarried males, the unemployed, those born outside of
Istanbul,100 and those accused of having been associated with Armenian organizations
such as the Dashnaks.101
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We can also confirm the Istanbul deportations based on data from the various
Istanbul military tribunals held between 1918 and 1922. For example, in the seventh
hearing of the trial known as the Nahiye Directors Case, an Armenian gave testimony
as to his experience of being deported, along with 200 others, in a convoy in July and
August 1915. Similar statements were made in another trial, against a police officer
named Hidayet Efendi. In this case the prosecution was brought for the crime of
‘‘causing the deportation of unmarried Armenians in the neighborhood of U¨sku¨dar and
seizing the property of some by entering the homes.’’ The accused was charged with the
deportation of close to 350 unmarried Armenian males from U¨sku¨dar.102
Other telegrams reveal that the deportations from Istanbul went through Konya to
Der Zor. In an EUM telegram to the Aleppo regional office appears the report that ‘‘the
gendarmerie guards are being prosecuted by the Military Tribunals for releasing
Armenians on the way to Der Zor from Istanbul and Aleppo in exchange for money.’’103
Other examples include the following:
(1) A telegram from the EUM to Edirne, Adana, Aydin, Ankara, Konya, and other
regional offices and the governors’ offices of Bolu, Kayseri, and others concerns
the dispatch of Armenians deported from Istanbul and other areas through
Konya, Karaman, Tarsus, Kars, Maras , and Pazarcik to Der Zor.104
(2) A telegram sent from EUM to the governor’s office of Izmit grants permission
from Dersaadet (Istanbul) for the expulsion of Armenians in Istanbul who
originate from Izmit and the surrounding areas.105
There are similar accounts of deportations from Izmir in both Ottoman and
German archival sources. A telegram from the EUM to the governor’s office of
Karahisar-i Sahip relates to the deportation of Armenians from Izmir by way of
Diyarbekir en route to Mosul.106 A German report from Izmir dated 10 November 1916
confirms that the deportation continued.107 It is well known that the deportation of the
Armenians from Izmir was stopped by the intervention of German General Liman von
Sanders.108 Significantly, there is further evidence of his intervention because it was
backed fully by the German Foreign Office.109
Some Concluding Remarks
The documents available in the BOA confirm the impression given by British, German,
Austrian, and American sources that the intention of the CUP’s policy toward
Armenians was clearly not to relocate and reestablish the Armenian communities of
Anatolia. What was intended was, in the CUP’s own words, ‘‘[e]saˆsl| bir suretde hal ve
fasl| ile ku¨lliyen izaˆlesi’’: ‘‘the total liquidation [of the Armenian question] in a manner
that is comprehensive and absolute.’’110 For this reason, a reassessment of the BOA
documents is necessary and timely.
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‘‘Native Christians Massacred’’: The
Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians
during World War I
Hannibal Travis
Florida International University College of Law
The Ottoman Empire’s widespread persecution of Assyrian civilians during
World War I constituted a form of genocide, the present-day term for an attempt
to destroy a national, ethnic, or religious group, in whole or in part. Ottoman
soldiers and their Kurdish and Persian militia partners subjected hundreds
of thousands of Assyrians to a deliberate and systematic campaign of massacre,
torture, abduction, deportation, impoverishment, and cultural and ethnic
destruction. Established principles of international law outlawed this war of
extermination against Ottoman Christian civilians before it was embarked
upon, and ample evidence of genocidal intent has surfaced in the form of
admissions by Ottoman officials. Nevertheless, the international community
has been hesitant to recognize the Assyrian experience as a form of genocide.
The Assyrian genocide is indistinguishable in principle from its Armenian
counterpart, however, and its recognition by scholars and the international
community may assist in the resettlement and relief of the Assyrian remnant,
currently fleeing by the thousands from its homelands in Iraq.
Introduction
Since the invasion of Iraq by a coalition of democratic nations in 2003, the plight of
the Christians of that nation has captured the world’s attention in a manner not seen
since World War I. What was a steady flow of Assyrian refugees out of Iraq, after the
Gulf War and the comprehensive economic sanctions of the 1990s, has accelerated
since the 2003 war into a torrent of refugee flight into western Asia, Europe,
the United States, and Australia. The international press could no longer ignore the
Assyrians’ increasingly desperate straits.1
During and after World War I, newspapers in London, Paris, New York, and Los
Angeles regularly reported on the desperate straits imposed on Assyrians, Chaldeans,
Nestorians, and Syriac Christians in the Ottoman Empire.2 Like the Armenians,
the Assyrians living in Mesopotamia, Persia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey became victims
of a genocidal ‘‘holy war’’ declared by the Ottoman Sultan and carried out by the Young
Turk regime of Enver Pasha. That this war against the indigenous Christians of
the Ottoman Empire was genocidal in character is manifest not only from the
admissions of Ottoman and Turkish officials at the highest levels of government but
also from those of their German allies in World War I, American and British officials,
legions of foreign journalists and missionaries, and, of course, the countless civilian
victims of the war’s massacres and deportations.
As described by those who lived them, the events of 1915–1916 in the Ottoman
Empire were clearly a form of genocide, the contemporary term for any attempt
to destroy a national, ethnic, or religious group in whole or in part. As in other
recognized genocides, the Ottomans and their local allies, the Kurds and
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Persians, demonstrated a pattern of deliberate and systematic targeting of Christians
as such, including Assyrians, for murder, maiming, enslavement, rape, dispossession,
impoverishment, and cultural and ethnic destruction. Nevertheless, governments and
historians have not been as willing to recognize the Assyrian experience during and
after World War I as a form of genocide, or even to acknowledge the existence and
criminality of the Ottoman atrocities against Assyrians, as to give such recognition to
the Ottoman genocide of the Armenians. Generally speaking, recognition of the latter
by both governments and historians has been more rapid, official, and detailed.
This article will argue that the hesitation to recognize the Assyrian genocide is
unjustified, for the evidence is overwhelming that Turks and their Kurdish allies
massacred tens, and more likely hundreds, of thousands of Assyrians in order to
exterminate the Christian population; raped and enslaved hundreds, and more likely
thousands, of Assyrian women in a systematic fashion; and deported the Assyrians
en masse from their ancestral lands under conditions that led to famine and
widespread death. I will maintain that the more rapid legal recognition and
establishment of compensation mechanisms for the Ottoman genocide of Armenians
are attributable to the larger numbers of Armenian victims and survivors, as well as to
more copious evidence of an intention on the part of the Young Turks to wipe out the
Armenian people. In conclusion, I will contend that the legal and historical recognition
of the Assyrian genocide at the hands of the Ottomans is vital to focus the world’s
attention on the Assyrian remnant in Iraq. That remnant has been dispersed by more
than a century of massacre, discrimination, and religious persecution into non-viable
communities that must be restored to their homelands, and to their rights of
self-determination, or they will scatter around the globe, refused asylum too often.
The Assyrians and the Turks in Mesopotamia and Persia
The Assyrian homeland is in northern Mesopotamia, present-day Iraq, where the
ancient cities of Assur and Nineveh were built.3 For 300 years, Assyrian kings ruled
the largest empire the world had yet known.4 The Assyrian Church of the East records
that the Apostle Thomas himself converted the Assyrians to Christianity within a
generation after the death of Christ.5 Christianity was ‘‘well established and
organized’’ in Mesopotamia by the third century CE.6
The (Assyrian) Church of the East became independent from the Roman Catholic
Church in the fifth century CE, after the Patriarch of Constantinople, Nestorius,
refused to assent to the concept of theotokos, or the idea that Mary was the mother of
God, and not merely of Jesus’ human form.7 By the sixth century CE, the Church of the
East had preached Christianity to the Persians, Medes, Huns, and Bactrians—indeed,
throughout the Middle East, from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and even as far
as India, Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan.8 One millennium later, the ethnic Assyrians
of Mesopotamia and Persia remained Christians, and some of them had entered into
communion with Rome by founding the Chaldean Catholic Church.9
Although some authors doubt that an Assyrian people could have survived from
600 BCE to the nineteenth century, many of the factors that justify recognizing
Armenians, Jews, and other groups as continuously existing since ancient times also
apply to the Assyrians: common patterns of worship, consistent self-identification, and
genetic continuity.10 As the early Christian church was growing and evange-
lizing distant lands, Assyrian identity survived the destruction of Nineveh.
Assyrians continued to practice their ancient religion and inhabited their ancient
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capital of Assur, rebuilt in a new style.11 The ancient Assyrian capital of Nineveh was a
Nestorian bishopric at the time of the Islamic conquest of Iraq, and Nestorian
‘‘Syrian’’—or, more likely, Assyrian—Christians living under the Abbasid Caliphs
are credited with translating many Greek scientific and philosophical works into
Arabic.12 The modern Assyrians of Iraq and Persia have had such ancient Assyrian
names as Sargon and Sennacherib since the earliest European contact with them.13
The name ‘‘Assyria’’ was also consistently applied to the area around the ancient
Assyrian capital of Nineveh, and the Christians of Iraq reaffirmed their Assyrian
identity from the earliest French and British contact.14 Although genetic testing of the
Assyrians is just getting under way, such testing as has been done supports the idea
that Assyrians very rarely intermarried with the surrounding population, at least
in Persia.15
The Assyrians have been a people without a state for more than two millennia,
since the fall of the empire and sack of Nineveh in 612 BCE.16 With the Arab conquests
of Mesopotamia and neighboring Persia and Syria, as well as Armenia, Egypt, and the
Levant, the Eastern Christian peoples fell to a subordinate status.17 Arab officials
decreed the destruction of many churches, the cessation of Christian religious services,
the deportation of Christians from the land, the expropriation of their property,
and the executions of those who resisted.18
For more than a thousand years before Mesopotamia and Persia fell under Turkish
domination, Turks had begun infiltrating Mesopotamia from Central Asia, as nomads
and imported slaves.19 The Seljuk Turks seized power from the Baghdad caliphs in the
eleventh century, only to be overthrown by the murderous Mongol hordes of Genghis
Khan, Hulagu Khan, and Timur the Lame.20 These forces massacred thousands of
people and destroyed many ancient cities, claiming countless Assyrian churches and
faithful and driving the Assyrian community into the nearly inhospitable Hakkari
mountains of Kurdistan.21 The Ottoman Turks re-conquered Mesopotamia in the
sixteenth century and ruled it, with substantial periods of Safavid Persian and
Mamluk Georgian rule intervening, until World War I.22
The Nineteenth-Century Massacres of the Ottoman Christians
Historians record that the first massacre of Assyrians in modern times took place in
the 1840s, in northern Mesopotamia. The Ottoman Turks allowed the Assyrians to be
massacred by the Kurdish chieftain Badr Khan Bey, who summoned the surrounding
Muslim population to a ‘‘Holy War,’’ killing 10,000 Assyrians, enslaving many women
and children, and ravaging villages.23 Turkish soldiers and their Kurdish allies
murdered the Christians of half a dozen Mesopotamian Christian villages;24 the
surviving women and children were kidnapped and enslaved.25 Slavery was a common
fate of Ottoman Christians in the nineteenth century.26
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II had
created an irregular force of pro-government Kurdish horsemen called the Hamidiye.27
The Hamidiye massacred and made refugees of the restive Assyrian and Armenian
subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as the contemporary Arab Janjaweed in Sudan have
done to the indigenous Africans in Darfur.28 Famine, ravaged towns and villages,
and extermination of the Christian population were the legacies of the Hamidiye
horsemen.29 The Kurds organized into the Hamidiye ‘‘received assurances that they
[would] not be called to answer before the tribunals for any acts of oppression
committed against Christians.’’30
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Ottoman forces killed tens of thousands of defenseless Christians in the capital,
Constantinople, and in the ‘‘provincial towns of the Empire.’’31 In 1895, the French
vice-consul for the southeastern Anatolian city of Diyarbekir reported a campaign
of terror against the Armenians and Assyrians. His description reminds us of
Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany: hundreds of Christians were murdered, hundreds
of Christian homes ransacked, and hundreds of Christian-owned shops looted and
burned.32 In nearby Urfa, the Edessa of Christian learning, the pogrom launched by
the Sultan led to the massacre of 3,000 women and children inside the city’s
cathedral.33
The French ambassador, Paul Cambon, wrote that Asia Minor was ‘‘literally in
flames,’’ with ‘‘massacres everywhere’’ and Kurds and other Muslims ‘‘massacring
all Christians without distinction.’’34 A French vice-consul wrote to the French
ambassador to Constantinople that the Ottoman government had, ‘‘for the last
few years, been pursuing its goal of gradually annihilating the Christian element’’
by ‘‘giving the Kurdish chieftains carte blanche to do whatever they please, to enrich
themselves at the Christians’ expense and to satisfy their men’s whims.’’35
The Hamidiye, the vice-consul declaimed, was ‘‘a band of official highway robbers
spreading terror throughout this vilayet [province or administrative division]
and many others.’’36 The ‘‘impunity they enjoy for the crimes they commit every
day’’ was ‘‘ample proof’’ of an Ottoman policy of annihilating the Christians of
the Empire.37
Ottoman Christians found themselves ‘‘dispersed’’ to other regions and living in
‘‘deplorable conditions.’’38 Their religious leaders predicted that ‘‘the Christian element
will slowly disappear, either by apostasy, emigration, or massacre.’’39 The Ottoman-
instigated atrocities of the Kurdish Hamidiye prompted the leaders of the Eastern
Christian denominations within the Empire to expect the ‘‘complete disappearance of
the Christian element.’’40
The Sultan had ‘‘consenting awareness’’ of the massacres of the Assyrians
and Armenians within his empire, an awareness of the same character used to
indict heads of states and armies for war crimes and genocide.41 According to a report
by the British consul, the Ottoman leadership had granted the Kurdish horsemen
guarantees against prosecution for murders of the Sultan’s Christian subjects.42 The
massacres of Armenians and other Christians spread to Sasun in 1904, and Adana and
Cilicia in 1909.43 The British and Russians threatened military intervention unless
the Ottomans reformed their pattern of persecuting their Christian subjects.44 But the
Sultan never implemented proposed reforms to protect minorities.45 The Ottoman
Empire’s campaign to exterminate its Christians had begun, as former British prime
minister William Ewart Gladstone recognized in a public speech in 1896.46
Eyewitness Accounts of the Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during
World War I
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire suffered a
string of setbacks that set its leaders on a much more violent and fanatical course.
A coalition of Austrian, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian forces drove the Turkish
occupiers out of their erstwhile imperial provinces in Europe, routing their armies
and inflicting thousands of casualties.47 An ultranationalist group called the
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or ‘‘Young Turks,’’ emerged after 1905 and
steadily gained control over the Ottoman government and legal system.48 The Young
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Turks seized power in 1913, forming a military dictatorship run by the triumvirate
of Ismail Enver Pasha, minister of war; Mehmet Talaˆt Pasha, minister of interior
affairs; and Ahmet Cemal Pasha, minister of the navy.49 The Young Turks
imposed ‘‘Ottomanization’’ and began conscripting Christians into the army for the
first time in many years, driving many Assyrians and other Christians to flee
the country.50
On 14 November 1914, less than two weeks after the Ottoman Empire declared
war on the Entente (Great Britain, France, and Russia), the Sultan, still acting as a
figurehead for the Young Turk regime, declared a jihad or holy war ‘‘against the
enemies of Islam, who have proven their hostility by their attacks on the Caliphate.’’51
The next day, a key CUP official led a march through Istanbul ‘‘meant to demonstrate
the people’s agreement with the Sultan’s declaration of holy war against the enemies
of Islam.’’52 The Sheikh al-Islam, a CUP appointee and the highest religious authority
in the Ottoman regime, endorsed the declaration of jihad and proclaimed it in print;
violence against Christian Armenians quickly followed.53 These declarations of jihad
‘‘incited wrath toward Christian minorities in the Ottoman lands, and . . . later
facilitated the government’s program of Genocide against the Armenians’’—and,
as it happened, the Assyrians.54
The Turks, reinforced by Kurdish irregulars, invaded Russian-controlled northern
Persia in the winter of 1914, and in early January 1915 they forced a Russian
evacuation of the northern Persian cities of Urmia, Tabriz, Salmas, Diliman, and
Gulpashan, among others.55 Kurdish irregulars would serve as important allies to
the Ottoman military in World War I, as the Hamidiye contingents had done prior to
the turn of the century.56
A key source of evidentiary support for the existence of the Armenian and
Assyrian genocides is the famous ‘‘Blue Book’’ compiled by Viscount James
Bryce and Arnold Toynbee in 1916, commonly known by the title under which
it was released by the British Foreign Office: The Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire 1915–16. The British government commissioned Viscount
Bryce and Mr. Toynbee, a young historian affiliated with Oxford University,
to prepare a ‘‘general narrative’’ of the ‘‘accounts of massacres and deportations
of the Christian population of Asiatic Turkey,’’ accounts that had increased in
‘‘number and fullness of detail.’’57 Most of these accounts were communicated to
Toynbee via the United States, then professing neutrality in World War I,
from citizens of neutral countries, often American missionaries.58 More than
three dozen of the reports in the Blue Book constituted official State Department
records.59
The original title of this compilation of American and European eyewitness
testimony and documentation of the Armenian and Assyrian genocides was ‘‘Papers
and Documents on the Treatment of Armenians and Assyrian Christians by the
Turks, 1915–1916, in the Ottoman Empire and North-West Persia.’’60 Bryce, some-
thing of a ‘‘champion of the Ottoman Armenians,’’61 had removed the reference to
Assyrian Christians in the title of the Blue Book prior to its publication by Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office.62 The deletion of the accounts of the Assyrian massacres
from the French translation of the Blue Book presented to the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919–1920 further distorted the historical record.63
The Blue Book documents how, under Turkish occupation and ‘‘urged on and
followed by Turkish officers and troops,’’ the Kurds and other Muslims in and around
Urmia ‘‘set to work robbing and looting, killing men and women and outraging
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the women.’’64 Turkish forces directly massacred the Christian population and failed
to prevent many other massacres, leading to
the murder of over one thousand people—men, women, and children; the outraging of
hundreds of women and girls of every age—from eight or nine years old to old age; the
total robbing of about five-sixths of the Christian population; and the total destruction
of about the same proportion of their houses.65
At least 4,000 perished from disease while or after being driven from their homes
or lands.66 Kidnapping and sexual slavery were used to destroy the Christian
community: ‘‘Over two hundred girls and women were carried off into captivity, to be
forced to embrace Islam and to accept Mohammedan husbands.’’67
Another eyewitness account recorded in the Blue Book states that in the largest
‘‘Syrian’’ or Assyrian village in Urmia,68 all the men were hauled over to the cemetery
to be murdered, while the ‘‘women and girls [were] treated barbarously,’’ and sixty men
were removed from the French Mission and summarily shot.69 In the Catholic Mission
in Urmia, dozens of Christians, including an Episcopal bishop, ‘‘were bound together
one night, taken to Gagain mountain and there shot down.’’70 A minister affiliated
with the Church of England’s mission to Assyrians reported that ‘‘those who died from
the slaughter and raiding of villages numbered 6,000.’’71 Another report estimated
8,500 deaths in and around Urmia in five months in 1915.72
Many other Assyrians in Persia suffered a similar fate under the Turks. In Salmas,
a town in Persia inhabited by more than 2,000 Assyrians, the Turks gathered
together and massacred about 800 Christians, mostly women and older men, prior
to the Turkish withdrawal from the area.73 Some Christian men ‘‘were tied with
their heads sticking through the rungs of a ladder and decapitated, others hacked
to pieces or mutilated before death.’’74 In Diliman, Persia, ‘‘all the males above
twelve years of age . . . were taken to two neighboring villages, tortured and shot.’’75
In Gulpashan, Persia, dozens of men were tied together to be shot outside the
village, their ‘‘wives and daughters distributed among the Turks, Kurds, and
Persian Mohammedans.’’76 About one-fifth of the 30,000 Assyrians living in
Urmia and its surrounding villages died, and their villages were the most
part torched, with their cultural property, their churches, reduced to ruin.77 These
accounts from the Blue Book are corroborated by American diplomatic files, which
document that
During the period of Turkish occupation [of northwestern Persia], from January 1st to
May 24th [1915], all the Christian villages and all the Christians living in Moslem
villages were completely looted, men were killed, women were violated and some two
hundred girls taken away captive . . .. thousands died of disease.78
American missionary William A. Shedd reported to the US minister to Persia that
one-fifth of the total population of Christians in the Urmia region had perished in the
first five months or so of 1915 alone and that the vast majority of families had had
all their property stolen.79
In Turkey itself, the Assyrians were caught up with the Armenians in a common
genocidal campaign against Christians. Thousands of Assyrians and Chaldeans were
caught up with nearly half a million Armenians in massacres, widespread assaults
against woman and girls, and pillaging of immeasurable amounts of property.80
Referring to southeastern Turkey, German missionary Johannes Lepsius wrote,
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‘‘In certain places, as in Mardin, all Christians have suffered the same fate without
differentiation as to race or denomination.’’81
The Blue Book reports that the governor of the vilayet of Van, Djevdet Bey, led
massacres of its Christian, mostly Armenian, population.82 Another source reports
that two dozen or more Assyrian and Chaldean villages in Van lost hundreds of
civilians to these massacres.83 Djevdet Bey formed special divisions of Turkish troops
known as ‘‘butcher battalions’’ (Kassab Tabouri), which massacred the men of Bitlis.84
His troops and their local allies collected all the women and the girls in an open area,
systematically assaulted them, and then sold them into slavery or gave them as ‘‘gifts’’
to one another.85 Similarly, in Bashkala (Bachcelet), a town in Van, ‘‘many hundreds
(perhaps some thousands) of Armenians and Syrians . . . [were] massacred.’’86
Armenians reported that the women and children of the Bashkala area had been
either killed or forced into ‘‘a captivity worse than death.’’87
The Chaldean population of Turkey generally shared the fate of the Armenians,
including 8,000 Chaldeans killed in the diocese and village of Seert; nearly 4,000 killed
in the city and diocese of Adana; many Chaldean families killed in the villages
surrounding the diocese of Diyarbekir (save for about forty families in Diyarbekir
itself); and hundreds of Chaldeans from dozens of families deported from the city of
Mardin, the diocese of Jazirah, and the diocese of Amadiya.88 About 500 Christians
met their end in a massacre inside a Chaldean church.89
The slaughter of Christians described in the Blue Book was not confined to
Turkey or to northern Persia but extended to Mesopotamia. The Assyrians, after
suffering ‘‘massacres and aggressions’’ instigated by Turkish officials and carried out
by Kurds,90 had declared independence from the Ottomans, giving the ‘‘best
of pretexts’’ to the Kurds to attack them ‘‘under Turkish instigation.’’91 Even prior to
the war, the Turks had refused to restrain Kurdish forces from slaughtering
Christians and plundering their habitations.92 An American missionary reported
that his countrymen ‘‘would have been ashamed not to resist under such
circumstances.’’93 Those Christians who could not fight back had fled to
Urmia from the districts of Tergawar, Dasht, and Mergawar, which, according
to Dr. Harry P. Packard of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian
Church, ‘‘had been destroyed.’’94 An American missionary reported, and the
US minister to Persia corroborated, that in October 1914, prior to the Assyrian
declaration of independence, ‘‘mixed forces encroached upon the city of Urmia,
robbing and looting two Christian villages, killing many non-combatants.’’95 The news
of these massacres in the northwest ‘‘and the hope of support from the Russians
eventually led to the [Assyrian] patriarch officially declaring war on Turkey in
the name of his nation (Millet) on May 10, 1915.’’96 Thus, although the Assyrians
lacked the political parties and proximity to the Ottoman capital that made
the Armenians a perceived threat to the Young Turks, they adopted a sympathetic
position to the liberation of Eastern Christians by czarist Russia that threatened
the Ottoman Empire’s expansion.
In the Hakkari mountains of northern Mesopotamia, which also extend into
northern Persia and southeastern Turkey, the Turks and their Kurdish allies
destroyed many Christian villages and plundered the crops and goods there,
condemning the Christian population to mass starvation.97 An American missionary
stationed in northern Mesopotamia reported that the Kurds there ‘‘had interpreted
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the deportations of the Armenians as another decree against all Christians.’’98
The Blue Book states that forty villages in one district of the Hakkari region had only
seventeen survivors between them.99
When the Turks were forced out of Persia by the Russians in May [1915], the Turks
turned on their own Assyrians. In mid-June . . . an attack was launched on the
mountainous dwellings of the Assyrians, initially . . . in the Hakkiari district, the seat
of their spiritual leader, whose title is Mar Shimun . . .. The Turks tried to starve them
out . . . [in what was] only the beginning of the upheaval, dispersion and massacre
that characterized the history of the Assyrians throughout the war and into the
mid-1930s.100
Assisted by Ottoman troops, Kurds entered Goele, a village of 300 Assyrian
Catholic and Protestant families, and murdered the men, enslaved the women
and children, and pillaged the houses in the village.101 In another Assyrian village of
fifty houses, Kurds attacked and killed the entire defenseless population.102 Johannes
Lepsius reported a massacre of 250 Chaldeans in Jazirah (Djesire), in northwestern
Mesopotamia.103
By the summer of 1915 the Kurds had carried out the ‘‘proclamation of Jihad’’ and
had ‘‘ravaged’’ Assyrian villages of Mesopotamia, driving the Assyrians into a
desperate flight to Urmia.104 After the Russian revolution and the dissolution of
the czarist army, the Assyrian nation embarked upon a ‘‘routed, headlong, and
massacre-haunted straggle’’ out of northern Persia and over the mountains back into
British-controlled Mesopotamia.105 In 1916, sixteen bishops of the Protestant
Episcopal Church of the United States issued an appeal declaring that Assyrian
refugees from the Hakkari mountains were ‘‘living in barns’’ and were ‘‘so lean
and emaciated that death will get at them wholesale.’’106 ‘‘With the loss of the Hakiari
region . . ., the Assyrians lost not only their homeland but also more than half
their population . . .. the Apostolic Church of the East appeared to have been entirely
wiped out.’’107 As the Earl of Listowel, speaking in the House of Lords on 28 November
1933, stated, ‘‘the Assyrians fought on our side during the war,’’ and made ‘‘enormous
sacrifices,’’ having ‘‘lost altogether by the end of the War about two-thirds of their
total number.’’108
The British accepted the ‘‘remnant’’ of the Assyrian population into refugee
camps, only one-third having survived the depredations of the Turks and Kurds.109
After World War I, the Turks prevented these refugees from returning to the Hakkari
mountains,110 and forces loyal to Mustafa Kemal ‘‘Atatu¨rk’’ murdered many of
the surviving Assyrian men not under British or Soviet protection; raped many young
girls and sold others into harem slavery; and deported 8,000 Christians from
Mesopotamia into the interior of Turkey.111 In 1925, the Turks ordered Kurdish
chiefs to massacre the Assyrians; Turkish soldiers and Kurds murdered many
Assyrians, raped and kidnapped women, plundered houses, and deported populations
in a way that ensured many deaths from starvation and disease.112 Tens of thousands
had died from ‘‘perpetual attacks on all sides from the Turks, Kurds and Persians
alike’’ and from smallpox, other diseases, and the heat, which combined to claim
children and the elderly in particular.113 Only about 20,000 Assyrians lived in Iraq
by the 1940s, a number that was equaled or eclipsed by the number living in the Soviet
Union (20,000) and in Chicago (30,000).114
The Turks extended their policy of exterminating the Christians of the empire
to the Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Lebanese. More than 1.5 million Armenians
perished in a premeditated campaign of disarmament, assassination of political
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and cultural leaders, massacre, systematic rape, deportation, pillage, and famine.115
According to an Associated Press report, of 500,000 Greeks deported from Thrace,
in Asia Minor, an estimated 250,000, or half, died of disease and torture.116 Starting
in 1910, the Ottoman Turks made about one million Greeks homeless and deported
hundreds of thousands; as many as 300,000 Greeks died of hunger, disease, and
the cold as a result.117 In the 1920s, the Turkish nationalists massacred about
200,000 more Christians, mostly Greeks, in cities such as Smyrna. Greek men became
victims of murder, torture, and starvation; Greek women suffered all this and
also became slaves in Muslim households; Greek children wandered the streets
as orphans ‘‘half-naked and begging for bread’’; and millions of dollars’ worth of
Greek property passed into Muslim hands.118 In Syria and Lebanon, ‘‘the young
Turks purposely created a famine that achieved the death of at least 100,000
people.’’119
Diplomatic and Journalistic Confirmation of the Assyrian Genocide
Viscount James Bryce, former British ambassador to the United States,
described Turkish crimes against Assyrians and Chaldeans during World War I
as follows:
The bloodstained annals of the East contain no record of massacres more unprovoked,
more widespread or more terrible than those perpetrated by the Turkish
Government upon the Christians of Anatolia and Armenia in 1915. It was the
sufferings of the Armenians that chiefly drew the attention of Britain and America
because they were the most numerous among the ecclesiastical bodies, and
the slaughter was, therefore, on a larger scale. But the minor communities, such
as the Nestorian and Assyro-Chaldean churches, were equally the victims of the plan
for exterminating Christianity, root and branch, although the Turks had never
ventured to allege that these communities had given any ground of offense. An account
of these massacres, organized and carried out with every circumstance of cruelty by
Enver and Talaat, chiefs of the ruffianly gang who were then in power in
Constantinople, has been given in the Blue Book, published by the British Foreign
Office in 1916, and entitled ‘‘Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire.’’ . . . similar cruelties [were] perpetrated upon members of the Assyro-
Chaldean Church in which about half of them, men, women and children, perished at
the hands of Turkish murderers and robbers.120
American diplomatic and journalistic sources confirmed Ambassador Bryce’s charge
of an Ottoman policy to exterminate Christians other than the Armenians. According
to the American ambassador to Constantinople from 1913 to 1916, Henry I.
Morgenthau, widely regarded as a principal source of information on the Armenian
Genocide: ‘‘The story which I have told about the Armenians I could also tell with
certain modifications about the Greeks and the Syrians,’’ as Assyrians were often
known to the West, especially those adhering to the Syrian Orthodox Church.121
He added that the ‘‘Turks afterward decided to apply the same methods [of deportation
and ‘‘wholesale massacre’’] on a larger scale not only to the Greeks but to the
Armenians, Syrians, Nestorians, and others of its subject peoples.’’122 In December
1918, according to the Los Angeles Times, Ambassador Morgenthau told an audience
in Chicago that the Turks ‘‘have massacred fully 2,000,000 men, women, and
children—Greeks, Assyrians, Armenians; fully 1,500,000 Armenians.’’123
The American consul in Aleppo, Syria, reported to the US secretary of state
that ‘‘from Mardin the Government deported great numbers of Syrians, Catholics,
Caldeans, and Protestants, and it is feared all Christians may later be included in
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the order and possibly even the Jews. They cry ‘Turkey for the Moslems’ . . .’’124
An American consular agent in Urfa, southeastern Turkey, documented how,
throughout the summer of 1915, thousands of Christian refugees had passed through
the city, all relating the same sequence of events: the murder of all the men on
the roads out their cities, the ‘‘criminal abuse[ ]’’ and kidnapping of the women and
girls, the theft of all ‘‘money, bedding, and clothing.’’125 His report adds, ‘‘The
poor weak women and children died by thousands along the roads and in the khan
where they were confined here.’’126
Another American diplomat reported that the Assyrians and Armenians of
Harput, Turkey, were deported by a publicly announced order covering both groups
in the summer of 1915.127 In the context of the grinding poverty and wartime
deprivations in Turkey, such deportation orders meant ‘‘a lingering and perhaps
even more dreadful death for nearly every one’’ than a massacre, with probably less
than one in 100 deportees surviving, as the American consul wrote to the US
ambassador.128 The roads were already populated by roving bands of marauding
Kurds ready to rob and murder the deportees.129
In July 1915, the German ambassador in Constantinople described to
the German Imperial Chancellor how the Ottoman governor of Diyarbekir, Res id
Bey, had supervised the systematic extermination (systematischen Ausrottung) of
the Christian population of his district, without regard to ethnicity or creed (der Rasse
und der Konfession), but including in particular Chaldeans and Assyrians (non-uniate
Syrians, German nicht unierten Syrer).130 The German consul in Mosul had
blamed Reis d Bey for the massacre of the exclusively Chaldean population of the
village of Faysh Khabour (Feihschahbur) near Jazirah (Djesireh).131 The German vice-
consul in Mosul had reported in July 1915 that the Chaldean, Syrian, and Armenian
men of the towns of Seert, Mardin, and Faysh Khabour had been massacred
(massakriert), with 1,200 of their female relatives and children arriving or about
to arrive in Mosul in ‘‘indescribable’’ (unbeschreiblich) conditions; the women and
children were dying of hunger ‘‘daily.’’132 Similarly, an October 1915 dispatch from
the German consul in Syria to the German ambassador in Constantinople states,
Further evidence has been found that the measures [i.e., extermination and
deportation] I described in my report dated 3 September – B.No. 1950 – which were
to be taken against the Armenians in the eastern Vilayets have now become such
against the Christians. The acting Syrian (Syrian Catholic) bishop told me that a
total of 300 children and older women from his denomination have arrived here from
Kharput, Diarbekr, Weranscheher and Mardin. The rest of the parishioners has
probably been killed or kidnapped . . .
The Chaldeans in [Seert] (Vilayet Bitlis) and [Jazirah] (Vilayet Diarbekir) and all of the
Christians in Djebel et Tor north of Mardin have been exterminated.133
A previous report from the same diplomat had declared that, in the eastern
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Assyrians and Chaldeans had ‘‘already for a long
time’’ been reported either ‘‘killed’’ (geto¨tet) or ‘‘banished’’ (verbannt).134
German military officers, diplomats, and civilians also witnessed the planning
and execution of the genocide of Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek Christians as it
unfolded. The accounts of German ambassadors and other officials dealing with the
Ottoman Empire are replete with such terms as ‘‘extermination,’’ ‘‘massacre,’’
‘‘destruction,’’ ‘‘slaughter,’’ ‘‘systematic butchery,’’ and ‘‘murder of thousands of
human beings.’’135 As the Ottomans’ main ally in World War I, the Germans
had military officers ‘‘stationed throughout the Empire’’; they trained and led
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Turkish troops, and their ‘‘military commanders and soldiers undoubtedly knew, saw,
and it is alleged [indirectly] participated’’ in the genocide of Ottoman Christians.136
The German government officially protested the murders ongoing in the Ottoman
Empire during the summer of 1915.137 German missionary Johannes Lepsius—in close
contact with the German government, as reflected in its ambassadors’ reports138—
‘‘produced two publications containing unique documentary material about the
political links between imperial Germany and the extermination policy of the Young
Turks’’; a substantial portion of these accounts was devoted to the Assyrian
genocide.139 The evidence of German military and diplomatic awareness and
complicity in the Ottoman genocide of Armenians and other Christians has filled an
entire book.140
Numerous articles in the American press documented the genocide of Assyrians
by the Turks and their Kurdish allies. By 1918, the Los Angeles Times carried the
story of a Syrian, or most likely Assyrian, merchant from Urmia who stated that
his city was ‘‘completely wiped out, the inhabitants massacred,’’ 200 surrounding
villages ravaged, 200,000 of his people dead, and hundreds of thousands of
more starving to death in exile from their agricultural lands.141 In an article entitled
‘‘Native Christians Massacred,’’ the Associated Press correspondent reported that
in the vicinity of Urmia, ‘‘Turkish regular troops and Kurds are persecuting
and massacring Assyrian Christians.’’142 Close to 800 were confirmed dead in
Urmia, and another 2,000 had perished from disease.143 Two hundred Assyrians
had been burned to death inside a church, and the Russians had discovered more than
700 bodies of massacre victims in the village of Hafdewan outside Urmia, ‘‘mostly
naked and mutilated,’’ some with gunshot wounds, others decapitated, and still
others carved to pieces.144
A few days earlier, the Associated Press had relayed a report from the
American consul at Tabriz stating that ‘‘the Turkish consul at Urumiah forced his
way into the [American Christian] mission with a number of regular Turkish
troops and removed some Assyrian Christian refugees, who were then massacred.’’145
Many other members of the ‘‘little tribe’’ of Assyrians had been enslaved by Kurds,
and those ‘‘who did not escape or were made slaves, perished.’’146 Tens of thousands
of Assyrians fled their homes for Russian or American protection; many died en
route.147
Other leading British and American newspapers corroborated these accounts
of the Assyrian genocide. The New York Times reported on 11 October that 12,000
Persian Christians had died of massacre, hunger, or disease; thousands of girls
as young as seven had been raped or forcibly converted to Islam; 120 Christian
villages had been destroyed, and three-fourths of Christian villages burned to the
ground.148 The Times of London was perhaps the first widely respected publication
to document the fact that 250,000 Assyrians and Chaldeans eventually died in
the Ottoman genocide of Christians,149 a figure which many journalists and
scholars have subsequently accepted.150 Among other violence, Turks and Kurds
exterminated 12,000 Nestorian and Assyrian civilians in Urmia; huge mass
graves holding up to 1,500 bodies were dug.151 The Ottomans and their allies
plundered and burned about 150 Nestorian villages.152 Their Persian allies seized
the opportunity to kidnap and enslave women and children and to forcibly convert
them to Islam.153 The Persian governor of Urmia had steel and lime dust baked
into the bread purchased by Christian missionaries tending to Assyrian refugees, so
that thousands of the refugees perished from eating contaminated food before
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local doctors realized what was happening.154 About half of the Assyrian nation died of
murder, disease, or exposure as refugees during the war, according to the head of the
Anglican Church, which had a mission to the Assyrians.155 Famine and want were the
fate of the survivors, whose homes, villages, churches, and schools had been wiped
out.156
The Washington Post reported in March 1915 that ‘‘Turkish regular troops and
Kurds are persecuting and massacring Assyrian Christians.’’157 According to a letter
from an American eyewitness, many of the thousands of Christian refugees in
Urmia were ‘‘murdered in cold blood and with cruel tortures by the Kurds,’’ with
‘‘women and children carried off ’’ into slavery.158 In the village of Diza, south of
Urmia, Kurdish forces had buried 3,000 Christians up to their chins, riding on
horseback over and crushing the skulls of those who survived the first day of this
ordeal.159 The Post also described how rampaging Kurds, spurred on by the Ottoman
Empire’s declaration of jihad the previous winter, exterminated the local population of
Christians unable to flee because they were too old, sick, or incapacitated.160 The
Kurds carried flags proclaiming the ‘‘holy war.’’161 As thousands of Assyrians fled
Urmia through the snowy fields to avoid bands of Kurds on the roads, the men
were massacred and many girls as young as seven or eight years old ‘‘were openly
assaulted.’’162 In Gulpashan, Kurds tore sixty-five Christian men out of missions,
to which they had fled for safety, and hanged them.163
According to one American citizen engaged in missionary work in Persia,
Turks and Kurds killed nearly every Assyrian Christian they found in the town of
Kochanis, on Turkish territory, and in the Christian villages and towns in the
surrounding area, and destroyed most or all of the churches and religious buildings.164
This account adds that by October 1914, the Turkish government had impelled
an organized army of Kurds to ‘‘expel[ ] several thousand Christians’’ from Turkish
villages adjoining Persia and to ‘‘plunder and burn the Christian villages’’ in
Persia adjoining eastern Turkey.165 On the road north to Russia, this missionary
and another eyewitness saw thousands of Christians starving to death in the fields,
children dying by the hundreds, as well as dozens of abandoned orphans.166
These diplomatic and journalistic accounts, as well as the accounts collected
in the Blue Book, establish a series of critical facts about the Ottoman genocide of
the Assyrians. First, the Turks and their Kurdish allies massacred untold
thousands of Assyrians as part of a campaign to, in Ambassador Bryce’s words,
‘‘exterminate[ ] Christianity, root and branch,’’ in the empire. Second, reputable
publications such as the Times of London and the Los Angeles Times confirm
that 200,000 to 250,000 Assyrians and Chaldeans lost their lives in the Ottoman
Christian genocide. Third, the rape, kidnapping, and enslavement of Assyrian
women were systematic and empire-wide, rather than being the fault of a few
scattered criminals or unruly mobs. Fourth, the Assyrians were ‘‘equally’’ (in the words
of Ambassador Bryce) and by the ‘‘same methods’’ (in the words of Ambassador
Morgenthau) subject to the Ottoman Turkish plan to wipe out the Armenian people.
Fifth, the Turks deported the Assyrians en masse from their ancestral lands,
confiscating thousands of homes and other property that would be of an inestimably
large value today (a single apartment in present-day Turkey may be worth more
than US$100,000, while a single villa may be worth more than US$200,000).167
Finally, this pattern of deportations and denial of housing caused thousands
of Assyrians to die of other political and criminal violence, as well as of hunger,
disease, exhaustion, and exposure to the elements.
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Genocide as a Crime by World War I
The present-day Republic of Turkey, as well as its defenders and certain scholars,
concedes that killings or even massacres of Christians took place within the
Ottoman Empire during World War I but rejects the notion that these massacres
fit the technical legal definition of genocide. To start with, the Turks make the
technical legal argument that genocide was not a crime at all in 1915 or 1916.
As the Web site of the Turkish government points out, the term ‘‘genocide’’ was
not invented until 1944, and the crime was not definitively codified into law until
1948, with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG).168
The same Web site also reproduces, with apparent approval, an account of
the ‘‘relocation’’ of the Armenians during World War I, which argues that the only
evidence of a campaign of destruction against the Armenians was ‘‘wartime
propaganda’’ produced by Britain and America.169 According to this account, all that
happened was that when the government ‘‘relocated’’ Armenians living in the
‘‘war zone,’’ the ‘‘security measures were inadequate,’’ leading to repeated attacks
on convoys ‘‘by Kurd, Circassian[,] vindictive Armenian, Turkish and Muslim people
on the way.’’170 The number of deaths due to such attacks, however, was ‘‘very low,’’
even though just one Ottoman document records a massacre of 500 people.171
The Armenians themselves triggered these relocations, the story goes, by their
rebelliousness and alliance with Russia, ‘‘not their ethnic or religious identity.’’172
Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office appears to concede the general thrust
of Turkey’s claims, calling the Armenian massacres a ‘‘terrible episode’’ but not
‘‘genocide.’’173
These responses by the Turkish and British governments to the evidence of
an Ottoman genocide of Christians warrant careful review. Their arguments raise
several important questions, including (1) whether any laws criminalizing
genocide were in existence during World War I, (2) whether there is any evidence of
genocide aside from the ‘‘wartime propaganda’’ of Britain and America, and (3)
whether the evidence indicates the requisite intention on the part of the Ottoman
government to attempt to wipe out a group or groups of people.
To start with, if the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against its
Christian population during World War I, this conduct was certainly criminal, as
the Turks themselves admitted. International customary law recognized genocide as
a crime prior to its incorporation into the UNCG of 1948, which defines ‘‘genocide’’
as killing, wounding, starving, or sterilizing members of a group ‘‘with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, [the] national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’’174
The signatories to the UNCG itself recognized that genocide was already a crime
by adopting language providing that ‘‘that at all periods of history genocide has
inflicted great losses on humanity’’ and that they merely ‘‘confirm[ed]’’ its criminality,
whether committed during war or in peacetime.175 The Nuremberg tribunal had
already indicted high Nazi officials for
deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national
groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to
destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups,
particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.176
As the International Court of Justice has held, the ‘‘principles underlying
the [Genocide] Convention are recognised by civilised nations as binding on States
even without any conventional [i.e., treaty] obligation.’’177 Genocide is therefore,
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as a UN report has described it, a recent term for ‘‘an old crime.’’178 In addition to
international treaties such as the UNCG, international law acknowledges the
binding character of general practices and principles of law adopted by civilized
nations, as illustrated by national and international judicial decisions and
the teachings of experts on international law.179
Massacring civilians, as the Ottomans did in World War I, had been recognized
as a war crime for centuries and had formed the basis for historic national
and international criminal tribunals.180 By the first decade of the twentieth
century, international treaty law specifically prohibited wartime violations against
‘‘the lives of persons,’’ ‘‘family honour and rights,’’ and ‘‘private property as well as
religious convictions and practice.’’181 His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans
was among the signatories to this treaty, and thus agreed to its preamble, which
declared that, in cases not specifically provided for, ‘‘the law of nations’’ and ‘‘the
laws of humanity’’ protect the inhabitants of war zones.182 As Nuremberg established,
violations of this treaty, known as the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, were recognized as crimes from 1907 on.183
With international customary law on their side, Britain, France, and Russia,
the Entente powers, issued a joint declaration in May 1915 characterizing the
‘‘connivance and often assistance of Ottoman authorities’’ in massacres of Armenians
over the previous month as ‘‘new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization.’’184 By that declaration the Entente announced publicly ‘‘that they
[would] hold personally responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman government and
those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.’’185 The declaration
recognized the Ottoman authorities’ prosecution of the war as criminal and
constituted ‘‘a public and joint commitment to prosecute after the war those
responsible for the crimes perpetrated.’’186
After losing the war, Turkey commenced its own prosecutions of those
responsible. An interim Ottoman government tried and convicted ministers Enver,
Talaˆt, and Cemal of widespread massacres, war crimes, and atrocities and
sentenced them to death in absentia.187 The court-martial concluded that
all the testimony and documents show that . . . bands of brigands were formed for the
sole purpose of massacring and destroying the caravans of the (Armenian) deportees.
It is fully proven that these massacres were taking place on the immediate orders and
full knowledge of Talat, Enver, and Cemal.188
As the New York Times reported in mid-July 1919, the triumvirate were ‘‘condemned
to death’’ by the court-martial ‘‘for joining in the war and for the Armenian, Greek,
and Syrian atrocities and deportations.’’189 A Turkish tribunal found that the orders
for the Armenian massacres in particular had issued directly from Istanbul.190 The
founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal ‘‘Atatu¨rk,’’ later captured the sentiments
in Turkey that led to the trials of those Young Turks responsible for the Ottoman
genocide of the Christian population:
These left-overs from the former Young Turk Party, who should have been made to
account for the lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en
masse, from their homes and massacred, have . . . hitherto lived on plunder, robbery and
bribery . . .191
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Treaty of Se`vres
recognized that the ‘‘terrorist regime’’ of the Young Turks had victimized their
‘‘subjects of non-Turkish race’’ with massacres, disappearances, forcible conversions to
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Islam, and unjust and illegal expropriations of homes and businesses.192 The treaty
denied the legitimacy of Turkish claims to lands inhabited by Christians by excluding
Mesopotamia, Syria, and Greece from the boundaries of the post-imperial Turkish
state and purported to guarantee equal rights and religious freedom to those
non-Turks and Christians remaining subjects of Turkey.193 Along with the Charter
of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles, the delegates to the Paris
Peace Conference, most notably the president of the United States, the prime
minister of Great Britain, and the premier of France, intended the Treaty of Se`vres
to frame a more peaceful post-war world.
The Treaty of Se`vres, which the Ottoman government signed in 1920, required
Turkey to hand over to Allied custody those of its nationals who were ‘‘responsible
for the massacres’’ and to recognize whatever tribunal the Allied powers designated
to try the perpetrators as criminals under international law.194 But by the next
year the British had abandoned their prosecutions of the Young Turks and
surrendered many suspects held in their custody to the new government of Atatu¨rk,
in exchange for the repatriation of British prisoners of war.195 Atatu¨rk had promised
to prosecute these leaders in Turkish courts;196 in 1923, however, his
government declared a general amnesty for all those convicted of war crimes
by courts-martial.197 As Atatu¨rk threatened Mesopotamian oil reserves, Britain
and France decided to conclude the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, with its ‘‘moral
horror[s]’’ of the Orthodox Christian expulsion from Turkey, no protections for
Armenians, and a secret annex granting amnesty to Turkish war criminals.198
Despite the success of the Kemalist revolution and the concessions wrought
from the oil-thirsty Entente at Lausanne, the fact remains that the Ottoman
government did acknowledge the criminal character of the massacres of
Christian civilians that took place during World War I. This disposes of the two
principal defenses of the conduct of the Turks from the charge of genocide: that
the charge that the Ottomans attempted to wipe out the Christians of the empire is
merely Western propaganda, and that any alleged attempt to exterminate
minority racial and religious groups did not constitute a criminal act under
international law as it stood during World War I. Only one weighty legal question
remains: Is there sufficient evidence of intent to eliminate a racial, ethnic, or
religious group for the charge of genocide to be made in a persuasive manner?
The Ottoman Plan to Exterminate the Assyrians
Assuming that the UNCG or some other law criminalizing genocide did apply in 1915,
the Turks and their defenders argue that the UNCG requires ‘‘specific intent’’
to destroy members of a group as such, which was lacking in the Ottoman
Empire’s approach to its Christian minorities, including the Armenians and
Assyrians. For example, the Web site of the Turkish government states that
Armenians were killed by ‘‘local Muslims,’’ whose actions the Ottoman armies
neither ordered nor participated in.199 Indeed, the Ottoman authorities ordered
their subordinate officials to ‘‘protect relocated Armenians’’ from local Muslims.200
The British government appears to agree with this general line of argumentation,
condemning ‘‘the massacres of 1915–16 . . . as a tragedy of historic proportions’’ but
not recognizing them as ‘‘genocide’’ because of ‘‘the absence of unequivocal
evidence to show that the Ottoman administration took a specific decision to eliminate
the Armenians under their control at the time.’’201
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Absent a governmental intention to exterminate the Christians of the empire,
it would be nearly impossible to explain how the massacres, rapes, deportations,
and dispossessions of the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek Christians living in
the Ottoman Empire at the time of World War I could have taken place on such a
vast scale.202 How could such a remarkable degree of coordination and common
purpose in slaughtering civilians, ravaging women, orphaning children, and stealing
money and property have emerged without organization and direction from above?
Indeed, it takes little searching to uncover abundant evidence of planning for genocide.
Interior Minister Talaˆt, initially the most powerful member of the CUP, believed
in ‘‘Turkey for the Turks,’’ or getting rid of the ancient Christian peoples stranded
in the Ottoman Empire.203 After the 1908 coup that propelled the Young Turks
to positions of power in the Ottoman government, the German ambassador to Athens
reported a conversation with the Turkish prime minister in which he learned that
‘‘The Turks have decided upon a war of extermination against their Christian
subjects.’’204 In 1910, the leaders of the CUP held a party conference during which
they discussed how ‘‘the complete Ottomanization of all Turkish subjects must be
effected, but it was becoming clear that this could never be achieved by persuasion,
and recourse must be had to force of arms.’’205 In 1911, a prominent Young Turk
declared that the ‘‘nations that remain from the old times in our empire are akin
to foreign and harmful weeds that must be uprooted.’’206
When the Russians advanced in the Caucasus, and the British marched north
from Mesopotamia, the Ottoman ‘‘policy of [Christian] oppression broadened across
the empire and increased to genocidal proportions.’’207 Soon after the Sultan’s
declaration of jihad in 1914, the Ottomans, seized with ‘‘anti-Christian chauvinism,’’
deported into other parts of Anatolia the entire Christian population of the Gallipoli
peninsula and the area around the Sea of Marmora, more than 60,000 people.208
‘‘Christians . . . were cast as collective targets when Talat and Cemal threatened
reprisals against them’’ for any Muslim war dead.209 The central government
disseminated wartime propaganda of a consistently anti-Christian theme, which,
surprisingly, was often written or inspired by Germans:
At the outbreak of hostilities the Germans worked with all their power to incite
the Mohammedan world . . .. The plan was to start a holy war, as in that way it would
be possible to stir into action millions of Moslems from Persia, India, Afghanistan,
Baluchistan, Arabia, Turkestan, and other Mohammedan countries. With a force of
from ten to fifteen million armed Mussulmans they planned to march against Russia
first. Naturally, the Russians being occupied in fighting such an army, this would give
the Germans better opportunities on the Western fronts . . .
The ablest German writers were enlisted . . .. It was reported that the English were
destroyed and their greatest generals captured. [Proclamations reported the total
defeat of the French and the Russians, and the deaths of most of the English armies.]
The Moslem crusade, they said, was being carried on in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria,
Afghanistan, Baluchistan, India, the Sudan. These utterly false reports constitute
one of the principal reasons why the Mohammedans, in Turkey and in some other parts
of the Moslem world, have been led to take sides against the cause of the Allies.210
An American missionary tasked by the US minister to Persia with providing a complete
account of the massacres in that country corroborated this account, stating that
the use of the Kurdish tribes was a part of the Turkish plan of campaign, and they
were urged and sent by responsible Turkish officers, military, civil and consular. It was
made more dangerous to Christians by the cry of Jihad (or holy war), which was
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deliberately made use of by responsible Turkish officials . . .. The use of barbarous
troops under little or no control against people who were non-combatants is absolutely
unjustifiable and of this crime the Turks were certainly guilty.211
Similarly, James L. Barton, Foreign Secretary of the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, wrote that, ‘‘soon after Turkey entered the
war on the side of the Central Powers, an effort was made to unite all the Moslem
peoples under Pan-Islam and to declare a Holy War.’’212
By 1914, the Ottomans had built yet another apparatus of ‘‘ethnic war.’’213 The
Tes kilat-ı Mahsusa, or Special Organization, was a force of more than 30,000 men
under arms, composed of Turkish law-enforcement officers and criminal bands under
the command of Ottoman army officers and CUP political leaders.214 The Special
Organization eventually became ‘‘a dedicated instrument of indiscriminate mass
murder.’’215 As noted above, Djevdet Bey also assembled what he called ‘‘butcher
battalions’’ for the same purpose.
In June 1915, Interior Minister Talaˆt told the German ambassador that the
Ottomans were exploiting the crisis of the war to ‘‘thoroughly clear Turkey of her
internal enemies, i.e. the Christians.’’216 Talaˆt told Ambassador Morgenthau that his
‘‘national policy’’ was that
these different blocs in the Turkish Empire . . . had always conspired against Turkey;
because of the hostility of these native populations, Turkey had lost province after
province—Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Egypt and Tripoli.
In this way the Turkish Empire had dwindled almost to the vanishing point. If what
was left of Turkey was to survive, added Talaat, he must get rid of these alien peoples.
‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ was now Talaat’s controlling idea.217
The Young Turks, Ambassador Morgenthau learned, had decided ‘‘to establish a
country exclusively for Turks,’’ so their ‘‘passion for Turkifying the nation seemed to
demand logically the extermination of all Christians.’’218 As a telegram from the
German ambassador in Constantinople reported, Talaˆt spoke in similar terms
‘‘without reservation’’ to a German diplomat, stating that the Ottoman government
is intent on taking advantage of the World War in order to [make a] clean sweep of
internal enemies—the indigenous Christians—without being hindered in doing so by
diplomatic intervention from other countries. Such an undertaking will serve the interest
of the Germans, the Allies of Turkey, which thus in turn could be strengthened.219
The policy of a ‘‘clean sweep’’ to rid the Ottomans of ‘‘alien peoples’’ was translated
into action by local commanders with close ties to the central government. In February
1915, Djevdet Bey, military governor of Van and brother-in-law of Enver Pasha
himself, stated, ‘‘We have made a clean sweep [literally, ‘‘clean table’’] of the
Armenians and Syrians of Azerbeijan [northern Persia]; we must do the same with
the Armenians of Van.’’220 The previous month, he had invaded Persia and ‘‘massacred
the Assyro-Chaldean populations of Persian Azerbeijan.’’221
By 1915, therefore, the CUP had created extermination squads and adopted
‘‘a crystallized policy of empire-wide killing and death-by-attrition.’’222 The Ottoman
government’s religious figurehead, the Sheik al-Islam, resigned from the Sultan’s
Cabinet after protesting ‘‘the extermination of the [Ottoman] Christian elements.’’223
Ambassador Ernst Wilhelm Hohenlohe reported that the Ottoman ‘‘government is
resolved . . . to eliminate the indigenous Christians.’’224 A telegram from Mosul to the
German consul in Constantinople related news from the leaders of the Assyrian and
Chaldean churches that ‘‘the Muslims in the district of Amadia planned a general
Christian massacre and had already begun with it; the governor admits the fact and
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the policy seems to be, if not quite to stir it up, to restrain it not very energetically.’’225
Lepsius added that ‘‘all Christians have suffered the same fate without differentiation
as to race or denomination.’’226
Along with the Armenians, the Assyrians were targeted as a group of non-Turkish
Christians in a way that ‘‘can only be explained by the CUP’s increasingly radical
ideology of ethnic [and religious] exclusivity.’’227 As Peter Balakian has demonstrated,
by 1915 one million people had died in ‘‘the extermination of innocent civilians in
Turkey (the Armenians, but also Syrian and Assyrian Christians and large portions of
the Greek population . . . ).’’228 Such a speedy and well-organized annihilation of the
indigenous Christians of the Ottoman Empire could scarcely have taken place other
than as a result of intentional planning and execution.
In any event, the intention on the part of Ottoman officials to exterminate their
Armenian and Assyrian subjects need not be proven exclusively by means of
confessions or admissions.229 As the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have made clear, ‘‘genocidal intent [may] be
inferred from the physical acts and specifically ‘their massive and/or systematic nature
of their atrocity.’ ’’230 The Tribunals have recognized that even ‘‘in the absence of a
confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from . . . the perpetration of
other culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these
acts were committed by the same offender or by others.’’231
Thus, the element of specific intent to commit genocide may be based upon the
testimony of the victims and direct physical evidence, such that a confession or
admission of genocidal intent is not necessary. Evidence of many ‘‘culpable acts [that]
were perpetrated systematically against the same group,’’ including those committed
by ‘‘other perpetrators,’’ may suffice as evidence of intent.232 Mass rape targeting
Assyrian women and children, and the consequent interference with births within and
reproductive survival of the group, also manifested a genocidal intent.233 The
deportation of the Assyrians, and the consequent deprivation of their established
means of sustenance, shelter, and dignified living, was a genocidal policy.234 The
dispossession of the Assyrians from their homes and agricultural lands, moreover,
tended to deprive them of the conditions necessary for bare life, let alone a civilized or
dignified life, and therefore served to destroy the group as such.235 In sum, the
‘‘inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation’’ of the Assyrians,
along with the ‘‘deliberate destruction’’ of their houses and places of worship,
establishes an intention by Ottoman officials to exterminate them as a group.236
Some may argue that it matters little to the victims, or to us, whether the
Ottomans committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, extermination,
‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ persecution, ‘‘atrocities,’’ or simple murder. It is not clear, however,
that each of these other crimes outlaws conduct short of murder that causes deaths or
prevents births within an ethnic or religious group with the intent of destroying all or
part of the group, such as ‘‘causing serious . . . mental harm to members of the group,’’
‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part,’’ or ‘‘imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group.’’237 Moreover, the concept and legal category of genocide must
be invoked for the sake of applying a consistent standard of international law and in
order to grasp the full implications and seriousness of what happened to the Assyrians
from 1914 to 1918, not to mention 1844 to 1846, 1896 to 1904, and 1918 to 1933.
As Raphael Lemkin wrote in coining the term, ‘‘genocide’’ was intended to cover just
such a situation, in which ‘‘a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
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destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups’’ is executed.238
Genocide is a particularly grave violation of international law precisely because the
world loses ‘‘future contributions’’ that would be ‘‘based upon [the destroyed group’s]
genuine traditions, genuine culture, and . . . well-developed national psychology.’’239
The widespread devastation of Assyrian communities, cultural property, and young
people with the potential to enlighten and fascinate the entire world was just such an
appalling loss to the region and to humanity.
The Struggle for Recognition of the Assyrian Genocide
The Armenian state and diaspora population have secured widespread international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Western governments and international
institutions otherwise on good terms with Turkey. US presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy
Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush have each acknowledged the Armenian
Genocide.240 The House of Representatives of the United States has passed several
resolutions recognizing the genocide of the Armenians,241 and at least twenty-three US
states have commemorated or officially recognized the Armenian genocide.242
The United Nations, the European Parliament, and the Catholic Church have
acknowledged the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.243 France, which has the
largest Armenian diaspora population outside the United States, has acknowledged
the Armenian genocide through its parliament.244 Its foreign minister has gone so far
as to state that Turkey must ‘‘recognize this tragedy’’ before applying for membership
in the European Union.245 Along with France, the parliaments of Russia, Canada,
Argentina, Poland, Greece, Switzerland, and Belgium have passed resolutions on the
genocide.246
By comparison, no US president, congressional body, or US state has recognized
the Assyrian genocide; nor has the United Nations, any European state, or any
prominent scholar of the Armenian genocide, so far as the author is aware.247 Part of
their reluctance may be due to the more extensive historical documentation of
Ottoman confessions and admissions of anti-Armenian extermination policies.248
Although a great deal of the evidence of genocidal intent deals with Christians more
broadly, much of it is specific to the elimination of the Armenian people.249
A requirement of a confession or other direct evidence of genocidal intent is not
supported by the law, however. The evidence of Ottoman-directed massacres, rapes,
deportations, and property expropriations is more than sufficient to establish a pattern
of systematic and discriminatory attacks on Assyrians from which a genocidal intent
may be inferred.250 As the tribunal hearing the case of Slobodan Milosevic held, while
direct evidence of genocide is theoretically possible, genocidal intent will more typically
be inferred from systematic attacks on or targeting of a group, atrocities on a large
scale, or repetitive ‘‘destructive and discriminatory acts.’’251
Aside from questions about the sufficiency of the documentary evidence, the
Assyrians may have struggled unsuccessfully to achieve recognition of their experience
of genocide because fewer absolute numbers of them than of the Armenians survived
the Ottoman genocide of Christians. As a smaller population, the Assyrians suffered
fewer total deaths than the Armenians, failed to win statehood after World War I,
as the Armenians did, and did not mount similarly ambitious and effective lobbying
efforts. The worldwide Armenian population stands at an estimated nine to ten million
people, substantially larger than the estimated four million Assyrians living around
the world.252 The three million Armenians living in and controlling the state of
Armenia outnumber and can outmaneuver the 600, 000 to one million Assyrians
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living in but largely excluded from political power in their traditional Mesopotamian
homeland.253 The estimated one million Armenians living in the United States,
concentrated in southern California, also exercise dramatically more political clout
than the 350,000 marginalized Assyrians dispersed across central California,
Michigan, and Illinois.254
Preventing Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing against
the Assyrians in Present-Day Iraq
Present-day Iraq is a state at high risk of genocide, according to a model for early
warning of genocidal violence developed for the US government.255 Many of the
warning signs of previous genocides, such as those in Turkey, German-occupied
Europe, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, are present in Iraq, including demonization of
minority groups, unfair scapegoating of minorities for the problems of the majority
population, and refugee flight.256
This would be the most recent such genocidal assault against the Assyrians, after
the Ottoman genocide of Christians, the massacre of up to 3,000 Assyrians by Iraqi
armed forces and Kurdish militia in 1933, and the disappearance of 1,000 Assyrians
during the Ba’athist ‘‘Arabization’’ and ‘‘Anfal’’ campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s.257
‘‘Military forces destroyed many Assyrian churches during the Anfal Campaign, and
reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians.’’258 Assyrians suffered from
chemical weapons attacks in Halabja and elsewhere.259 Widespread discrimination
against Iraqi Christians and Kurds in the name of ‘‘Arabization’’ continued into 2001,
especially in the area around Kirkuk, and drove 100,000 people from their homes
and villages.260 Between 1963 and 1987, the Iraqi government destroyed about 200
majority Assyrian villages in the provinces of Nineveh, Dohuk, and Arbil.261 Many of
these villages housed 100 to 200 families each.262 The Iraqi government razed almost
twenty-five churches, monasteries, and religious-run orphanages during this
period.263 Assyrian political activists have also claimed that up to 40,000 Assyrians
were conscripted and killed, wounded, taken prisoner, or went missing during the
Iran–Iraq War.264
Hundreds of thousands of Assyrians fled Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule from
1979 to 2003. Up to half of the Assyrian population has fled Iraq since 1991.265 As
British political journalist Alastair Bruton has pointed out in the New York Times,
the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey were subject to ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ for over a
decade, as ‘‘the Kurds have driven tens of thousands of Assyrians and Chaldeans into
exile, and yet Western commentators persist in their naive belief that the Kurds are
the only oppressed people in the region.’’266 Millions of Assyrians and Chaldeans now
live in exile, including about 400,000 in the United States and hundreds of thousands
more in the European Union, Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other
nations offering asylum to victims of religious persecution.267
The vice-chair of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom has
warned of a new ‘‘ethnic-cleansing campaign’’ against Assyrians, with violence against
Assyrians intensifying since the 2003 war to depose Saddam Hussein.268 Human-
rights reports issued in the years immediately preceding the 2003 war by the United
Nations and the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom cited
isolated killings and widespread ethnic and religious discrimination against
Assyrians.269 By comparison, similar reports issued since the 2003 war acknowledge
‘‘systematic attacks’’ against Assyrians.270 Among other incidents, ‘‘more than 100
Christians had been murdered after the U.S.-led war,’’271 including eleven people
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killed during bombings of Christian churches and seven people riding on a bus who
were massacred in one day in October 2004;272 three Christians were killed in Basra
for selling alcohol, and Christian women there have been assaulted for not wearing
veils, prompting most Christian families formerly living in Basra to flee fundamen-
talism in Iraq;273 and a campaign of kidnappings has terrorized Iraqi Christians at a
rate of two or three disappeared per week in Baghdad alone.274
Half of those Christians who remained in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime have since been driven from the country by horrific violence and medieval
fundamentalism.275 About 300,000 Christians fled their homes in Iraq between March
2003 war and August 2005 alone, many languishing as refugees in Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Turkey, and Iran.276 About 80,000 have emigrated out of Iraq altogether,
while the remainder is presumably displaced internally.277 More than 15,000
Assyrians left Iraq in just three months after a coordinated series of church bombings
in August 2004.278
Preventing the dispossession and exile of the Christians of Iraq will require
acknowledging their historical persecution and taking concrete steps to block its
recurrence. The failure to acknowledge and punish the perpetrators of the Ottoman
genocide has probably emboldened other despots in the region, notably the rulers of
Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, to massacre and persecute their
Christian and non-Arab minorities. After all, once American and British diplomats
admitted abandoning their Christian allies among the Armenians, Assyrians, and
Greeks to the massacres of the Turks and Kurds,279 why should future Turkish, Arab,
or Kurdish authorities fear international laws against oppressing minorities?
The example of the German Holocaust of Jews, Slavs, Roma, leftists, homosexuals,
and other minorities also underlines the importance of punishing one genocide in order
to deter others. Near the end of World War II in Europe, an American official with
firsthand knowledge of the persecution of the Jews and other minorities in Europe
reported that the ‘‘failure to punish criminals of World War I may well have removed a
deterrent to the commission of brutalities against civilian populations in this war,
including the mass murder of the Jews.’’280 Nazi officials at the highest levels
perceived Allied tolerance of genocidal policies toward racial and religious minorities
in World War I as a green light to engage in the same practices in World War II. Adolf
Hitler, noting that history often views a mass-murdering conqueror such as Genghis
Khan as ‘‘the great founder of States,’’ stated that
in the East I have put my death-head formations in place with the command
relentlessly and without compassion to send into death many women and children of
Polish origin and language . . .. Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of
the Armenians?281
Likewise, Joseph Goebbels recorded in his diary in 1942 his belief that ‘‘both
the English and the Americans are happy that we are exterminating the Jewish
riff-raff.’’282
Conversely, the international norm against genocide has been shown to be
effective under certain circumstances, even against a high Nazi official in the midst of
an unprecedented world war. At the close of World War II in Europe, key Holocaust
architect Heinrich Himmler ‘‘ordered an end to the death marches of the Jews, fearing
that continued murders would embarrass him in talks with America.’’283 Other
populations have been spared the continuation of genocidal campaigns started against
them; examples of this phenomenon include the residents of independent Armenia,
Israel, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Bosnia, and East Timor.284
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It is beyond the scope of this paper, but a fertile ground for further research, to ask
whether the Assyrians of Iraq, who have been dispersed into non-viable minority
communities since the Ottoman genocide, would be better served by liberalizing
refugee and asylum laws to facilitate their resettlement in the West, or whether,
in addition to or in lieu of such liberalization, they require the establishment of a safe
haven from religious persecution inside Iraq.285 The global asylum system is not
currently adequate to deal with the flood of Assyrian refugees out of Iraq, who often
end up dying en route to the West, or being imprisoned for illegal entry.286 A safe
haven inside Iraq for Assyrians unable to resettle in the West would find ample
support in Assyrians’ right to self-determination under international law, which long
predated Iraq’s new ‘‘permanent’’ constitution.287 Without international support for
such an Assyrian safe haven, tens of thousands of Christian refugees may continue to
flee Iraq each year.
Whether the solution to their plight lies in international immigration or in local
autonomy, the Assyrians desperately need financial support for resettling their
refugees and replacing the homes, villages, and personal and cultural property
destroyed over the past century by the Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. Genocide and ethnic
cleansing give rise to legally enforceable claims for reparation and restoration of
property and the value of lives lost.288 Perhaps because their genocide has rarely been
recognized, the Assyrians driven from their homes over the past century have received
relatively little by way of compensation or assistance with rebuilding. Although the
United States has spent close to $3 billion on the reconstruction of northern Iraq,
it seems that less than $35 million has gone to Assyrian towns and villages.289 Local
Iraqi leaders have systematically excluded Assyrians from the distribution of
reconstruction assistance.290 By comparison, the United Nations has forced Iraqis to
pay over $19.2 billion in compensation to those harmed by the 1991 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, which caused far fewer deaths than even the Anfal campaign of the 1980s,
let alone the Ottoman genocide of the Armenians and Assyrians.291
To make an Assyrian safe haven a viable option for Christian refugees, a just
proportion of the Iraqi reconstruction spending authorized by the United States and
the international community would need to be specifically earmarked to security,
resettlement, and rebuilding of at least those Assyrian villages destroyed in the ethnic
cleansing campaigns of the Saddam Hussein regime.292 Independent Assyrian
administrators could be charged with spending these funds, to prevent their
continuing to be diverted to other Iraqis. With this international support, Assyrian
victims of religious persecution in Iraq and neighboring states such as Syria, Jordan,
Turkey, and Iran who are denied entry into Europe, North America, and so on could
rebuild their lives in a safe haven.
Conclusion: Recognizing a Legacy
Many analogies may be drawn between the experience of the Assyrians during World
War I and other acknowledged genocides, including not only the Armenian Genocide
but also the Holocaust of Jews, Slavs, Roma, leftists, homosexuals, and other
minorities under Nazi occupation during World War II.293 The Assyrians and other
Ottoman Christians, like the Jews, had suffered from centuries of discrimination and
official segregation; were charged with being agents of foreign powers and scapegoated
for military defeats and looming threats in a rhetoric of ethnic elimination; and were
physically and culturally exterminated in large numbers by means of massacres,
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rapes, expulsions, and attacks on homes and religious institutions carried out by
genocidal state apparatuses and local irregular forces.294 Just as the Holocaust
reached its full expression only after the invasion of Poland and the world war with
Britain and the Soviet Union, so the genocide of Christian populations reached its most
intense phase only after the outbreak of war with Britain and Russia and the Ottoman
invasion of Persia.295
Although the primary blame for the genocide of the Assyrians lies with the
Ottoman officials who distributed the proclamations of jihad, massacred civilians and
outraged women, and instigated their Kurdish and Persian allies to do the same,
the West bears a heavy responsibility. Disgraceful rivalries among the Great Powers
facilitated Turkish violations against the Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and other
Christian and non-Christian minorities, both during the waning years of the Ottoman
Empire and in the independent Kemalist Turkey that followed it. Britain’s alliance
with Turkey during the Crimean War repelled a Russian attempt to liberate the
Ottoman Christians from the subjugation and periodic slaughter to which they had
been condemned by Turkish rule.296 After the Hamidiye massacres and during World
War I, the Germans acted as the Ottomans’ Christian ally, actually encouraging the
Sultan to declare a jihad against the Christian allies of the British, without regard for
the consequences.297
This dolorous history continued throughout the twentieth century, with Western
powers such as the United States, Great Britain, and France financing and aiding
oppressive Turkish and Arab rule over the Christian remnant in Asia and even in
Europe, in the case of Cyprus.298 Western powers largely ignored abuses against
Christians in Turkey and Iraq, continuing to extend military aid and diplomatic
support.299 The United States remains the principal supplier of Turkish military
equipment, which is used to blockade tiny landlocked Armenia and threaten military
intervention against it for protecting the ethnic Armenians of Azerbaijan.300 The
Soviet Union, for its part, was the principal source of Iraqi weaponry in the late 1980s,
the period of the Anfal and Arabization campaigns.301
Unfortunately, the West has rejected the idea of solidarity with the Christians
of the Middle East, prioritizing diplomacy based on oil interests and the Arab–Israeli
conflict.302 Thus, the United States, Britain, and France have largely ignored the
persecutions of the Christians of Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Sudan, while rushing to
save the oil-rich Muslim states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as besieged
minority Kurds, Bosnians, and Kosovars.303 To this day, American troops in Iraq
reportedly do not always intervene against the persecution of Christians, perhaps not
wanting to be seen as ‘‘siding with the Christians’’ and thus provoke retaliation.304
As the West, and the world in general, becomes more familiar with the history
of the Armenians, Assyrians, and other victims of genocide, the prospects for adequate
reparation for such events, and their future prevention, may improve. This essay has
demonstrated that the Ottoman genocide of the Assyrians took place, that it followed
centuries of violent persecution of the Assyrians by Muslim rulers, that it intensified
after the outbreak of international war against Western Christian nations, and that
it was implemented by Ottoman troops and their local militia allies via massacre,
systematic rape, deportation, the destruction of homes and villages, and cultural
annihilation. These findings may contribute to identifying and preventing other cases
of genocide against Christian minorities living in majority Muslim states, such as
Sudan and Nigeria, in which religiously motivated massacres are becoming more
common.305
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Book Review
Samuel Totten, ed. Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches,
and Resources. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004.
Pp. 358, paper. $34.95 US.
Reviewed by Samuel Edelman, University of Judaism; State of California Center for
Excellence in the Study of the Holocaust, Genocide, Human Rights and Tolerance
There are only a few scholars writing about teaching genocide and the Holocaust, and
Samuel Totten is truly one of the most prolific and most effective. His book Teaching
about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources is the latest of a long list of
publications for educators on the subject of genocide.
This is a highly readable critical work. The introduction and first six chapters lay
out very clearly a number of key considerations for both educators and public-policy
leaders who are concerned with embedding issues concerning genocide into state
educational standards and curricula.
In her chapter, ‘‘Educating about Genocide, Yes: But What Kind of Education?’’
Carol Rittner sets out the parameters of teaching. Teaching solely about the
perpetrators, without teaching about the victims, the resisters, and the rescuers, is
a problem. Teachers who have only a brief period to teach about genocide have a
responsibility, even in that brief time, to be comprehensive to avoid the problem of
glorifying the perpetrator. Rittner’s chapter moves us a great distance toward that goal
of comprehensive teaching.
Totten’s chapter ‘‘Issues of Rationale: Teaching about Genocide’’ is one of those
very critical essays that lay out for teachers, administrators, and state education
officials the justification for including genocide in educational curricula. Not only do
we see guidelines for writing rationales, we also see Totten’s own extensive
experience and knowledge at work here, advising us as to good practice on
this issue. Rationales are often ignored, but in fact they provide important
guidelines for educational policy development, and this chapter helps us get to this
in an effective way.
The chapter by Paul Bartrop and Samuel Totten, ‘‘The History of Genocide,’’ is
a tour de force, a brief, tight, comprehensive history of genocide. For teachers with
only a brief time to get into the topic of genocide, this chapter is a must. In addition,
it contains a tight and well-written synopsis of the career of Raphael Lemkin—
the story of a true hero of our age. Finally, this chapter’s section on genocide
intervention lays out the possibility of genocide early-warning systems and their
potential impact. This is a critical chapter for teachers and students.
In ‘‘Wrestling with the Definition of Genocide,’’ Totten looks at Lemkin’s efforts
in defining genocide in more detail and then examines the effect of the definition
stated in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG). Totten demonstrates the significant problems with the UN
treaty definition, as well as with other definitions. This is an excellent appraisal
with great potential for policy discussions among students.
Henry Huttenbach’s chapter, ‘‘Defining Genocide,’’ is a little more difficult
to grasp. This chapter is both detailed and complex in outlining the issues
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surrounding the development of the UNCG’s definition of genocide. While it is a
useful text, it is somewhat hard to read.
Chapter 6 presents ten case studies (the Armenian Genocide, starvation in
the Ukraine, the Holocaust, Indonesia in 1965–1966, Bangladesh, Burundi,
Rwanda, Cambodia, genocide against the Kurds, and Bosnia) by some of the
most outstanding scholars on genocide in the world, including Richard Hovannisian,
Michael Berenbaum, Eric Markusen, and Rene´ Lemarchand. Each one
provides significant content material that might easily be translated into curricular
materials.
The remaining five chapters deal successively with instructional strategies,
comparative genocide, issues of human rights, intervention and prevention
issues, and an extensive annotated bibliography. Just as the earlier part of the
book gives educators a strong and comprehensive understanding of genocide,
so this last section gives a strong overview of issues surrounding genocide prevention
and the critically important interface of human-rights violations and potential
genocide.
It is rare that those of us who work in the field of genocide studies and
teacher preparation see works as comprehensive and as useful as this text is. Samuel
Totten has once again produced an important and remarkable work that is eminently
useable for educators and policy makers concerned with genocide education.
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Book Review
Naomi Baumslag. Murderous Medicine: Nazi Doctors, Human
Experimentation, and Typhus. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.
Pp. 216, cloth. $49.50 US.
Reviewed by Myrna Goldenberg, independent scholar, Bethesda, MD
In Murderous Medicine: Nazi Doctors, Human Experimentation, and Typhus,
Naomi Baumslag proposes an agenda for research on the connections among medicine,
war, and genocide. Building on the groundbreaking work of Robert Jay Lifton, John J.
Michalczyk, Howard Fertig, Arthur Caplan, Henry Friedlander, and others, Baumslag
sets out to prove that the Nazis rewarded physicians who helped implement the
Final Solution, specifically by encouraging the spread of typhus as a means of
murdering Jews. By imposing and then neglecting deplorable conditions in the ghettos
and camps, Baumslag argues, Nazi doctors ‘‘promoted typhus . . . because ‘natural
death’ was cheaper than gassing’’ (57). Baumslag demonstrates that Nazi medicine
distinguished itself by its unprecedented and willing complicity in murdering
Jews: the German and Austrian ‘‘medical profession as a whole perpetrated
and tolerated without protest such widespread atrocities as were performed by
German health professionals and researchers during World War II’’ (126). In her
analysis of Nazi medicine, Baumslag catalogs bogus and unethical experiments,
largely funded by I.G. Farben, to test typhus vaccines, each experiment more
sadistic than the last. She also provides insights into other non-typhus-related
experiments and vivisections, aptly labeling them ‘‘scientific butchery.’’ Interestingly,
as has been repeatedly acknowledged by medical historians and ethicists,
Nazi medicine ‘‘produced not a single new cure and not a single important
medical discovery’’ (163).
Baumslag begins with an extensive history of typhus, tracing it back to
fifteenth-century Europe, and follows with a discussion of the history of the
struggle to treat and eliminate it. While readers will find that they have learned
more than they ever wanted to know about lice and typhus, they will also appreciate
the level of detail and the scope of the sources Baumslag uses to explain the
significance of the disease in the German war against the Jews. Her experience as
a physician and her training in public health are evident in her careful description
of typhus and its effects on the individual and the community.
In her chapter on the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and its involvement with the Nazi camp system, Baumslag delineates the failure
of the ICRC to investigate the conditions of the camps: ‘‘the record of the ICRC
during World War II is atrocious and indicative of the inherent weaknesses in the
organization’’ (176). She releases her anger at the obvious collusion between the Swiss
ICRC directors and German business and military interests, condemning Max Huber
and Carl Jacob Burkhardt, the top ICRC officials, for the pro-German decisions that
not only led to the unnecessary death by disease of hundreds of thousands of Jews and
other prisoners but fed and reinforced the arrogance of the Germans in their
determination to ignore the Geneva Convention. Not to be forgotten, Baumslag
reminds her readers, is the ICRC’s inadvertent complicity in facilitating the escape of
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some of the notorious doctors. The passports and travel papers issued to Nazi doctors
guaranteed that they would not face capture, trial, and, ultimately, justice.
Murderous Medicine also constitutes a compendium of vignettes about the
doctors who participated in murdering Jews and other victims of Nazi brutality.
These doctors were simultaneously preoccupied with preventing epidemics of typhus
among the SS and confining the disease to the Jews—a losing battle, because
acknowledging the presence of an epidemic among the Germans would demonstrate
the failure to control or contain typhus, and hence a failure of Nazi medicine.
Baumslag devotes a substantial section of the book to prisoner doctors, some of
whom she considers collaborators (Hungarian doctor Miklos Nyiszli, who was
Mengele’s research assistant) while others acted to reduce the misery of fellow
prisoners (Berlin physician Dr. Lucie Adelsberger, who ‘‘practiced’’ in Birkenau).
Prisoner doctors, of course, faced a spectrum of moral dilemmas—for example,
choosing to assist Nazi doctors to save themselves from hunger and hard labor,
or choosing to work with other prisoners while living among them and risking
hunger, disease, and selection, or choosing to conceal one’s medical credentials,
as psychiatrist Viktor Frankl did.
Baumslag closes her richly illustrated book with a discussion of biological
warfare and biological terrorism in contemporary military actions. Here she urges
the medical profession to become activists in the fight
against the use of biological weapons, whether they take the form of missiles laden with
anthrax or the negligent medical treatment of targeted groups. Lessons learned from
the Nazi experience indicate that medical professionals play a unique role in society,
not only as guardians of public health but also policy creators and enforcers. It was
not cultural propagandists who organized the infamous ‘‘special treatment’’ of the
Jews: it was the public health officials, the scientific journals, the physicians, the
administrators, and the lawyers who feared that the very presence of Jews would
endanger their families and ultimately their lives. (213)
Murderous Medicine reflects Baumslag’s medical insights and her professional
and personal idealism. She is a strong critic of sloppy, unethical, and discriminatory
public-health policy; indeed, her book stands as a valuable contribution to the
study of Nazi medicine as well as a warning to public-health officials. While
appreciating Baumslag’s strong sense of morality, I felt her condemnation of
some prisoner doctors was, at best, overly harsh and insensitive to the dilemmas
and horrors to which they were subjected. Adelsberger, for example, had no family
to protect, while Nyiszli believed that by collaborating he was assuring the safety
of his family. The book is slightly weakened by Baumslag’s irregular and
inconsistent documentation, a fault that is likely to inspire historians and
political scientists in the field of genocide and Holocaust studies to pursue
the ramifications of official medical policy and to investigate the relationship
between mass murder and health policy thoroughly and intensely. We can only
hope that their work will reinforce and help disseminate Baumslag’s plea for her
medical colleagues to uphold not only the Hippocratic Oath but also basic human
rights.
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Book Review
Laurel Leff. Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s
Most Important Newspaper. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005. Pp. 426, cloth. $29.00 US.
Reviewed by Janine Minkler, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Northern
Arizona University
Why did the New York Times persistently bury news of the Holocaust? asks
Laurel Leff in her dramatic historical account of ‘‘America’s most important
newspaper.’’ Leff, associate professor at Northeastern University and former journalist
for the Wall Street Journal and Miami Herald, examines the complex combination
of forces that led the Times to relegate news of the Holocaust to secondary status.
She also sustains an uncompromising critique of this period in New York Times
history. ‘‘No American newspaper was better positioned to highlight the Holocaust
than the Times, and no American newspaper so influenced public discourse by its
failure to do so. The first reason makes the Times’ failure more puzzling, the second
more devastating,’’ charges Leff (9).
Buried by the Times opens with a cry for help couched between the normal
news of the day. Leff sets the scene: ‘‘On page four, amid 13 other stories, appeared
a five-paragraph item with a London dateline’’ (1). The first two paragraphs
described a House of Commons refugee decision; then appeared an appeal issued
by the Jewish National Committee in Poland: ‘‘May this, perhaps our last voice
from the abyss, reach the ears of the world’’ (1). Leff emphasizes the ironic placement
of this appeal and concludes,
The Times never treated the news of the Holocaust as important—or at least as
important as, say, informing motorists to visit the Office of Price Administration if they
did not have their automobile registration number and state written on their gasoline
ration coupons. A story about that possible bureaucratic snafu appeared on the front
page on March 2, 1944, the same day that the ‘‘last voice from the abyss’’ was relegated
to page four. (16)
In her examination of Times coverage (1939–1945) of Jewish persecution and
massacres, Leff systematically demonstrates how news stories about Jews were
consigned to the end of other news stories and concealed within paragraphs. Moreover,
news about Jews most often appeared inside the paper rather than on the front
page. Times articles often avoided identifying Jews as Jews, instead identifying
them as ‘‘refugees,’’ ‘‘prisoners,’’ ‘‘the living dead,’’ ‘‘political prisoners,’’ ‘‘civilians,’’
‘‘skeletons,’’ and ‘‘slaves.’’ When they were identified as Jews, their stories were
typically discussed along with those of other persecuted minorities. Leff writes that
‘‘the Times never acknowledged that the mass murder of Jews, because they were Jews,
was something its readers needed to know’’ (16; original emphasis). Leff also
examines the role that news editors played in making placement decisions, the
relationship between the government and the mass media in ‘‘making the news,’’ and
how journalists’ idiosyncrasies and relationships with one another affected coverage.
A more thorough treatment of the Times during the Holocaust does not exist,
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although a number of scholars have documented how the American press failed to
recognize and report on the Holocaust.1
Leff goes to great lengths to demonstrate how the news, published by a paper
known for its objectivity, was nevertheless influenced by the viewpoint of its owner,
Arthur Hays Sulzberger. She paints a portrait of a man obsessed by an anti-Zionist
position, anxious not to appear to give Jews special treatment, and concerned that
too much focus on Jews would fuel American anti-Semitism. Although he belonged
to four synagogues and personally helped several family members escape Nazi
persecution, Sulzberger viewed his personal life as entirely separate from his public
paper and, according to Leff, continually diminished the plight of the European Jews.
To Leff, Sulzberger and his paper are partly responsible for obscuring the truth of
the Holocaust from the American public: ‘‘Although there is no direct evidence to prove
it, it is likely that other newspapers did not highlight the Holocaust at least partly
because the New York Times did not’’ (12).
Leff’s meticulous analysis yields a stunning portrait of a paper consumed by
the events of World War II yet strikingly oblivious to the seriousness of the Jewish
crisis. ‘‘It was not a failure of information, but what historian Henry L. Feingold calls
‘a failure of mind’ that kept the story off the front pages,’’ she writes (119). Indeed, Leff
has an eye for irony, and she illuminates the many incongruities inherent in a Jewish-
owned newspaper that covered the Holocaust more than any other paper in the
country while at the same time failing to comprehend the reality of the ‘‘Final
Solution’’ or to draw attention to it.
Leff’s media analysis ultimately highlights what W. Lance Bennett has called
‘‘the news puzzle.’’ Paradoxically, the news provides an ‘‘instant historical record’’
but offers ‘‘a superficial distorted image of society.’’2 Leff masterfully demonstrates
how the Times isolated information about Jews, placed that information
in insignificant spots, and ‘‘did almost nothing to help the reader understand
its importance’’ (15). She examines more than 2,000 individual issues of the
Times published during World War II and draws from seventeen archives and
thirty-nine collections.
Unfortunately, Leff interviewed only two New York Times employees
and a handful of Sulzberger’s family members, former refugees whom he helped
bring to the United States during the war. Leff’s lack of contact with Times
staff renders her strong indictment of the paper’s coverage problematic, for she
does not merely document the coverage and leave it to the reader to draw
conclusions but consistently presents her own critique: ‘‘The Times had an obligation
to do more than be swept along with the tide. The journalist’s job was to
determine what the public needed to know’’ (16). Leff borders on disdain when
describing Sulzberger’s anti-Zionist position, and she characterizes him as
blindly driven by his ideologies: ‘‘By 1946, even the most staunch anti-Zionists
seemed to be changing their views’’ (325). Thus, Leff suggests that, since most
changed their views about the development of a Jewish state, Sulzberger’s
moral compass was somehow off. By the middle of the book a portrait emerges of
a powerful and influential man so insulated and driven by his ideologies that he had
lost any sense of justice or humanity.
Had members of the Times or Sulzberger’s family offered more direct insights
into the decision-making process, and had Leff then found these explanations
deficient, her critique would have been stronger. However, her persistent condemna-
tion falls flat because she does not give voice to anyone in a position to defend
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the choices of the Times editors, its journalists, or Sulzberger. One is driven to ask
if there could have been other reasons, aside from those that Leff deduces, for
Sulzberger’s and his newspaper’s inadequate coverage of the Holocaust. Perhaps not,
but the defense remains silent.
Leff’s meticulous documentation of Times coverage is what really makes Buried
by the Times an important contribution to genocide studies. Recent studies on media
and the Holocaust examine representation of the Holocaust in journalism;3 others
continue a tradition of examining war journalism during the Holocaust,4 but few
have conducted this kind of detailed content analysis of news coverage during
the Holocaust. Buried by the Times ultimately raises the question, What do our
most important news sources miss and neglect when they publish what Washington
Post editor Phil Graham called the ‘‘first rough draft of history’’5?
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